

AFGHANISTAN IN 2013

# A Survey of the Afghan People



The Asia Foundation

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#### **About The Asia Foundation**

The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing Asia. Informed by six decades of experience and deep local expertise, our programs address critical issues affecting Asia in the 21st century—governance and law, economic development, women's empowerment, environment, and regional cooperation. In addition, our Books for Asia and professional exchange programs are among the ways we encourage Asia's continued development as a peaceful, just, and thriving region of the world.

Headquartered in San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through a network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in Washington, DC. Working with public and private partners, the Foundation receives funding from a diverse group of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, foundations, corporations, and individuals. In 2012, we provided nearly \$100 million in direct program support and distributed textbooks and other educational materials valued at over \$30 million.

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## Preface

The Asia Foundation is pleased to present *Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People*.

This annual nationwide opinion survey, currently in its ninth year, is unique in Afghanistan due to its long duration and broad scope. It provides insights into Afghans' views on the most critical issues facing the country, including security, national reconciliation, the economy, development and essential services, the quality of governance and political participation, corruption, justice, gender equality, and access to information. Over the years the Foundation has maintained a core set of questions for longitudinal comparison, while including select new questions each year to solicit public opinion on additional topics of interest.

Expert survey teams were deployed in July 2013 to gather the opinions and perspectives of a nationally representative sample of 9,260 Afghan men and women. 962 male and female enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews across all 34 provinces of the country, often under challenging conditions. To meet more aggressive margins of error, this year's sample size represents nearly a 47% increase from previous years. ACSOR-Surveys, a respected Afghan market and opinion research firm, is the Foundation's longstanding in-country survey partner. This year, for the first time the Foundation contracted with the Kabul-based Sayara Media Group to conduct independent, third party monitoring for survey quality control.

In the spirit of continual improvement, the Foundation has made some important changes to the survey presentation this year. We have increased the analysis available in the survey book, highlighting in particular those findings that are the most interesting, surprising, and useful for policy, programming, and further research in Afghanistan. We also conducted extensive in-house statistical analysis to draw out significant differences in opinion based on respondents' region, ethnicity, income, gender, and other characteristics. The Foundation and its survey partners are committed to ensuring the survey's data validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and integrity; we have included a more comprehensive technical Appendix this year that describes the survey methodology in detail. As we did in 2012, we will make public the full 2013 survey dataset on the Foundation's interactive data visualization site, *Visualizing Afghanistan*.

This year's *Survey of the Afghan People* reflects some unease in the country as Afghans approach the 2014 election and transition, in which the Afghan government will assume full responsibility for security and development in the country as NATO-led forces draw down. Afghans continue to be worried about insecurity, corruption, and unemployment. Over the past year, there has been a sharp increase in fears about personal safety, and over half of the country expressed fear about voting in a national election. Public confidence in a wide range of public officials and institutions is at an eight-year low, and public satisfaction with the performance of all levels of subnational government has declined. Despite these significant concerns, the survey also reveals considerable public optimism in some areas. A majority of Afghans continue to report that the country is going in the right direction, and a sizeable and growing number give national government performance a positive assessment.

Afghans express high levels of satisfaction with several basic services in their community, including education and drinking water. There is widespread awareness of the government's reconciliation efforts, and most Afghans surveyed say these efforts can stabilize the country. A majority of Afghans report that they believe that elections in their country are generally free and fair, and that the upcoming election has potential to improve their lives.

Across the Asia-Pacific region, The Asia Foundation supports empirical research and surveys to help to inform public policy and development programs. The findings presented in *A Survey of the Afghan People* may have particularly high relevance in Afghanistan in 2014, as political parties and candidates shape their election platforms and voters consider their choices. Since our Kabul office re-opened in 2002, The Asia Foundation has assisted Afghan efforts to rebuild the country and accelerate development. We hope that the comprehensive findings will continue to help illuminate the complex environment in Afghanistan, and increase understanding and collaboration between the Afghan government, development partners, and local communities as they work together in the years ahead.

David D. Arnold  
President, The Asia Foundation  
November 2013

## Acknowledgements

The *Survey of the Afghan People* is a major undertaking of the Foundation each year, requiring contributions and cooperation of numerous Asia Foundation staff and the Foundation's partners. The survey report was produced under the overall guidance of Afghanistan Country Representative Mark Kryzer. Very special thanks are due to Survey and Research Director Keith Shawe. Survey Manager Shahim Kabuli and Deputy Survey Manager Shamim Sarabi played critical roles in the preparation and production of the survey. Zach Warren was instrumental in ensuring the quality of the survey. We also acknowledge the contributions of Deputy Country Representative Najla Ayubi, Women's Empowerment Program Director Palwasha Kakar, Senior Program Advisor Allen Choate, and Office of Country Representative Assistant Khatera Azizpour. Nancy Hopkins was indispensable as editor for the survey, and Asia Foundation staff in San Francisco and Washington, DC, provided key editorial input and technical support. ACSOR worked closely and productively with the Foundation in planning and conducting the survey fieldwork.

The Asia Foundation would like to thank the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Department for International Development (FCO/DFID), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for their support to this survey and also for facilitating Afghan capacity building in statistical research.



## 1 Executive Summary

*Afghanistan in 2013: A Survey of the Afghan People* is The Asia Foundation's ninth annual public opinion survey in Afghanistan. Not only does this survey document Afghans' assessment of the current situation in their country in critical areas of governance and development, it has also established a statistically valid, longitudinal barometer of how people perceive changes in their country over time.

Expert survey teams were deployed from July 17 and July 25, 2013 to gather the opinions and perspectives of a nationally representative sample of 9,260 Afghan men and women. 962 male and female enumerators conducted face-to-face interviews across all 34 provinces of the country, often under challenging conditions. Respondents were all 18 years of age or older, including 14% from urban households and 86% from rural households. The average interview length was 38 minutes, with a range of 20 to 80 minutes. To meet more aggressive margins of error, this year's sample size represents nearly a 47% increase from previous years.

Important advances were made in ensuring both the quality and accuracy of the data in 2013. The sampling error is a quality indicator that measures overall statistical confidence in the statements that can be made about the survey findings. For 2013 the sampling error for five key questions is +/- 1.10% at 95% confidence level. The design effect also is a quality indicator measuring the difference between the actual sampling error and the intended or theoretical sampling error if random sampling had been achieved. In 2013 the design effect for five key questions is less than 2.33 (+/- 0.04).

### 1.1 National mood

- **Direction of the country.** A majority of Afghans (57%) say their country is moving in the right direction. While this percentage has fluctuated since 2006, it has been increasing in recent years: from 46% in 2011 to 52% in 2012. Overall optimism this year is highest in the Central/Hazarajat, South West, and South East regions.
- **Reasons for optimism.** When asked why the country might be moving in the right direction, Afghans point to reconstruction (32%), good security (24%), an improved education system (13%), the opening of schools for girls (13%), and the active presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) (13%). Since 2006, good security and reconstruction have been consistently identified as the main reasons for optimism.
- **Reasons for pessimism.** The main reasons for pessimism about the direction of the country include insecurity (24%), corruption (23%), unemployment (20%), suicide attacks (11%), and the presence of the Taliban (9%). Although the proportion of Afghans who attribute their pessimism about the direction of the country to the issue of insecurity declined in 2012 and 2013, it has been the leading reason for pessimism every year since 2007. The proportion of Afghans citing corruption as a reason for pessimism rose significantly in 2013. The proportion of Afghans citing unemployment is at its highest point since 2006.

- **Afghanistan's biggest problems: national level.** Afghans identify insecurity (30%), corruption (26%), unemployment (25%), and the economy (10%) as the top four problems currently facing Afghanistan as a whole. While this list of issues has remained fairly constant over the years, the most notable rise this year is in the number of those interviewed citing suicide attacks as the biggest problem (9% in 2013 compared to 4-5% for 2009-2012 period).
- **Afghanistan's biggest problems: local level.** At the local level, people are concerned about the problems of unemployment (27%) and insecurity (14%) (both of which were among the top national-level problems), but also about critical service delivery issues, including the electricity supply (24%), roads (19%), the availability of drinking water (19%), healthcare (13%), and education (11%). While this list and ranking has not changed significantly over the last eight years, the most notable increase in 2013 is the problem of insecurity, which was 10% in 2012 and 14% in 2013. The longer trendline, however, does not reveal a major shift since 2007.
- **Biggest problems facing women.** When asked about the most pressing problems facing women today, Afghans consistently identify education and illiteracy (27%), a lack of job opportunities for women (12%), women's rights (10%), forced marriages and dowry payments (9%), and domestic violence (8%). While men and women reported many of these issues with equal frequency, women cited job opportunities with significantly higher frequency than men. Women's rights issues were cited as a concern with significantly higher frequency in rural areas than in urban areas. Pashtuns were significantly more likely to identify human rights as a concern than Afghans from other ethnic groups.

## 1.2 Security

- In 2013 a majority of Afghans (59%) report always, often, or sometimes fearing for their own safety or security or that of their family. While there was a significant drop in overall fear for safety in 2012 (to 48% from 56% in 2011) there was a sharp increase in fear for safety this year to 59%. People in the West region report feeling the most fear, and people in the Central/Hazarajat region the least fear.
- Around three quarters of Afghans say they would be afraid when encountering international forces (77%) and traveling from one part to another part of Afghanistan (75%). A clear majority would be afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration (68%) and vote in a national election (59%).
- Nineteen percent of those surveyed say they or a family member experienced violence or a criminal act in 2013. Among those, around half experienced crime and half experienced violence. Looking at incidents of crime and violence since 2007, the reported level of violence experienced is increasing, while the reported level of crime experienced is decreasing. By far, the most frequently experienced type of crime or violence in 2013 was a physical attack or beating (21%). Having some or a lot of fear for safety is significantly correlated with having experienced crime or violence.

- Only half (51%) of Afghans have some level of confidence that perpetrators of violence or crime will be punished; confidence has declined across all regions of the country. On a positive note, people's willingness to report incidents of crime or violence has increased significantly over the past year, from 52% in 2012 to 64% in 2013. Afghans who are confident that the guilty party would be punished are significantly more likely to have reported their incident of crime or violence. The institutions to which people most frequently reported crime or violence were the ANP and their local shura/jirga (informal justice system). Although overall only 2% of respondents reported incidents to the Taliban, in Zabul province 51% reported incidents of violence or crime to the Taliban.
- Over the last seven years, the level of confidence in both the ANA and the ANP has been relatively stable and high. In 2013, 88% of respondents say they are confident in the ANA, while 72% of respondents say they are confident in the ANP. Urban Afghans have higher levels of confidence in these institutions than rural Afghans, and Pashtuns have lower levels of confidence than other ethnic groups.
- Lower levels of confidence in the ANP (25-65%) are concentrated in the South West, South East, and Central/Kabul regions. The South West, North East, and North West regions contain several provinces that have the highest level of confidence in the ANA (90-98%).
- Since 2009, there has been decreasing support for armed opposition groups (AOGs). In 2013, only a third (35%) of respondents say they have a little or a lot of sympathy for the armed opposition. Pashtuns are significantly more likely to have some sympathy for AOGs than other ethnic groups; urban Afghans are significantly more likely to have no sympathy than rural Afghans, and women are significantly more likely to have no sympathy for AOGs than men. The provinces with the lowest percentage of Afghans reporting a lot of sympathy for AOGs are Badakshan and Panjshir (less than 1%), and the provinces with the highest percentage include Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Daikundi, Paktika, Logar, Wardak, and Laghman (20-44%). When asked why Afghans might disagree with the goals of the AOGs, the main reason cited reason is that they kill innocent civilians.
- There is a high level of public awareness (74%) of the government's attempts at reconciliation with AOGs, and a majority of Afghans (63%) say that these efforts can help stabilize the country. People more likely to agree that reconciliation efforts can lead to stability are largely concentrated in the provinces bordering Pakistan (70-88% in most of those provinces).

### 1.3 Economic growth and employment

- Most Afghans (76%) report that their household economic situation is better now than in the Taliban period.
- The most common employment sectors are agriculture (45%), skilled workers and artisans (10%), and informal sales and business (9%). On average, only 5% of women are employed, compared to 79% of men. The West region has the highest male employment rate, and the Central/Kabul region has the lowest. Only 17% of Afghans surveyed report having female members



of the household contributing to household income, with women from rural households significantly more likely to contribute to household income than women from urban households.

#### 1.4 Development and service delivery

- When asked to assess a range of local services, most Afghans say they are satisfied with the availability of drinking water (74%) and education for children (72%). Around half are satisfied with the availability of irrigation water (53%), clinics and hospitals (52%), and medicine (50%). Less than half are satisfied with the condition of roads (43%) and the supply of electricity (41%). Satisfaction with the supply of water for irrigation has risen over the last two years, and satisfaction with the electricity supply has been gradually rising since 2009.
- The three most recognized types of development projects involve reconstruction or opening of new schools, building of roads and bridges, and improving the drinking water supply.
- The top five most frequently mentioned donors are the United States (46%), Japan (24%), Germany (16%), India (16%), and China (7%). The United States has consistently been the most recognized donor since 2009.
- The two main fuel sources Afghans use for heating are firewood (26%) and animal dung (20%). The two main fuel sources for cooking are firewood (48%) and bottled gas (21%). The use of firewood for heating has declined since 2009, and the use of grass and other biomass for heating has increased during the same period.
- Nationally, the most common form of household water supply is a well, with 58% of urban respondents reporting that they use a well compared to 66% of rural respondents. More urban residents (38%) have piped water than rural residents (11%). Thirteen percent of Afghans say they have not had enough water over the past five years. More than 30% of people in 47 districts of 17 provinces say they have not had enough water.
- Among those Afghans who report using water for irrigation, 80% say that availability is good or very good. The main reason given for poor availability is decreased availability from natural springs.
- Sixty percent of respondents say they have had no education (76% of women and 44% of men). Lack of education is more common among rural respondents than urban respondents. Uzbek women were significantly less likely to have had formal education than other ethnic groups, closely followed by Pashtun women. Hazara women were significantly more likely to have had formal education at any level than women from any other ethnic group. Younger women are significantly more likely to be educated than older women.
- Among those with formal education, 25% had completed primary school, 20% completed secondary school, 36% completed high school, 12% completed grade 13 or 14, and 6% completed university or higher. Afghans with some level of education were significantly less likely to say that the country is moving in the right direction than Afghans with no education.

## 1.5 Governance

- Three quarters (75%) of respondents give national government performance a positive assessment. After a high of 80% of Afghans satisfied with national government performance in 2007 dropped to a low of 67% in 2008, Afghans' satisfaction with national government performance has been gradually rising over the past five years.
- Satisfaction with all levels of subnational government performance declined this year, with the most notable decrease in the level of satisfaction with provincial government performance (from 80% in 2011-2012 to a seven-year low of 68% in 2013). In 2013, 59% of urban Afghans say municipal authorities are doing a good job and 66% of rural Afghans say district authorities are doing a good job. Respondents from the North West region are consistently the most likely to report that their provincial and district-level governments are doing a good job.
- Afghans give a particularly negative assessment of their member of parliament's performance in two key areas: listening to their constituents and representing their needs, and delivering jobs and development.
- Around one quarter (27%) of Afghans have received help from their provincial governor in resolving a problem or issue affecting them in the past two years, with rural residents more likely to have obtained such help than urban residents. Similarly, around one quarter (24%) of Afghans have had contact with a provincial council member over the past two years regarding a personal or local problem; contact with provincial council members has been on an upward trend since 2006.
- Over half of respondents (58%) say they are aware of a community development council (CDC) in their area, and awareness has been rising since 2006. Awareness of CDCs is noticeably higher among men than women. Among those who are aware of their local CDC, 63% are satisfied with their performance; citizens from the Central/Hazarajat region report the highest level of satisfaction.
- When asked about the level of confidence they have in various public institutions, organizations, and officials, in virtually all cases Afghans' stated level of confidence in these various entities reached an eight-year low in 2013. The entities with the highest levels of public confidence are the Afghan Land Authority, electronic media, religious leaders, and community shuras/jirgas. Public confidence in parliament showed the sharpest decline in respondents' level of confidence: a 15% drop from 2012 to 2013.
- Afghans see corruption as a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government. Around half say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood (49%), daily life (56%), and local authorities (58%). Around two thirds (68%) say it is a major problem in their provincial government, and around three quarters (77%) say corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole. The perception that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole is at its highest point in 2013 since 2006. Nonetheless, around half (47%) of Afghans still say that district and provincial government is applying about the right level of effort to fight corruption.

- Afghans routinely experience corruption in a wide range of situations, including when in the district or municipality office, encountering the ANA and ANP, interacting with the judiciary/courts, dealing with the state electricity authority, seeking public healthcare services, when applying for jobs, when applying for school, and when receiving official documents.
- When asked about the availability of dispute resolution mechanisms and services in their area, 71% of Afghans say they are generally satisfied. In the past two years, 19% have taken a dispute to the Huquq (formal justice system dispute resolution service) or village jirga/shura (local informal justice system) and a high proportion report some level of satisfaction with the outcome. The main types of disputes involve land, family matters, commercial matters, and other property disputes.
- Overall, Afghans consider the local informal justice system (shuras/jirgas) to be more fair, trustworthy, effective, efficient, and in line with local norms and values than the formal state courts. For example, 67% say jirgas/shuras resolve cases in a timely and prompt fashion, while only 46% say the same of the state courts.

## 1.6 Political participation

- Around a quarter (23%) of Afghans report that it is safer today for people in their communities to express their opinions than it was a year ago, 17% say it is less safe, and 56% say that it is no different than a year ago.
- Those who say people in their area feel safer this year to express their opinions tend to attribute it to things like improvements in local security conditions and guaranteed free speech. Respondents who say it is less safe to express opinions this year cite things like poor security and the presence of the Taliban. A person who is afraid of foreign forces is significantly more likely to report having fear to express opinions. Afghans who fear for their personal safety or that of their family are significantly more likely to feel less safe to express their opinions.
- A high proportion of Afghans (68%) would be afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration. Women are significantly more likely to be afraid to participate in a demonstration than men; wealthier Afghans are more likely to be afraid to participate in peaceful demonstrations than those who earn less; and Pashtuns are more likely to report having a lot of fear than Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. The main reasons why respondents are likely to be afraid of participating in a peaceful demonstration are fear of foreign forces, fear of travel, and fear of the ANP and ANA.
- About three quarters of Afghans (76%) agree that it is acceptable to criticize the government in public. Agreement is highest in the Central/Kabul region and lowest in the West region, and higher in urban areas than rural areas.
- Around half (48%) of Afghans say they can have some level of influence over local government decisions. Pashtuns are significantly more likely than all other ethnic groups to say they have influence, Tajiks significantly less likely than Pashtuns, and men significantly more likely than women.

- There is majority support (58%) for the idea that religion and politics should mix, while just over a third (38%) say that politics and religion should not mix. The proportion of people who agree that politics and religion should be mixed has declined considerably since 2011 and 2012 (69-70%).
- When asked about elections in Afghanistan, a majority (61%) of Afghans surveyed say that in general they are free and fair. People are nonetheless concerned about things like corruption in counting the votes, vote buying, and security.
- Nearly three quarters (58%) of Afghans would have some level of fear to run for public office. Citizens from the North East and Central/Kabul (49%) regions would have significantly less fear compared to other regions. Women are more afraid of running for public office than men, but compared to 2012, both men and women would be significantly more afraid of running for public office in 2013. In fact, the level of fear to run for public office was significantly higher in 2013 than in all previous years.
- Around half (59%) of Afghans say they would experience some level of fear when voting in a national or provincial election. The trend for this question peaked in 2010 after the national elections, but overall it appears to be on an upward trajectory. Pashtuns are significantly more afraid of voting in a national or provincial election than other ethnic groups in 2013. Afghans in the Central/Kabul and West regions express significantly more fear of voting this year compared to 2012.
- Most Afghans (81%) agree that each person should vote for himself/herself, regardless of what the community thinks, but only half (53%) say women should decide who to vote for on their own. Forty-six percent say men should be involved in women's voting decision in some way. Women and urban residents are significantly more likely to say that women should decide on their own.
- For obtaining election information, Afghans by far and most frequently rely on relatives and family members as their main source, but also on (in descending order) weekly community shuras, mosques, and twice-weekly village markets and bazaars.
- Most Afghans (81%) say that election day security conditions are a factor in their decision to travel to polling stations to vote. Around half (56%) say that the outcome of the 2014 election will make a positive difference in their lives. One quarter (24%) say it will make no difference, and only a small number (15%) anticipate that it will make their lives worse.

## 1.7 Access to information

- Most Afghans (80%) use radio to obtain information. Around half use mobile phones (57%) and television (54%). Very few use the internet (3%), a computer (2%), and a fixed line phone (less than 1%).
- Rural Afghans are significantly more likely to use radio, and urban Afghans significantly more likely to use television and mobile phones. More women than men report using a television for obtaining information. Four times as many men as women use a computer and the internet.
- In terms of social sources of information, the most common means of obtaining information is by far through family and friends, then mosques, community shuras/jirgas, and bazaars. Women are significantly more likely than men to rely on friends and family, and significantly less likely than men to obtain information at the mosque.

## 1.8 Women in society

- Nearly all Afghans (90%) agree with the idea that everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender. Women and urban residents express stronger support than men and rural Afghans.
- A majority (62%) of Afghans disagree with the traditional practices of baad (a traditional practice of giving a daughter to another party as a penalty or payment for some offense) and badal (an exchange of daughters between families for marriage). When asked whether a girl's guardian should wait until she is of adult age and should always consult her first before arranging her marriage, three quarters (74%) of Afghans agree. There were only slight differences between men's views and women's views on these issues.
- A majority of respondents agree that a widow should be entitled to a portion of mahr (mahr is a provision of Shariah law that obligates a husband at the time of marriage to give a gift of money, possessions, or land to his wife, the aim being to provide her some financial security; the wife may take the gift at the time of marriage or defer, receiving all or part of the gift at a later date). Twenty-six percent of respondents disagree, with men disagreeing at a higher rate than women.
- Less than a quarter (21%) of women say that they know where women can take their problems to be resolved. The Directorate of Women's Affairs, the Human Rights Council, and the district government office are the most commonly-cited institutions.
- Around half of Afghans (54%) say state courts treat women and men equally. Sixty-eight percent say there should be special local jirgas and shuras for women only.
- Afghans' support for equal representation of men and women in elected government positions is at 44% in 2013. Over time there has been a slight but noticeable decline in support for equality in leadership positions, down from a high of 50-51% in the 2006-2008 period.
- The vast majority of respondents (83%) agree that men and women should have equal oppor-

tunities in education. Although there has been a steady decrease in the level of strong support for gender equality in education between 2006 (58%) and 2013 (43%), the overall level of support (i.e., including those who either strongly or somewhat agree with equal opportunities) has stayed high and constant. Women were significantly more likely to support equal opportunities in education than men, as were urban respondents.

- A majority (63%) of Afghans agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home; this has been the case since 2006. Women and urban Afghans are significantly more likely to agree. Regionally, the highest level of support for women working outside of the home was in Central/Hazarajat and the lowest was in the South West. Nearly all Afghans who support the idea of women working outside the home support equal opportunities in education for men and women.

## 1.9 Enhancements in methodology

- Over the last nine years, the *Survey of the Afghan People* has assessed the perceptions of Afghan citizens across all 34 provinces. As in previous years, survey fieldwork was conducted by ACSOR-Surveys for The Asia Foundation in Afghanistan. This year, the Foundation conducted additional in-house quality control and for the first time, independent, third-party monitoring conducted by Sayara Media Group.
- In the spirit of continual improvement, The Asia Foundation has made some important changes to the survey presentation this year. As in previous years, technical improvements have been made to the sample size, sampling plan, sampling method, and survey questionnaire. Please see Appendix 2: Methodology for further detail.
- In 2013 the sample size was increased to 9,260 respondents (from 6,290 in 2012). This increase in sample size by 47% from previous years meets more aggressive margins of error. Respondents were selected using stratified finite sampling techniques, with a minimum target set of 192 respondents per province (last year, the minimum set was 100 respondents per province).
- A number of changes were made to the survey questionnaire based on a statistical analysis of the results for 2012. As a result of this analysis, the wording of select questions was changed to ensure that they measure the intended concept more clearly. A total of 32 questions were deleted from the 2012 questionnaire, while 38 questions were added. For example, four new questions were added to improve the information available on voting behavior and decisions, and new questions were added on water (five new questions) and land issues (four new questions), as these topics are at the root of many local conflicts in Afghanistan.
- Additional advances were made in quality control, and will continue to improve in the 2014 survey. The 2013 survey includes three new substantive checks for quality control: (a) nonresponse analysis (Don't Know and Refused responses) over time by province, district, enumerator, gender, ethnicity, and number of observers present for the interview; (b) logic tests to check for bias, as well as question reliability and validity; and (c) scales for increased reliability and validity, including cross-analysis against key trend questions.

- As in 2012, deteriorating security was a challenge for accessing sampling points in 2013. While sampling points are randomly identified, opinions on key trends may differ significantly between safe and unsafe districts. In an effort this year to reduce the negative impact of sampling replacements on representativeness, this year's survey included 840 "intercept" interviews, a technique where respondents from insecure districts are intercepted while shopping or traveling in more secure ones, in addition to 2,079 respondents from "man-only" districts, where female enumerators cannot travel due to security concerns.
- As a result of efforts to survey insecure areas, this year reflects an oversampling of men (64%) compared to women (34%), as well as an oversampling of rural areas compared to urban areas. However, due to the increase in sample size, the total number of women surveyed this year is more than most previous years.
- Eleven provinces were over-sampled, with the minimum sample size set to 402 respondents to reduce sampling error and allow for a statistically reliable provincial-level comparative analysis. To avoid the problem of having to replace sampling points due to inaccessibility as a result of insecurity or other reasons, a larger number of sampling points than necessary (about 30%) were selected; this way, any substitutions made would have already been randomly chosen, and so sampling point substitution had no impact on the randomness of the overall sample.
- The main findings are presented in the report using geographical and demographic criteria to examine and then describe any statistically significant differences in perceptions of survey respondents. The main statistical tests used to describe any differences reported were Chi-Square tests, correlations, and regression analyses.
- The goal when presenting the findings has been to provide sufficient context and detail for readers to draw their own conclusions. As in previous years, however, interpretation of the results has been kept to a minimum.

## 2 National Mood

Afghanistan faces a number of pressing and interconnected problems at the national level. Three fundamental challenges facing the country are insecurity, the state of the economy, and the lack of good governance.

Afghan civilian casualties have increased sharply this year as armed opposition groups have stepped up their attacks. With the peace talks yet to produce any significant results and international forces scheduled to end their combat mission in Afghanistan next year, insecurity is likely to be one of the biggest national concerns in 2014.

One of the biggest but still poorly understood and planned changes in 2013 has been the security and economic impact of the withdrawal of many Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Up to this point in time, the PRTs have played an important role at the provincial and district level by enabling service delivery, circulating cash into the local economy, creating jobs, developing infrastructure, and maintaining some level of security. Government capacity to fill the gap is weak, leaving a funding and security vacuum. In July 2012, a meeting between the government of Afghanistan and its donors in Tokyo gave assurances for continued aid for a “decade of transformation,” but the resulting Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF) placed strict conditions on further support.

Corruption, from petty bribery to grand corruption, is another pressing problem at the national level. Afghanistan ranks third from last in a recent comparative analysis of citizen perceptions of corruption in 176 countries,<sup>1</sup> with the annual cost of corruption estimated at around USD \$3.9 billion. In the past year the local media has made efforts to expose the extent and nature of corruption in the country. To date, the government’s efforts in fighting the problem have not produced the desired positive results. Corruption at all levels of society continues to affect most Afghan citizens.

In general, apart from the slow lead up to the presidential and provincial council elections that are scheduled to take place in April 2014, the context for most of the significant events in 2013 has been characterized by uncertainty. This is largely due to the current social, political, and security transition, as well as the gradual transition from “off budget” development assistance to channeling of donor funds directly through the government budget. In this environment, the reaction of officials and institutions at both the central and local levels has been one of hedging against uncertainties related to the upcoming elections and the post-2014 context.

### 2.1 Direction of the country

#### Key Questions:

**Q-3:** Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

**Q-1a/b:** Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?


1 Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012. [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org).



**Q-2a/b:** Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Overall, 57% of respondents surveyed in 2013 say that the country is moving in the right direction, and 38% say that it is moving in the wrong direction. As shown in Fig. 2.1 below, the percentage of respondents who say that the country is going in the right direction has fluctuated since 2006, but has remained fairly high.

**Fig. 2.1: Q-3.** Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? || 2006-2013




The key changes in the direction of this trend that occurred in 2008, 2010, and 2011 are likely linked to key events in those years. The downturn in optimism in 2008 may have been due to the surge in violence that year, and also to the nature of that violence. In 2008, the Taliban shifted its tactics from assaults and combat to more suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which created more civilian casualties and raised anxieties about safety among the population. In 2010, the rise in optimism may be linked to the shift in U.S. and NATO strategy. The number of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops peaked that year at 150,000. ISAF/NATO shifted its strategy from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgency, which emphasizes protecting the civilian population and reducing public support for insurgents through more development assistance. In 2011, the downward shift in mood could be connected to declining prospects for reconciliation talks with the Taliban. The head of the High Peace Council and former president of Afghanistan, Burhannudin Rabbani, was assassinated in September 2011, and President Karzai's relationship with the U.S. government came under increasing strain, especially as talks on the Bilateral Strategic Agreement stalled. It is also interesting to note that 2008 and 2011 were the worst drought years in the last decade, which may have been a contributing factor to a decreased sense of optimism in the country.

It is important to note that in 2013 this question did not allow respondents the option of saying “some in right direction, and some in wrong direction,” as was the case in previous years. For 2013, the option was to list “don’t know.” This may have affected the percentages for both “right direction” and “wrong direction” somewhat this year.

According to the provincial data (see Fig. 2.2 below), Nooristan, Panjshir, and Zabul provinces have the lowest percentages of respondents who say the country is headed in the right direction. In those provinces, only 28% to 40% of those interviewed gave positive responses. In the provinces of Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak, and Logar, 40% to 50% of the respondents say Afghanistan is going in the right direction. More than 60% of the respondents say that Afghanistan is going in the right direction in Badakhshan, Takhar, Balkh, Samangan, and Jawzjan. National mood is similarly high in Daikundi, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Kunar, and Laghnam. Overall optimism this year is highest in the Central/Hazarajat, South West, and South East regions.


**Fig. 2.2: Q-3.** Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction? || Provincial breakdown



When looking at the different responses to the question on why the country might be moving in the right direction, the top five issues were (see Fig. 2.3 below):

- Reconstruction (32%);
- Good security (24%);
- Improved education system (13%);
- Opening of schools for girls (13%); and
- Presence of the Afghan National Army (ANA)/Afghan National Police (ANP) (13%).

**Fig 2.3: Q-1a/b.** *Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (a and b responses combined)*



It is interesting to note that urban respondents (37%) rank reconstruction higher than rural respondents (30%), which is consistent with previous years. Similarly, rural respondents are more likely than urban respondents to cite the existence of a functional ANA/ANP as a reason for thinking that the country is moving in the right direction.

Since 2006, good security and reconstruction/rebuilding have been consistently identified as the main reasons why Afghans say that their country is moving in the right direction (see Fig. 2.4 below).

**Fig. 2.4: Q-1a/b.** *Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (a and b responses combined) | | 2006-2013*

### REASONS: RIGHT DIRECTION


	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Good security	31	34	39	44	38	39	41	24
Reconstruction/rebuilding	21	39	32	36	35	40	35	32
Schools for girls have opened	16	19	19	21	15	10	14	13
Improvement in education system	-	-	-	-	10	16	13	13
Economic revival	7	9	5	6	10	8	8	6
Having active ANA and ANP	-	7	7	7	6	11	13	13
Peace/end of the war	29	16	21	9	12	7	7	7
Good government	9	9	9	12	10	9	5	5
Democracy/elections	10	9	7	1	7	3	4	6

There is considerable regional variation in the reasons given for why the country is moving in the right direction. For example, reconstruction/rebuilding as a reason for optimism accounts for 33% in the Central/Kabul region, 26% in the East, 27% in the South East, 26% in the South West, 34% in the West, 27% in Central/Hazarajat, and 37% in the North West. Improved security as a reason for optimism was most commonly mentioned in the North East (33%) region, followed by the Central/Hazarajat (32%) region. Respondents in the South East mentioned improved security at a lower rate (15%) than respondents in other provinces.

When looking at the different reasons given for why the country might be moving in the wrong direction, the top five issues were (see Fig. 2.5 below):

- Insecurity (24%);
- Corruption (23%);
- Unemployment (20%);
- Suicide attacks (11%); and
- The presence of the Taliban (9%).

**Fig 2.5: Q-2a/b.** Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (a and b responses combined)



Of those respondents who said that the country is going in the wrong direction, insecurity is still the top reason given (Fig. 2.5). However, citing insecurity as a reason for the country moving in the wrong direction has declined by half since 2007.

Although the proportion of Afghans who attribute their pessimism about the direction of the country to the issue of insecurity declined in 2013, it has been the leading reason for pessimism every year since 2007. It dropped to 39% in 2012 (down from 45% in 2011) and dropped further down to 24% in 2013 (see Fig. 2.6 below).

**Fig 2.6: Q-2a/b.** Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (a and b responses combined) || Insecurity



Looking at longitudinal trends (see Fig. 2.7 below) beyond the issue of insecurity, the proportion of respondents citing unemployment as a reason for pessimism increased from 13% in 2011 to 20%

in 2013. Unemployment as a reason is at its highest point in 2013 (20%) since 2006. The proportion of respondents citing general corruption has risen significantly in 2013, up to 23% from 14% in the previous year.

**Fig. 2.7: Q-2a/b.** *Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction? (a and b responses combined) || 2006-2013*

REASONS: WRONG DIRECTION								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Insecurity	6	48	50	42	44	45	39	24
Unemployment	21	15	15	15	16	13	18	20
Corruption	-	13	19	17	27	16	14	23
Suicide attacks	-	-	-	6	8	11	11	11
Presence of Taliban	-	9	8	7	6	7	6	9
Bad government	22	15	12	25	18	15	11	6
Bad economy	27	12	17	11	8	10	10	8
Administrative corruption	2	15	9	10	-	4	10	6
No reconstruction	22	8	7	6	4	4	6	4

There are significant differences between provinces in respondents' perceptions on why the country is moving in the right direction or wrong direction. In Helmand, for example, 84% of respondents say that the country is moving in the right direction, compared to just 32% in Nooristan. In Helmand, the data shows that the high percentage of respondents who think the country is moving in the right direction reflects their level of satisfaction with reconstruction projects and the existence of a functioning ANA/ANP. By contrast, in Nooristan, respondents reported two main reasons for why the country may be moving in the wrong direction: insecurity (17%) and corruption (14%).

A statistical analysis of factors that may explain why respondents might say that Afghanistan is moving in the right direction<sup>2</sup> shows that the following factors each have a significant effect.

- An increase in the level of confidence in government institutions significantly increases the likelihood of a "right direction" response.
- As a respondent's level of support for women's rights increases,<sup>3</sup> the likelihood that the respondent will say that the country is moving in the right direction also increases.

<sup>2</sup> A stepwise regression analysis was carried out to test the relative importance of gender (d1), age (d2), education (d5), ethnicity (d14), income (d18a), province (m7), and perceived personal safety (q18) as factors that explain whether or not respondents say Afghanistan is moving in the right direction.

<sup>3</sup> A scale was created for women's rights using three variables: Everybody should have equal rights (q66a\_R):  $\chi^2(1)=26.09$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Women should be allowed to work outside the home (q82):  $\chi^2(1)=59.25$ ,  $p < .001$ ; Women should decide for themselves on who to vote for (q84\_R):  $\chi^2(1)=46.70$ ,  $p < .001$ .

- The more literate the respondent, the more likely they are to say that the country is moving in the right direction.<sup>4</sup>
- Being single rather than married significantly decreases the likelihood of a “right direction” response.
- An increase in the extent of a respondent’s use of different forms of communication technology (e.g., radio, TV, mobile phone) increases the likelihood of a right direction response.

The number of people witnessing the interview was not statistically correlated with the likelihood of a “right direction” response.

## 2.2 Afghanistan’s biggest problems: national level


### Key Question:

Q-4: In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole?

When respondents were asked what the biggest problems facing the country are at the national level, the top four issues were (see Fig. 2.8 below):

- Insecurity (30%);
- Corruption (26%);
- Unemployment (25%); and
- Poor economy (10%).

**Fig 2.8: Q-4a/b.** *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (a and b responses combined)*



Looking at longitudinal trends (see Fig. 2.9 below) the percentage of respondents citing insecurity (30%) shows a slight increase in 2013 compared to the 2012 figure of 28%. Perceptions of unemployment as a major problem facing Afghanistan declined slightly from 27% in 2012 to 25% in 2013. The most notable rise is in the number of those interviewed citing suicide attacks as the biggest problem (9% in 2013 compared to 4%-5% for 2009-2012 period).

<sup>4</sup> Literacy:  $\chi^2(2)=14.68$ ,  $p=.001$ . Note that differences in the level of education were also significant [Pearson  $\chi^2(2)=12.86$ ,  $p=.002$ ].

**Fig 2.9: Q-4a/b.** *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (a and b responses combined) || 2006-2013*

### BIGGEST PROBLEM: NATIONAL

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Insecurity	27	46	36	36	37	38	28	30
Unemployment	32	27	31	35	28	23	27	25
Corruption	19	16	14	17	27	21	25	26
Poor economy	24	19	17	20	11	10	11	10
Education	10	11	9	11	11	10	10	9
Poverty	13	5	8	11	10	12	9	9
Suicide attacks	-	-	-	4	5	4	5	9
Presence of Taliban	6	13	13	8	8	4	8	7

Regionally, between 37%-38% of respondents in the Central/Kabul, the South East, and the Central/Hazarajat regions cited insecurity as the biggest problem facing Afghanistan today. Thirty-seven percent of Central/Kabul region respondents identified unemployment as the biggest national problem. This is significantly higher than anywhere else in the country. The North West region recorded the next highest percentage (29%).

## 2.3 Afghanistan's biggest problems: local level

### Key Question:


Q-5: What are the biggest problems in your local area?

When respondents were asked what the biggest problems facing the country are at the local level, the top seven issues were (see Fig. 2.10 below):

- Unemployment (27%);
- Electricity supply (24%);
- Roads (19%);
- Availability of drinking water (19%);
- Insecurity (14%);
- Healthcare (13%); and
- Education (11%).



Fig. 2.10: Q-5a/b. *What is the biggest problem in your local area? (a and b responses combined)*



At the local level, the list and hierarchy of problems cited has not changed significantly over the last eight years (see Fig. 2.11 below). The mention of unemployment as a pressing local problem decreased slightly from 29% in 2012 and 27% in 2013. The most notable increase compared to the previous year is the problem of insecurity, which was 10% in 2012 and 14% in 2013. The longer trendline on insecurity, however, does not reveal a major shift since 2007.

Fig. 2.11: Q-5a/b. *What is the biggest problem in your local area? (a and b responses combined)* || 2006-2013

#### BIGGEST PROBLEM: LOCAL

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Unemployment	34	26	28	26	26	28	29	27
Electricity	25	27	30	26	28	23	25	24
Roads	14	19	18	24	24	15	20	19
Drinking water	18	21	22	22	22	20	18	19
Education/schools/literacy	14	21	14	15	16	14	15	11
Healthcare/clinics/hospitals	15	17	15	20	17	12	12	13
Insecurity	8	15	14	13	13	14	10	14

The biggest local problems identified by respondents vary by region. Lack of employment opportunities was cited most frequently in the East (33%) region, while lack of electricity was most frequently cited as the most important local problem in the North East and North West (35%). Drinking water is most often cited in the North West (34%) region as the biggest local problem.

While overall, 19% of respondents cite roads as the biggest local problem, around one quarter of respondents in the Central/Kabul (26%), North East (26%), and North West (23%) regions identify roads; in fact, roads rank as the most frequently cited local problem in the Central/Kabul region.

## 2.4 Biggest problems facing women


### Key Question:

Q-78. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today?

When asked about the biggest problems facing women in Afghanistan, respondents referenced the following top five issues (see Fig. 2.12 below):

- Education/illiteracy (27%);
- Lack of job opportunities for women (12%);
- Lack of women's rights (10%);
- Forced marriages/dowry payments (9%); and
- Domestic violence (8%).

Fig. 2.12: Q-78ab. *What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today?*



Across the country, illiteracy and the lack of education is identified as the biggest problem facing women in all regions, with the highest proportions recorded in the Central/Hazarajat (30%), North West (27%), and Central/Kabul and East regions (both 24%). Issues of illiteracy and education were mentioned least frequently in the South West (17%) region.


The lack of job opportunities for women was particularly prominent in the North West (23%) and North East (21%), followed by the Central/Kabul (15%), Central/Hazarajat (14%), and West (11%) regions.

Lack of rights for women is a main concern of South West (15%), East, and West region respondents (both 13%), but in the Central/Kabul region only 5% of respondents say that lack of rights is a problem facing women. Domestic violence was most commonly identified by respondents in the South West (14%), South East (12%), and West (10%) regions. Interestingly, in Central/Hazarajat very few respondents (3%) mentioned domestic violence.

Female and male respondents agree that education/illiteracy and lack of rights are among the most significant problems facing women. However, a lack of job opportunities for women was more likely<sup>5</sup> to be cited by women (18%) than men (13%), and domestic violence was a more important issue for female respondents (11%) than male respondents (8%). Interestingly, forced marriages/dowries were cited by both men (10%) and women (8%) as a pressing problem.

There are significant regional and ethnic differences in the extent to which respondents say forced marriages and the payment of dowries are a problem. The region that was most likely to report that forced marriages and dowries are a problem was the South East (18%),<sup>6</sup> and the two regions that were least likely to report these issues as problems were the North West (3%) and Central/Hazarajat (3%) regions. Similarly, in comparison with the three other largest ethnic groups in Afghanistan (Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek), Pashtun respondents were more than twice as likely to cite forced marriages and dowry payments as problems than respondents from other ethnic groups (see Fig. 2.13 below).

**Fig. 2.13: Q-78a/b.** *What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today?* || Forced marriages/dowry responses by ethnic group



5  $\text{Chi}^2(1, 8840) = 58.19 \text{ Pr} < 0.001$

6  $\text{Chi}^2(1, 8840) = 91.71 \text{ Pr} < 0.001$

Women's human rights issues were mentioned as a concern with significantly<sup>7</sup> higher frequency in rural areas (32%) than in urban areas (22%). Pashtuns ranked women's human rights issues (32%) as a concern at a significantly<sup>8</sup> higher frequency than all other ethnic groups.

Viewed longitudinally (see Fig. 2.14 below), there is not a noticeable change in the percentages and rankings of these issues, suggesting that the numerous initiatives to improve the rights and roles of women have not yet made major headway.

**Fig. 2.14: Q-78ab.** *What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today?*

#### BIGGEST PROBLEMS FACING WOMEN

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Education/illiteracy	24	29	28	30	31	25	29	27
Lack of rights/women's rights	18	13	13	11	7	15	10	10
Lack of job opportunities for women	0	9	11	13	15	2	14	12
Domestic violence	5	7	6	5	7	9	8	8
Forced marriages/dowry	7	7	5	4	5	8	6	9
General healthcare	9	5	5	6	3	8	5	4
Poverty	2	5	6	5	2	8	4	3
Can't leave home	9	5	5	4	3	6	2	1
Under control of men/men have power	9	3	1	1	2	6	2	2
Pregnancy-related healthcare	10	4	2	5	5	5	2	3
Don't know	1	3	11	2	13	1	3	4

7 Chi<sup>2</sup> (1) 54.19 p < 0.001

8 Chi<sup>2</sup> (1) 342.26, p < 0.001



### 3 Security

With the transition formally slated for 2014, responsibility for security and counter-terrorism has now passed to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF),<sup>9</sup> even in the country's most insecure provinces. Following the creation of the Special Forces within the Afghan National Police (ANP) and their nationwide deployment to handle insurgent activities, the media coverage of some of their operations appears to have positively influenced public perceptions of the ANSF. In addition to the increasing presence and professionalism of the ANSF, in rural areas that are contested by illegal armed groups there is a growing reliance on semi-formal law enforcement and security structures such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP), and in some places, *arbakai* (tribal militias).

Despite these significant developments, the rate of crime in the country remains high, possibly fueled by insufficient numbers of criminal investigative police.<sup>10</sup> In the large urban centers such as Kabul, many trained security staff were left without work due to the dismantling of private security firms. This has inhibited government efforts to control crime. Armed robbery and kidnappings have received increasing national media coverage, which has led to large-scale protests against such kidnappings of traders and businessmen. In some areas, the establishment of the ALP and *arbakai* may be undermining local government and may have even led to an increase in criminal activities.

In addition to the general increase in crime across the country, the incidence of violence has also increased. The number of civilian casualties in the first six months of this year has increased by 23%<sup>11</sup> compared to the same period in 2012, as armed opposition groups have stepped up their attacks. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is generally acknowledged to be doing a good job, even though they, too, are currently suffering a significant number of casualties.<sup>12</sup>

After 2015, responsibility for the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan, which is currently being led by the High Peace Council, will be transferred to line ministries. While clear progress has been made, several factors suggest that advancements will be slow during the transition, including the timeframe required for long-term shifts in thinking among the main actors, the likely influence of the planned elections in 2014, and the need to develop a clear strategy for the post-2015 peace process. The main challenges ahead are likely to be the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the process. Perhaps the weakest part of the process to date has been the lack of mechanisms for linking local communities with the political process. Local conflict resolution mechanisms will be a necessary component of the post-2015 strategy to ensure that the peace and reconciliation process is effective.

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9 ANSF is a blanket term that includes the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and the National Directorate of Security.

10 Ministry of Interior of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Annual Report 1392: (ratio of one criminal investigative policeman to 5,267 citizens).

11 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2013). Mid-year Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. p1. Kabul, Afghanistan: July 2013.

12 Informal estimate provided by Wall Street Journal staff based on information gathered during field missions: The Afghan Army and Police are sustaining about 400 casualties a week since taking over the lead for security operations from ISAF this year.

### 3.1 Crime and violence

#### Key Questions:

**Q-18:** How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?

**Q-19:** Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year?

**Q-20:** What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?

**Q-21:** Still thinking about any violent or criminal act you or your family may have experienced in the past year, was it reported to anybody outside your family or not?

**Q-22:** Who did you report the crime to?

**Q-23:** If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the guilty party would be punished?

**Q-24:** In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan?

**Q-30:** Would you participate in the following activities with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?:  
 a) When participating in resolving problems in your community; b) Voting in a national/provincial election; c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration, d) To run for public office; e) When encountering ANP; f) When encountering ANA; g) When traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country; h) When encountering international forces.

Overall, 59% of respondents in 2013 report always, often, or sometimes fearing for their own safety or security, or for that of their families. The trend line on fear for safety (see Fig. 3.1 below) shows that there was a significant drop in 2012. From 2011 to 2012, there was a decrease in the number of attacks by militant/insurgent groups and the foreign forces reported by respondents. The trend then increases from 2012 to 2013. This cannot be explained directly by the survey data, but it is interesting when considered in the context of the above-mentioned recent increase in civilian injuries and casualties in the first half of 2013, owing mainly to the increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by insurgents.<sup>13</sup>

13 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2013). Mid-year Report: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. p1. Kabul, Afghanistan: July 2013.

**Fig. 3.1: Q-18.** *How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? | 2006-2013*



Overall, respondents from the West region (81%) report feeling the most fear in general, and respondents from the Central/Hazarajat report feeling the least fear (35%). Pashtuns (66%) report experiencing significantly<sup>14</sup> more fear compared to all other ethnic groups.

Looking at the main responses to the questions about level of fear to participate in various specific activities (see Fig. 3.2 below), nationally, 77% of respondents report experiencing fear when encountering international forces, 68% report they would feel fear participating in a demonstration, 75% of respondents report they would feel fear when traveling from one part to another part of Afghanistan, and 59% of respondents say they would feel fear when voting in a national election.

**Fig. 3.2: Q-30a/h.** *Would you participate in the following activities with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?*

#### LEVEL OF FEAR: PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES

	No fear	Some fear	A lot of fear	Don't know
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
When participating in resolving problems in your community	57	34	8	1
Voting in a national/provincial election	41	40	19	1
Participating in a peaceful demonstration	28	40	28	3
To run for public office	37	39	19	4
When encountering ANP	46	37	15	2
When encountering ANA	49	34	15	2
When traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	24	46	29	1
When encountering international forces	20	43	34	2

<sup>14</sup> Pearsons Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,233) = 65.2619, p < 0.000




In general, the trend on fear when voting in a national election has been increasing since 2006. The current high level of fear respondents say they would feel when voting in a national election is likely to be of concern to those planning the 2014 elections. It is also important to note that Pashtuns say they would experience significantly<sup>15</sup> more fear (67%) when voting compared to other ethnic groups.

Looking at respondents' experience with crime or violence, overall, 19% of Afghans surveyed say they have suffered from either violence or a criminal act in 2013, compared to 16% in 2012. Ten percent of urban respondents have experienced crime or violence, and 22% of rural respondents. Sixteen percent of women report having experienced crime or violence, and 21% of men; men were significantly more likely than women<sup>16</sup> to report that they or a member of their family had suffered from violence or crime. Among different ethnic groups, 26% of Pashtuns, 15% of Tajiks, and 12% of Hazaras surveyed report having experienced violence or crime. Pashtuns were significantly<sup>17</sup> more likely than any other ethnic group to say they had experienced violence or crime.

After combining the different categories of responses given into two broader categories (crime; violence),<sup>18</sup> the data show that among those who experienced violence or crime, 51% of respondents report having experienced crime and 49% report having experienced violence in 2013 (see Fig. 3.3 below). The analysis also shows that having some or a lot of fear for safety is significantly correlated<sup>19</sup> with respondents or their families having also experienced violence or crime.<sup>20</sup>

**Fig. 3.3: Q-19.** *Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year? || 2007-2013*



15 Pearson's Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n = 9,177) = 325.78, p < 0.000

16 Pearson's Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,249) = 45.26, p < 0.000

17 Pearson's Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n = 241.7806, p < 0.000

18 In total, 15 different categories of responses were given to Q-22: for the purposes of analysis, these were placed into two broad categories: 8 response categories were placed under Crime, and 7 response categories were placed under Violence.

19  $r = -0.12$  p < 0.000


20 75% of those respondents who had experienced some violence or crime, also reported some or a lot of fear for their safety or the safety of their families.

Looking at incidents of crime and violence since 2007, the overall the level of violence reported being experienced has been increasing, while the level of crime reported being experienced has been decreasing.

Examining just the above trendline on violence (which is based on seven different types of violence, including physical attack or beating, suicide attacks, sexual violence, and actions by militants/insurgents, the police, the army, or foreign forces), the type of violence experienced by respondents has varied from year to year. The main type of violence reported in 2013 was physical attack or beating (21%). There had been a significant<sup>21</sup> increase from 2010 to 2011 in the number respondents who reported physical attacks, while from 2011 to 2012, there had been a significant decrease in reports of physical attacks.<sup>22</sup> From 2012 to 2013, there was a significant increase in the percentage of respondents reporting actions by militant/insurgents<sup>23</sup> and foreign forces.<sup>24</sup> At the same time there was a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents reporting physical attacks<sup>25</sup> and suicide attacks.<sup>26</sup>

Figure 3.4 below shows the different types of crime or violence respondents experienced in 2013. By far, the most frequently experienced type of crime or violence was physical attack or beating (21%). This was followed by racketeering or extortion (12%), theft of livestock (10%), and burglary or looting (10%).

**Fig. 3.4: Q-20.** *What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year?*



21 Pearsons  $\chi^2$  (1, n=2,416) = 24.34, p < 0.000

22 Pearsons  $\chi^2$  (1, n=2,311) = 17.78, p < 0.000

23 Pearsons  $\chi^2$  (1, n=2,930) = 11.0597, p < 0.001

24 Pearsons  $\chi^2$  (1, n=2,930) = 7.5722, p < 0.006

25 Pearsons  $\chi^2$  (1, n=2,930) = 23.3406, p < 0.000

26 Pearsons  $\chi^2$  (1, n=2,930) = 5.9360, p < 0.015

When asked about their level of confidence that perpetrators of violence or crime would be punished, 51% of respondents said that they would have some or a great deal of confidence. Respondents who say they are confident that the guilty party would be punished were significantly more likely to have reported the incident. However, the rate of reporting varies with the type of violence or crime. For example, those who had experienced a physical attack or beating were more likely<sup>27</sup> to report the incident than those who had experienced violence as a result of the actions of the foreign forces.<sup>28</sup>

Across all regions there has been a decrease in the level of confidence that authorities would punish perpetrators of violence or criminal acts (see Fig. 3.5 below). The steepest declines in confidence from 2012 to 2013 have been in the West (a decrease of 13%) and the North East (a decrease of 11%). Among the regions, people in the Central/Hazarajat region had the highest overall level of confidence (66%).

**Fig. 3.5: Q-23.** *If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the guilty party would be punished?* || Some or a great deal of confidence, 2010-2013 by region

#### LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE: 2010-2013 BY REGION

	2010	2011	2012	2013
Central/Kabul	56	49	51	44
East	58	66	61	56
South East	50	49	54	48
South West	49	61	63	62
West	55	58	58	45
North East	62	69	70	59
Central/ Hazarajat	53	63	67	66
North West	68	61	59	51

Respondents' willingness to report incidents of crime or violence has increased significantly over the past year, from 52% in 2012 to 64% in 2013.

While respondents in rural areas were more than twice as likely to say they had experienced violence or crime than respondents from urban areas, rural respondents were significantly less likely to report these incidents.<sup>29</sup> Respondents from the South East and South West regions were the most likely to say they had experienced violence or crime, but respondents in the North East (75%) and North West (80%) were the most likely to report such incidents. Respondents from the Central/Hazarajat region are the least likely to say they have experienced violence or crime, and are also the least likely to report such incidents (34%).


27 Pearsons Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=1,994) 38.09, p < 0.000

28 Pearsons Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=545) = 10.07, p < 0.002

29 Pearsons Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=1,907) = 6.27, p < 0.01

Among those respondents who reported violence or criminal acts, 26% took their problems to the ANP and 18% took their problems to the local shura or jirga (see Fig. 3.6 below). Interestingly, in 2013, 2% of respondents who reported these incidents reported them to the Taliban. Respondents in only nine provinces out of 34 reported such incidents to the Taliban, and most of these were from Zabul province, where 51% of respondents reported incidents of violence or crime to the Taliban.

**Fig. 3.6: Q-22. Who did you report the crime to?**



## 3.2 Perceptions of the Afghan National Security Forces

### Key Questions:

**Q-42:** Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people; b) ANA helps improve security. Would you say strongly or somewhat?

**Q-44:** Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people; b) ANP helps improve the security; c) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat?

**Q-46.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following [ANA and ANP] need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment?

Over the last seven years, the level of confidence in both the ANA and the ANP has been relatively stable and high. The level of confidence in the ANA and ANP reported here is based on the average number of respondents who either somewhat or strongly agreed with all of the statements listed in Fig. 3.7 below.

**Fig. 3.7: Q-42a/b & Q-44a/b/c.** *Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.*

#### CONFIDENCE IN ANA AND ANP

Q-42: Afghan National Army	Q-44: Afghan National Police
a) ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people	a) ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people
b) ANA helps improve the security	b) ANP helps improve the security
	c) ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes

In 2013, 88% of respondents say they are confident in the ANA, while 72% of respondents say they are confident in the ANP. Although overall, agreement was consistently high across all provinces, urban respondents (79%) are significantly<sup>30</sup> more likely to say they are confident in both the ANA and ANP (i.e., likely to somewhat or strongly agree with all five of the statements in Fig. 3.7 above) than rural respondents (65%). Among ethnic groups, Pashtuns are significantly<sup>31</sup> more likely to disagree with these statements than other ethnic groups, and regionally, respondents living in the South East region are the most likely<sup>32</sup> to disagree.

In 2013, confidence in the ANA is consistently higher across the country than it is for the ANP, except for in three provinces where the respondents have equal confidence in both institutions (Dai-kundi, Laghman, and Wardak). For those respondents who reported police actions, there is a significant<sup>33</sup> increase in confidence in the ANA compared to the ANP. These differences are most extreme for respondents in the following five provinces: Khost, Nooristan, Paktia, Panjshir, and Parwan.

Afghans' views on the ANP have not changed significantly since 2008 (see Fig. 3.8 below). The level of agreement with the statements about the ANP's role in improving security and the ANP's efficiency in arresting perpetrators of crime rose about 5% from 2012 to 2013.


30 Pearsons  $\chi^2(1, 9,260) = 99.55, p < 0.000$

31 Pearsons  $\chi^2(1, 9,257) = 16.4011, p < 0.000$

32 Pearsons  $\chi^2(1, 9,260) = 88.7585, p < 0.000$


33 Those who reported police action: [Mean = 0.56, SD = 0.93] compared to those who did not,  $t(n=1914) = 3.17, p < 0.000$ , one tail

**Fig 3.8: Q-44a/b/c.** Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANP helps improve the security; ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat? || 2008-2013




Looking at provincial-level data for these questions about the ANP (see Fig. 3.9 below), compared to other provinces, respondents in Kunduz and Jawzjan have the highest level of confidence in the ANP (90-94%). Respondents with lower levels of confidence in the ANP (25-65%) tend to be concentrated in the South West, South East, and Central/Kabul regions.

**Fig 3.9: Q-44a/b/c.** Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANP helps improve the security; ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat? || Provincial breakdown




Longitudinal data on perceptions of the ANA (see Fig. 3.10 below) shows that the percentage of those who regard the ANA as helping to improve security rose from 87% in 2012 to 91% in 2013. Overall, views on the ANA have not changed much since 2007.

**Fig 3.10: Q-42a/b.** Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANA helps improve the security. Would you say strongly or somewhat? | 2007-2013



At the provincial level, there is a wide variation among the respondents who have confidence in the ANA (see Fig. 3.11 below). Those interviewed in the provinces of Ghor, Wardak, and Zabul are the least confident in the ANA (38% to 65%). The South West, North East, and North West regions contain several provinces that have the highest level of confidence (90% to 98%).

**Fig 3.11: Q-42 a/b.** Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people; ANA helps improve the security. Would you say strongly or somewhat? | Provincial breakdown





To understand why the confidence levels for both the ANA and ANP have been consistently high since 2007, some consideration must be given to the responses provided by respondents to the following questions:

Q-1: Reasons for country moving in the right direction.

Q-22: Who did you report the crime to?

Q-23: If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the guilty party would be punished?

Q-26: How often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations?


Q-30: Fear when encountering the ANA/ANP.

Q-46: Do you think that the ANA/ANP need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment?

Thirteen percent of respondents give the existence of a functional ANA and ANP as a main reason for why the country is moving in the right direction. Overall, 26% of all respondents who reported incidents of violence or crime reported them to the ANP. Of those respondents who are confident in the ANP, 28% reported incidents of violence or crime to the ANP compared to 23% of those who are not confident in the ANP (i.e. those who did not agree with any of the statements in Fig. 2.7)

Those respondents who report being exposed to violence or crime were significantly<sup>34</sup> less likely to have confidence in the ANP. However, if they reported this incident to the ANP, they are 11% more likely to have confidence in the ANP than if they had reported the incident to another institution. The level of confidence that the ANP would arrest the guilty party has increased from 75% in 2012 to 80% in 2013. In total, there has been an increase of 10% since 2010 (see Fig. 3.12 below).

**Fig 3.12: Q-44c.** *ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes. Would you say strongly or somewhat?* | 2008-2013



<sup>34</sup> An OLS regression was conducted to determine the effect of exposure to violence and exposure to theft on the perceived effectiveness of the ANP, controlling for ethnicity and region. Violence significantly decreased perceptions of the effectiveness of the ANP (Beta=-0.024, Pr=004), as did exposure to theft with less magnitude (Beta=-0.021, p=.007). Effectiveness of the ANP was measured using a reliable 3-item scale. Overall, the model was significant,  $R^2 = .0.004$ ,  $F(4, 53730) = 59.98$ ,  $p < 0.0001$

Nationally, 37% of respondents say they experienced corruption in their dealings with the ANP. Of those who had confidence in the ANP, 49% say they had experienced corruption. Interestingly, a reported experience of corruption decreased confidence in the ANP by only 12%.

Lastly, despite the high level of confidence in the ANP nationally, 76% of all respondents say that the ANP still needed foreign support to do its job. This is a significant increase from 2012, when 67% of respondents said that the ANP needed continued foreign support. Although most respondents in all provinces say that the ANP needs help from foreigners, in Panjshir and in Baghlan only 30% and 45% of respondents respectively say that ANP needs help from foreigners.

The consistently high level of confidence in both the ANA and ANP since 2007, despite the high percentages of respondents that have reported fear when encountering the ANA or ANP during this time,<sup>35,36</sup> is likely to be based on very practical considerations that reflect the realities for ordinary citizens in Afghanistan. Both the ANA and the ANP are both relatively new institutions. Compared to the period prior to their formation, their presence has brought at least some sense of law and order to the country.

Overall, the reasons for the high level of confidence in the ANA and ANP are complex and vary between provinces, but appear to reflect three main factors:

- **Existence:** the fact that the ANA and ANP are present, and thus help to bring order and a sense of security;
- **Confidence:** the level of confidence that if incidents of violence or crime are reported to the ANA and ANP, the guilty party would be arrested; and
- **Corruption:** whether or not the respondents had experienced corruption in their dealings with the ANP.

### 3.3 Peace and reconciliation

#### Key Questions:

Q-60. Are you aware of any efforts being taken by the Afghan government to reconcile with armed opposition groups?

Q-61. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?

Q-62. In your opinion, what is the reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government?

Q-63. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might support the goals of armed opposition groups?

35 2013 data: fear when encountering ANA (39%) and ANP (52%)


36 There was significant variation at the provincial level in the reported fear when encountering ANA/ANP, ranging from just 2% of respondents in Jawzjan, to 43% of respondents in Zabul.

**Q-64.** What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might disagree with the goals of armed opposition groups?

**Q-65:** Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these groups?

Since 2009, there has been decreasing support for armed opposition groups (AOGs). In 2013, only 35% of respondents say they have a little or a lot of sympathy for the armed opposition (see Fig. 3.13 below).

**Fig. 3.13: Q-65.** *Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or no sympathy at all for these groups? || 2009-2013*




Pashtuns are significantly more likely to have some sympathy for the armed opposition (42%) compared to other ethnic groups. Urban respondents (71%) are significantly<sup>37</sup> more likely to have no sympathy at all compared to rural respondents (61%), and women (70%) are more likely<sup>38</sup> to have no sympathy for AOGs than men.

There are interesting differences among provinces in the level of support for the armed opposition (see Fig. 3.14 below). The provinces with the lowest percentage of respondents who say they have a lot of sympathy for AOGs are Badakshan and Panjshir (less than 1%). Provinces with the highest percentage of respondents with a lot of sympathy include Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Daikundi, Paktika, Logar, Wardak, and Laghman (20-44%).

37 Pearsons  $\chi^2(1, n = ) = 66.8538, p < 0.000$

38 Pearsons  $\chi^2(1, n = ) = 111.6667, p < 0.000$

**Fig. 3.14: Q-65.** *Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or no sympathy at all for these groups? || Provincial breakdown*



When asked why Afghans might disagree with the goals of the AOGs, the most commonly cited reason is that they kill innocent civilians 24%. This is true both among those with no sympathy (30%) and among those reporting some or a lot of sympathy (26%). The second most commonly cited reason for disagreeing is a desire to finish the war (14%). Regionally (see Fig. 3.15 below), the desire to finish the war as a reason for disagreeing with the goals of AOGs is highest in the Central/Hazarajat region (30%) and lowest in the South East region (9%). The third most common reason for disagreeing with AOGs is the perception that they work for Pakistan (8%). This differs along regional lines, where regions bordering Pakistan (East, South East, Central/Kabul, and South West) are more likely to report AOG allegiances to Pakistan compared to regions farther from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

**Fig. 3.15: Q-64.** *What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might disagree with the goals of armed opposition groups?* | Provincial breakdown

**REASONS: NO SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS**


	Central/ Kabul (%)	East (%)	South East (%)	South West (%)	West (%)	North East (%)	Central Hazarat (%)	North West (%)	All (%)
They kill innocent people	26	27	35	34	22	15	10	17	24
To finish the war	11	13	9	10	14	24	30	12	14
They work for Pakistan	10	11	10	9	5	7	2	5	8
They perform suicide	10	7	7	3	8	9	2	8	8
AOGs have bad intention	2	4	2	5	7	3	4	7	4
AOGs are not trustworthy	4	5	4	4	5	2	5	5	4
They love their country	2	4	2	3	5	3	5	3	3
AOGs are against freedom	2	4	3	3	2	5	0	2	3
Don't know (vol.)	10	6	4	11	11	13	21	19	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Nationally, 74% of respondents are aware of the government's attempts at reconciliation with the armed opposition groups. The level of awareness is higher in urban areas (77%) than in rural areas of the country (74%).

Overall, 63% of respondents agree with the statement that the reconciliation efforts between the government and armed opposition groups can stabilize the country (64% of rural respondents, and 57% of urban respondents). Looking at ethnic differences, more Pashtuns (70%) and Uzbeks (69%) agree that reconciliation can stabilize the country than Tajiks (55%), and Hazaras (50%).

There are provincial differences in the response to this question about reconciliation (see Fig. 3.16 below). Those respondents more likely to agree that reconciliation efforts between the government and AOGs can help stabilize the country are largely concentrated in the provinces bordering Pakistan (70-88% in most of those provinces). The Central provinces of Panjshir and Parwan and the West provinces of Ghor and Herat have the lowest percentage of the respondents agreeing with the statement (17-50%).

**Fig. 3.16: Q-61.** *Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?* | Provincial breakdown





## 4 Economic Growth and Employment

With a per capita GDP (based on Purchasing Power Parity) of only USD \$1072 in 2013, Afghanistan is the tenth poorest country in the world.<sup>39</sup> Agriculture plays a critical role in the country's economy, and many Afghans rely on farm-related activities as their main source of income. Afghanistan's agricultural output is still 50% below its pre-war (1979) level, and investment in the sector has been very low.<sup>40</sup> However, an exceptional harvest in 2012, along with the launch of Afghanistan's first large-scale mining activities, increased real GDP growth from around 7% to nearly 12%<sup>41</sup> last year. Untapped mineral deposits of oil, gold, copper, lithium, and iron ore in Afghanistan are estimated at USD \$1 trillion.<sup>42</sup> Improvements in the legal and regulatory environment for mining could help secure planned investment, and assuming a good harvest in 2014, peaceful elections, and the continued growth of the telecommunications sector, growth could increase in 2014.<sup>43</sup> The Ministry of Commerce and Industries (MoCI), in accordance with the London Compact and at the direction of both the President's Office and parliament, is taking the lead on drafting and revising 45 new commercial laws and regulations, several of which are now before parliament.

The planned withdrawal of most international military troops by the end of 2014 may adversely affect private sector confidence, and is likely to be accompanied by a decline in international development assistance. The Afghan national budget has depended heavily on external aid since 2001, with donor funds providing up to 65% of the core budget in 2012. There is widespread concern that the pre-election period may be accompanied by increased insurgency activities that will undermine hard-won economic and social development gains. Afghanistan must make a rather rapid transition from a war-oriented, aid-dependent economy to one that is more sustainable and commercially oriented.

Afghanistan's annual population growth rate is around 3%. In 2010, 49% of the population in Afghanistan were the age of 14 years or younger.<sup>44</sup> A large number of young adults are entering the labor force, thus the unemployment rate is likely to rise. The proportion of the labor force that is underemployed or in vulnerable employment is also set to rise. Local job creation is therefore likely to be the greatest challenge during the transition period, especially since investors are increasingly reluctant to invest while the economic climate and security situation are uncertain, and since the manufacturing base has suffered so badly from cheap imports. The balance of trade and the depreciation of the Afghan currency are also important considerations for the country's growth and development.

### 4.1 Economy

#### Key Question:

**Q-6:** Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically? [Recent period after the Taliban, or the Taliban period]

39 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013.

40 World Bank (April 2013). Afghanistan Economic Update. Poverty Reduction & Economic Management: South Asia Region. 24pp.

41 World Bank (April 2013). Afghanistan Economic Update. Poverty Reduction & Economic Management: South Asia Region. 24pp.

42 Joint Geological Survey conducted in 2010 by the U.S. Pentagon and the U.S. Geological Survey.

43 World Bank (April 2013). Afghanistan Economic Update. Poverty Reduction & Economic Management: South Asia Region. 24pp.

44 Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm>.




In 2013 most Afghans (76%) report that economic conditions improved after the Taliban period, but the figures vary according to geography, gender, and household income. For example, urban residents (92%) are more likely than rural residents (85%) to report that economic conditions have improved after the Taliban period.

Respondents from the North West region of Afghanistan are the most likely to report an improvement in the post-Taliban period (96%), while respondents from the West region are the least likely (76%). Women are significantly more likely than men to report that they and their families are better off in the post-Taliban period.<sup>45</sup>

Regionally (see Fig. 4.1 below), far more respondents in the North West, North East, and Central/Kabul regions (73-94% in most of those provinces) say that their economic situation is currently better in comparison to the Taliban period. In Zabul, Paktika, and Nooristan, a much lower percentage (33-53%) of respondents say that their current economic situation is better now than before. It is worth noting that these three provinces have had limited development relative to other provinces, and are among the most insecure.


**Fig. 4.1: Q-6.** *Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically? || Most recent period after the Taliban: Provincial breakdown*



45 Probit regression,  $R^2=0.05$ , LR Pearsons Chi<sup>2</sup> (9) = 474.78,  $p < 0.0001$  [(Model controlled for Age, Marital Status, Income, Access to Information, Support for Women's Rights, Gender, Education, Province, and Urban/Rural)]

Respondents from poorer households are significantly more likely to report being economically better off during the post-Taliban era, and wealthier respondents are significantly more likely to report having been better off during the Taliban era (see Fig. 4.2 below).

**Fig. 4.2: Q-6.** Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically? || By income level



As the level of support for women's rights and confidence in the government increases, access to information increases, and the level of education increases, respondents are significantly more likely to say that the post-Taliban period is better economically for them and their families. By contrast, perceptions that the economy was better under the Taliban are significantly correlated with sympathy for armed opposition groups.<sup>46</sup>

## 4.2 Employment

### Key Questions:

D-3: Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or looking for work?

D-4: What is your main occupation?

In 2013, 51%<sup>47</sup> of the respondents surveyed say that they are employed. Fig. 4.3 below shows the distribution of employment categories among those respondents. Forty-five percent<sup>48</sup> of those who are employed work in agriculture, either as farmers (36%) or farm laborers (9%). The next largest employment categories are skilled workers/artisans (10%) and informal sales/business (9%).

46  $r=0.18, p < 0.0001$

47  $n=5,154$

48  $n=2,583$

Fig. 4.3: D-4. *What is your main occupation?*

Eighty-seven percent of those under the age of 35 are employed, and 91% of those between the ages of 35-54 are employed. Only 76% of those aged 55 or over are employed. These figures represent only those people who are available for employment, not those who are housewives, students, or retirees.

The definition of “employed” used in the survey is “being paid for work.” Eighty six percent of the women surveyed say they are housewives. Housewives may still earn some money for their families, but are generally not available for employment.<sup>49</sup> For all respondents, on average 5% of all women and 79% of all men surveyed are employed, with men in rural areas being statistically more likely to be employed than men in urban areas.<sup>50</sup> The overall national employment rate<sup>51</sup> for men is 89%. However, there is a significant<sup>52</sup> difference in the male employment rate among the regions. The West region has the highest rate of employment for men (91%), while the Central/Kabul region has the lowest rate of employment for men (84%).

The overall rate of unemployment for men varies at the regional level, from 7% in the South East region to 19% in the Central/Kabul region. Among those working, the Central/Kabul region has the highest percentage of self-employed (14%), while the Western region has the lowest (3%). The Central/Kabul region has the largest proportion of students (13%), compared to a low of 2% in the South West region. The Central/Hazarajat region has the lowest percentage of skilled workers and artisans (3%) and the highest percentage of farmers (55%).

49 Women living in rural areas are more likely to be housewives than women living in urban areas [Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 30.6063$   $p < 0.000$ ].

50 Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 27.1313$   $p = 0.000$

51 The male employment rate is the number of males employed/number of males employed or available for work (which in this case includes two categories: unemployed and other). “Employed” means receiving a wage. Housewives, students, and retirees are excluded from this calculation.

52  $F(7,5726) = 12.61$ ,  $p < .0001$ ,  $R^2 = 0.015$

### 4.3 Household income

#### Key Questions:

**D-18a:** For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly income?


**D-18b:** Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?

**D-18c:** How much of your household's total income comes from female members of the household?

**D-19:** Please rate the living standard of your household.

The average household size in the sample was nine people per household,<sup>53</sup> with 48% of households consisting of seven to 10 people. Household size (which varies in the survey from one to 48 people per household) is significantly correlated with the reported household income.<sup>54</sup> While 6% of respondents report a household income of less than 2,000 Afghani per month, and 5% report an income of more than 20,000 Afghani, over half (54%) of respondents report a household income of 3,001-10,000 Afghani per month (see Fig 4.4 below).

**Fig. 4.4: D-18a.** For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly income?



53 SE=.04, 95% CI 9.00-9.16

54  $r = 0.29$ ,  $p < 0.0001$

Overall, as the education level of the respondent increases, there is a significant increase in reported household income. It is worth noting that on average, women report significantly lower monthly household incomes than men. The reasons for this are not clear, but it may be more difficult for women to assess the overall monthly household income since 86% of the women surveyed are housewives, and not working outside the home, and therefore do not have an income. Only 17% of respondents report having female members of the household contributing to household income. Women from households in rural areas (20%) are more likely<sup>55</sup> to contribute to household income than women in urban areas (13%).

There are significant differences between ethnic groups in the rate of women's contribution to household income. For example, both Pashtun and Hazara women are significantly<sup>56</sup> more likely to contribute to household income than Tajik women. The reasons for this may be cultural; the difference cannot be explained by household size, nor by the level of education of the respondent. There are also statistically significant differences between regions. For example, respondents in the South East region are significantly<sup>57</sup> more likely to report that women are contributing to their household income than other regions.

Looking at the issue of self-reported standard of living, 85% of respondents say that their household has enough money for food every day, and 66% say that their household has enough money for fuel. Fifty-three percent say that their household has enough money for daily food, fuel, and children's education combined. Only 26% say that their household has enough money for daily food, fuel, children's education, and occasional luxury items.

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55 Pearsons  $\chi^2(3) = 30.8231, p < 0.000$

56 Pashtun vs Tajik: Pearsons  $\chi^2(1) = 23.6359, p < 0.000$ ; Hazara vs Tajik: Pearsons  $\chi^2(1) = 12.2505, p < 0.000$

57 Pearsons  $\chi^2(1) = 35.0686, p < 0.000$

## 5 Development and Service Delivery

The 2013 UN Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>58</sup> for Afghanistan places the country in the low human development category (175<sup>th</sup> out of the 187 countries assessed). Afghanistan scores low in several key areas, including: health; education; gender; and trade, economy, and income. Afghanistan is currently dependent on donors to address its pressing development needs. The international community has reaffirmed its commitment to make up to USD \$16 billion in development aid available for Afghanistan under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), which was agreed at the Tokyo Conference in July 2012. However, this funding, which will increasingly be channeled directly through the Afghan government's budget, is linked to the introduction and successful implementation of a range of government reforms.

Slow progress has been made on developing the necessary legal and policy framework and offering the necessary incentives for encouraging the private sector to provide services on behalf of the government in areas where it has insufficient capacity to do this directly. In addition, insecurity is undermining budget execution rates and violence is preventing basic government operations. Overall, there is a lack of reliable data on the number of service-delivery related projects in the country, and the assessment of impacts tends to be short-term and rather narrow. Higher priority needs to be placed on assessing the sustainability of projects and their lasting long-term benefits.

### 5.1 Satisfaction with services available in local area

#### Key Questions:

**Q-9:** I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. Would you rate [each item on a list of services: a. availability of clean drinking water, b. availability of water for irrigation, c. supply of electricity, d. availability of clinics and hospitals, e. availability of medicine, f. availability of education for children, g. condition of roads in your areas] as very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad in your area?

**Q-10:** In the last 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this area/district covering any of the following?

**Q-11:** Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area/district?

**Q-38c:** Provincial council members have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? [c. improving the delivery of basic services]

The survey asked Afghans about their current level of satisfaction with five categories of services:

- *Water:* Seventy-four percent of respondents report that the availability of clean drinking water is good or very good in their area, and 53% report that the availability of water for irrigation is good or very good.

58 <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.html>

- *Electricity*: Forty-one percent report that the supply of electricity is good or very good.
- *Healthcare*: Fifty-two percent of respondents say that the availability of clinics and hospitals is good or very good, and 50% report that the availability of medicine is good or very good.
- *Education*: Seventy-two percent report that the availability of education for children is good or very good.
- *Roads*: Forty-three percent say that the condition of roads in their area is good or very good.

Nationally, respondents were most satisfied with the drinking water supply and education. They were least satisfied with the electricity supply and the condition of the roads. Although overall satisfaction with the condition of roads was low considering that approximately 76% of Afghanistan's main roads have been rehabilitated, the low level of satisfaction may be due to the relatively poor condition of secondary local access roads.

Looking at regional data on levels of satisfaction with basic services, respondents from the Central/Kabul region are most satisfied with education for children (80%), the availability of hospitals and clinics (63%), medicine (63%), and the condition of roads (50%). Respondents from the East (20%) and South East (18%) regions report the lowest level of satisfaction with the electricity supply. Respondents in the East region are the most satisfied with the condition of roads (53%).

Comparing 2013 to previous years (see Fig. 5.1 below), respondents' satisfaction with electricity supply and water for irrigation has risen over the last two years. Respondents' satisfaction with availability of children's education, drinking water, clinics and hospitals, and medicine experienced a slight decline from 2012 to 2013.


**Fig 5.1: Q-9a/f.** *How would you rate today's conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live?* || Combination of quite good and very good responses: 2007- 2013

#### SATISFACTION WITH BASIC SERVICES

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Availability of education for children	72	70	67	68	73	77	72
Availability of clean drinking water	63	62	63	63	70	76	74
Availability of clinics and hospitals	56	51	49	46	57	58	52
Availability of medicine	-	49	44	43	53	53	50
Availability of water for irrigation	59	47	53	49	45	52	53
Supply of electricity	31	25	34	34	34	36	41

Afghans' satisfaction with the electricity supply has been gradually increasing since 2009 (see Fig. 5.2 below), even though most households still only use electricity for lighting rather than for heating or cooking. The sharp drop in satisfaction with the electricity supply in 2008 coincides with a serious drought that year, which would have made electricity generation more difficult than usual. In 2011, there was another serious drought, but this does not seem to have affected the trend line, perhaps due to the completion of new power lines to supply electricity from Tajikistan.

**Fig 5.2: Q-9c.** *How would you rate today's conditions [c. supply of electricity] in the village/neighborhood where you live?* || Combination of quite good and very good responses: 2007- 2013



When asked how well provincial councils are doing in improving the delivery of basic services, nationally, 31% of respondents report that they are doing a bad job. There were differences between regions in the assessment of the performance of provincial councils on service delivery. The least likely to be satisfied were respondents from the Central/Kabul region, where nearly half of the respondents (47%) report that provincial councils are doing a bad job. In contrast, only 18% of respondents in the North West region say that the provincial councils are doing a bad job.

## 5.2 Awareness of development programs and donors

### Key Questions:

**Q-10:** In the last 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this area/district covering any of the following? (see Appendix 3 for full list)

**Q-11:** Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area/district?

An analysis of the 2012 survey dataset shows that the level of awareness of development projects and the countries that fund them is influenced by eight main factors:

- The extent to which the projects generate local employment and mobilize the community;
- The direct impact of projects on household income;
- The type of project (“soft” projects that focus on capacity development have lower recognition, but not necessarily less impact, when compared to “hard” projects such as the construction of roads or irrigation ditches);
- The duration of the project (projects that are implemented over a longer timeframe are likely to have better recognition than projects implemented over a shorter timeframe);
- Whether or not the projects improve service delivery;
- The number of people directly affected by the project;
- The effectiveness of the communication strategy for the project; and



- Gender (men and women are equally likely to be aware of projects that focus on household energy sources, but men are likely to be more aware of irrigation projects).

These factors are reflected in Afghan citizens' level of recognition of service delivery and reconstruction projects. Nationally, in 2013, the three most recognized categories of development projects were those involving reconstruction or opening of new schools (37% of respondents), building of roads and bridges (36%), and improving the drinking water supply (31%). These are all "hard" project types that have long-term benefits and employ or directly benefit large numbers of people. It is interesting that school projects received a higher level of recognition than did drinking water supply projects.

Regionally, there was significant variation in respondents' level of recognition of the three project categories mentioned above, even for the types of projects that were most recognized overall. For example, looking at the awareness of reconstruction of roads and bridges, which were among the most visible projects overall, the level of awareness ranged from 54% of respondents in the South West region to just 16% of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region. The South West region also had the highest level of awareness of drinking water projects (60%) compared to just 16% in the Central/Hazarajat region. The level of awareness of education projects was more consistent across the regions, except in two adjacent regions. In the South West region 55% of respondents were aware of education projects, while in the West region, only 28% of respondents were aware of education projects. The eight influencing factors listed above are likely contributing to the variation in the awareness of such projects, but these results may also reflect an uneven distribution of donors across provinces.

In terms of donor recognition, (see Fig. 5.3 below) the top five most recognized donors were: the United States (46%), Japan (24%), Germany (16%), India (16%), and China (7%). The United States has consistently been the most recognized donor since 2009. The level of recognition for each of the top five donors varies between regions, reflecting the distribution of their projects. In each region, the United States was recognized as a donor with the following frequencies: Central/Kabul (37%), East (54%), South East (61%), South West (62%), West (46%) North East (42%), Central/Hazarajat (33%), and North West (31%). Japan was most recognized in the East (37%) region and least recognized in the North East region (11%). Germany was most recognized in the North East (44%) and the East regions (27%) and at much lower levels in other regions. India had a fairly even distribution of recognition between the regions, with the highest level of recognition in the South West (28%) and the East (25%) regions, and the lowest level of recognition in the Central/Hazarajat region (5%). China was recognized with fairly steady frequency across all regions, ranging from 3%-9%.

**Fig. 5.3 Q-11a/b/c.** Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area/district? (a, b, and c responses combined)

### DONOR RECOGNITION

Country Name	Central/ Kabul	East	South East	South West	West	North East	Central/ Hazarajat	North West	Overall
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
USA	37	54	61	62	46	42	33	31	46
Japan	26	37	25	27	27	11	29	18	24
Germany	8	27	13	7	8	44	2	17	16
India	14	25	22	28	16	7	5	6	16
Afghan Gov't	15	5	9	5	10	21	17	14	12
China	9	9	6	7	7	3	5	3	7
Turkey	10	2	4	4	4	3	5	10	6
UK (Britain)	1	7	4	21	2	4	1	1	6
Saudi Arabia	3	4	5	21	3	2	0	2	5
France	7	5	2	2	5	11	1	2	5
Iran	3	5	6	5	10	2	9	4	5
Canada	2	5	5	12	8	0	6	0	4
Pakistan	2	3	2	3	4	1	4	2	2
Nat'l Solidarity Program	3	3	3	0	1	2	1	3	2
Thailand	3	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	1
Australia	1	0	2	3	0	1	0	0	1

## 5.3 Household fuel sources


### Key Questions:

**Q-17a:** What is the main source of energy that you use for cooking at home?

**Q-17b:** What is the main source of energy that you use for heating your home?

The availability of energy for domestic use in Afghanistan is an important issue at the household level for both economic and both environmental reasons. Looking at household energy use for heating and cooking, a total of seven main fuel sources were reported (see Fig. 5.4 below).

Fig 5.4: Q-17a/b. *What is the main source of energy that you use for cooking at/heating your home?*



The two main fuel sources used by respondents for heating are firewood (26%) and animal dung (20%). The two main fuel sources for cooking are firewood (48%) and bottled gas (21%).

Household firewood costs, which for the average household are at least \$300 per year, represent a significant expense. However, there are also serious health and environmental consequences of using firewood as the main source of fuel for both cooking and heating in Afghanistan. The use of firewood for cooking causes respiratory problems due to the inhalation of smoke. Firewood for those who live in urban areas is sourced mostly from rapidly depleting supplies of wood from the two South East region provinces of Khost and Paktia.<sup>59</sup> For most rural residents, firewood is obtained by harvesting woody species that grow in rangeland habitats, which puts pressure on the species that are being harvested. In parts of Bamyan, for example, due to widespread overharvesting of woody plants for fuel, people may now have to walk for up to four hours from their village to harvest sufficient firewood to meet their needs.<sup>60</sup> While this is a direct consequence of overharvesting and thus a natural resources management issue, it is also becoming a conservation issue. For example, many slow-growing woody rangeland species often used for firewood may need special protection from over-harvesting, as the volumes being harvested are likely to be unsustainable.<sup>61</sup> Also, many woody species of *Ephedra* that grow in the region, which are commonly harvested for firewood, are included in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature's threatened species list.<sup>62</sup>

59 Wingard, J.R. et al. (2008). East Forest Program, Timber Trade Survey (2006-2008). 68pp. Wildlife Conservation Society: Kabul, Afghanistan.

60 Shawe, K.G. Unpublished fieldwork conducted in Bamyan Province in 2009.


61 Slow-growing woody species are often the dominant species in rangeland habitats and do not regenerate easily.

62 <http://www.iucnredlist.org> [search *Ephedra* species Central/West Asia].

In addition to firewood, the other main source of energy for heating is animal dung. The use of animal dung as a major source of fuel is unsustainable because it deprives the soil of necessary nutrients. Despite the effort required to harvest them, rangeland-harvested firewood and animal dung are both free, hence the dependency on these two main fuel sources. Bottled gas is relatively cheap, is easy to transport, and the amount used can be more precisely controlled than wood, hence its use as the second most important fuel for cooking.

The reported use of firewood for heating has declined since 2009 (see Fig. 5.5 below). The reasons for this need further research, but it is interesting to note that the reported use of grass and other biomass as a source of energy for heating has increased during the same period.

**Fig 5.5: Q-17b.** *What is the main source of energy that you use for heating your home?* | | 2009-2013



The Central/Hazarajat region has the highest reported use of grass and other plant biomass for heating (30%), and a higher use of animal dung (40%) than any other province. This region is one of the main rangeland areas in Afghanistan, and the communities in rangeland areas are mainly dependent on livestock.

The Central/Kabul region has a higher reported use of firewood for heating purposes (46%) than any other region, even though the electricity supply in the Central/Kabul region is good relative to other regions. The reported use of electricity (3%) as a source of energy for heating is very low across all regions, similar to the use of kerosene (2%) and diesel (<1%). The reported use of charcoal for heating is higher in the South West region (18%) compared to all other regions, and the reported use of bottled gas for heating is higher in the East region (18%) than in any other region.

The survey revealed different regional patterns of energy use for cooking and heating. For example, although the Central/Kabul region had the highest use of firewood for heating, it had the lowest

reported use of firewood for cooking (21%). However, almost half of respondents from the Central/Kabul region report using bottled gas for cooking (49%), more than twice the level reported for any other region, and twice as many respondents in the Central/Kabul region report using electricity for cooking (8%) than in any other region. The differences in fuel use for cooking purposes probably reflect price and availability. The low use of firewood for cooking in the Central/Kabul region is probably due to the ready availability of bottled gas as a cheap and cleaner alternative. In the Central/Hazarajat region the reported use of animal dung and grass or other plant biomass for cooking was higher than for any other region. Further information on the availability and price of bottled gas in the Central/Hazarajat region is needed, but the most likely explanation is that animal dung and grass or other plant biomass are readily available and free.

## 5.4 Household and agricultural water use

### Key Questions:

Q-12: Where do you usually get drinking water for your family?

Q-13: Do you use water for irrigation?

Q-14: How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last year?

Q-15: Please list the main reasons why the amount of water for irrigation is bad or very bad.

Q-16: Over the last five years, has your household generally had enough water?

Nationwide, the most common form of household water supply is a well, with 58% of urban respondents reporting that they use a well compared to 66% of rural respondents.


Unsurprisingly, 38% of urban respondents have piped water compared to only 11% of rural respondents. The environmental and public health significance of the findings needs careful consideration. Over-reliance by urban dwellers on wells that draw water from aquifers is likely to be unsustainable, given the rapid urban population growth in cities such as Kabul. Where wells tap into water stored in fossil aquifers, it is likely to become a significant problem in the future because such aquifers are not naturally recharged.

When asked whether their household has generally had enough water over the past five years, 42% of respondents say they have had enough, while 45% say that they have only sometimes had enough. Thirteen percent of respondents say that in the past five years they have not had enough water. Respondents in the Central and South West regions of Afghanistan were the most likely to report having enough water. The provinces in which respondents most often report not having enough water are: Khost (20%), Takhar (21%), Balkh (25%), Jawzjan (25%), and Zabul (33%). More critically, more than 30% of the respondents in a total of 47 districts in 17 provinces report that they have not had an adequate water supply (see Fig. 5.6 below). These districts should be high priority targets for development projects designed to improve the water supply.


**Fig 5.6: Q-16:** *Over the last five years, has your household generally had enough water?***DISTRICTS WITHOUT ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY**

Province	District (% of respondents)
Kabul	District 8 (39%), Bagrami (36%)
Wardak	Daimir Dad (38%)
Ghazni	Waghaz (42%), Deh Yak (33%)
Paktika	Mata Khan (42%)
Khost	Musa Kheil (50%)
Laghman	Bad Pech (33%)
Kunar	Sawaki (83%), Shigal wa Sheltan (42%), Sar Kani (33%)
Badakhshan	Kash (50%), Darayim (58%)
Takhar	Rustag (33%), Chahab (58%), Namak Ab (33%)
Baghlan	Dushi (46%)
Balkh	Marmul (57%), Shortepa (50%), Char Bolak (58%), Sholgara (50%)
Jawzjan	Darzab (33%), Faizabad (58%), Mardyan (30%), Khwaja Dukoh (42%)
Faryab	Andkhoy (31%), Qurghan (50%)
Badghis	Qalai-e-Now (33%)
Herat	Rubat-e-Sangi (53%), Pashtun Zarghun (45%), Karrukh (42%)
Farah	Shibkoh (50%), Qala-e-kah (50%), Pur Chaman (50%)
Nimroz	Asl-i-chakhansur (31%)
Kandahar	Nesh (42%)
Zabul	Atghar (42%), Tarang Wa Jaldak (36%), Naw Bahar (67%), Shinkai (61%), Qalat (42%), Shemel Zayi (33%), Arghandab (Zabul) (50%)
Ghor	Char Sada (42%), Saghar (58%)
Daikundi	Sang-t-Takht (30%), Gizab (42%)

Nationally, 52%<sup>63</sup> of those surveyed report that they use water for irrigation. There is a large difference between rural and urban areas, with rural respondents comprising 94% of those who report using water for irrigation. Analyzing urban and rural respondents separately, 64% of rural respondents surveyed report that they use water for irrigation, compared to only 14% of respondents living in urban areas (see Fig. 5.7 below).

**Fig 5.7: Q-13.** *Do you use water for irrigation?* || National, urban, rural breakdown

Among those respondents<sup>64</sup> who report using water for irrigation purposes, 80% say that the availability of water for irrigation is either good or very good (see Fig. 5.8 below).

**Fig 5.8: Q-14.** *How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last year?*

64 n=4,436

There is a statistically significant difference<sup>65</sup> in urban and rural respondents' assessment of the availability of water for irrigation, Sixty-one percent of rural respondents compared to 46% of urban respondents say that irrigation water availability is good or very good.

Interestingly, among those respondents who report using water for irrigation, the main reason given for bad or very bad availability is the lack of water available from natural springs (64% of respondents). Assisting communities to plan for natural fluctuations in water availability and providing training in climate change adaptation will be particularly important in these areas.

There were statistically significant differences between regions, with respondents from the West region being the most likely to report that the availability of water for irrigation is bad or very bad (37% of West region<sup>66</sup> respondents compared to 18% nationally). In contrast, only 11% of respondents from the North East region report that availability is bad or very bad.<sup>67</sup> This is interesting, because the Amur/Panj River Basin that feeds this part of Afghanistan has 20% of the country's irrigated land, but only 3% of its water resources.<sup>68</sup>

Those provinces in which the respondents surveyed are most likely to be dissatisfied with the availability of water for irrigation are listed below in Fig. 5.9 below.

**Fig. 5.9: Q-14: How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last year? || Bad or very bad**

#### PROVINCES WITHOUT ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY FOR IRRIGATION

Province	% of respondents
Balkh	33%
Wardak	31%
Ghor	41%
Zabul	42%
Kabul	33%
Farah	38%

65 Urban vs Rural: Pearsons  $\chi^2(1) = 88.38, p < 0.001$

66 West Region vs. Other regions: Pearsons  $\chi^2(1) = 93.99, p < 0.0001$

67 Northeast vs. Other regions: Pearsons  $\chi^2(1) = 27.92, p < 0.001$

68 United Nations Country Team in Afghanistan (2013): Natural Resources Management & Peace-building in Afghanistan. p. 20. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme.



## 5.5 Educational attainment and literacy

### Key Questions:


**D-5:** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?

**D-6:** Please tell me if you can: [a. write a letter to someone without any assistance, b. read a letter from somebody without any assistance, c. if a piece of nan cost 20 Afghani at a bakery, how much change will you get if you want to buy 4 pieces and you have 100 Afghani in your pocket?]

Although 72% of respondents report that the availability of education is quite good or very good in their area, 60% of respondents reported that they have received no schooling whatsoever (i.e., no formal education, in-home schooling, literacy classes, or madrasa education).

It is important to look at gender-disaggregated data for this question. The percentage of respondents reporting that they have no education rises to 76% for women, compared to only 44% for men. Lack of education is more common among rural respondents (63%) than urban (48%) respondents (see Fig. 5.10 below).


**Fig. 5.10: D-5.** *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?* || No education with national, rural, urban, and gender breakdown



As expected, education is significantly correlated with income.<sup>69</sup> There are observable differences between the monthly incomes of those who have no education and those who have a university education or higher (see Fig. 5.11 below).

<sup>69</sup>  $r = 0.2641, p = < 0.000$

**Fig. 5.11: D-5.** *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed? || No education and university or higher education by monthly income*



When looking at the highest level of formal educational attainment respondents have achieved, among those who had pursued formal education, 25% had achieved a primary school level education, 20% secondary school level, 36% high school level, 12% grade 13 or 14, and 6% a university level education.<sup>70</sup>

However, looking at each level of education separately, the completion rates vary. Of those who entered primary school, only 40% completed this level of education. Of all those who went on to enter secondary school after primary school, 40% completed this level of education and 60% dropped out. Of all those who entered high school, 63% completed this level of education and 37% dropped out. Of all those who went on to study at grade 13 and grade 14 levels, 66% completed grade 14 and 34% had dropped out. Finally, of all those who entered university, 62% completed this level of education and 38% dropped out. This data shows that although completion rates are relatively poor for primary and secondary level education, they are much higher for high school, grade 14, and university.

Given the low completion rate at the primary school level (40%) and the small percentage of respondents who completed grade 14 (comprising 12% of all respondents who said that they had received some level of formal education), arguably the most important immediate educational target would be to increase the completion rates for primary and grade 14 levels. These are the most critical levels of education for improving the national literacy level and supplying qualified teachers for the next generation.

Interestingly, the survey data does not show significantly different overall rates of completion for women and men at each of the different levels of education. However, there were ethnic differences in the levels of female educational attainment. Uzbek (84%) women were significantly less likely to have had formal education at any level<sup>71</sup> than other ethnic groups, closely followed by Pashtun (83%)

<sup>70</sup> 130 respondents out of 9,260 surveyed. See the questionnaire in Appendix (1) for a full listing of educational levels.

<sup>71</sup> Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,251) = 31.5141, p = < 0.000

women. By contrast, Hazara women (28%) were significantly<sup>72</sup> more likely to have had formal education at any level than women from any other ethnic group. Hazara (14% of those surveyed) and Tajik (10% of those surveyed) women were most likely to have high school diplomas, and Uzbek (3%) and Pashtun (5%) women the least likely.

Younger female respondents were significantly more likely to be educated than older female respondents.<sup>73</sup> For example, younger women in the 18-30 age group are more likely to have had some formal education (29% of the women surveyed in this age group), than women in the 31-50 age group (12%), or the over 50 age group (6%). Although very few of the women included in the survey reported having a university level education (less than 1% of all women surveyed), of these women, 53% were in the 18-30 age group, 41% were in the 31-50 age group, and just 6% were in the over 50 age group.

Men in all three of the age groups are significantly<sup>74</sup> more likely than their female peers to have had some formal education. Sixty-three percent of men aged 18-30, 42% of men aged 31-50, and 36% of men over 50 years of age have had some formal education. Just as for women, the generation gap in male education increases as the level of educational attainment increases. Of all men included in the survey that have some university level education (3%), 54% were in the age 18-30 category, 32% were in the age 31-50 category, and 14% were in the over age 50 category (note that this figure is more than twice the percentage of women over age 50 who have a university level education).

Looking at all respondents in 2013, only 2% had some university education. A lack of gender parity is evident when this figure is disaggregated: 88% of those respondents with some university education are male, and only 12% are female.

There are some interesting correlations between the survey findings on education level and respondents' views on other questions in this survey. Those respondents with some level of education were significantly<sup>75</sup> less likely to think that country is moving in the right direction than those with no education. Fifty-nine percent of the respondents with some level of education said that the country is moving in the right direction, compared to 62% of those with no education. While women's access to education is increasing in Afghanistan, a lack of education and illiteracy have consistently been identified as the biggest problems facing women in Afghanistan since 2006, and were reported by 27% of respondents in 2013. One of the most common reasons respondents provide for thinking that the country is moving in the right direction is the opening of schools for girls (reported by 6% of respondents this year).

This year, respondents were asked three questions about literacy, which resulted in a classification of the respondents into one of four main levels of literacy ranging from illiterate to literate.<sup>76</sup> Using this

72 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=3,134) = 17.2541, p = < 0.000

73 r = -0.2102, p < 0.000

74 18-30 Age Category: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=4,055) = 436.6224, p = < 0.000; 31-50 Age Category Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=4,157) = 408.5643, p = < 0.000; 51 and Over Age Category: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=1,408) = 75.2347, p = < 0.000

75 Pearson's Chi<sup>2</sup> (2, n=8,770) = 12.8318, p < 0.001

76 No skills (Illiteracy): Literacy Level (0): not numerate, can't read or write / 1 Skill: Literacy Level (1a): numerate only; Literacy Level (1b): read only; Literacy Level (1c): write only / 2 Skills: Literacy Level (2a): numerate + read; Literacy Level (2b): numerate + write; Literacy Level (2c): both read + write / 3 Skills (Literacy): Literacy Level (3): numeracy + read + write.

classification, 8% of the respondents could neither read, write, or count and so are classified as illiterate, but this is likely to be an under-estimate for the reasons given below. Fifty percent were classified as literate (able to read, write, and count). Surprisingly, 39% of respondents fell in the middle of this classification scheme under the category of those who could count, but could neither read nor write.

Although inadequate as a surrogate, not having had any schooling at all is often equated to illiteracy. Of those respondents (60%) who reported having no education at all, based on the answers given, 22% were still classified as literate for practical purposes. It is likely that this represents a degree of social desirability bias in the responses given by this group of respondents, as some may not want to admit to not being able to read, write, or count. It is important to note that when assessing literacy, specific literacy tests should be conducted in order to determine the actual level of literacy of the respondent. The answers given to each of these questions were not backed up by checks on the reading, writing, and numeracy skills claimed, thus the levels of illiteracy reported here are probably underestimates.

Forty percent of respondents reported that they could write a letter without any assistance, and 41% reported that they could read a letter without assistance. Breaking this down by the level of educational attainment, the percentages of respondents that could write a letter without any assistance were as follows: those with some home schooling or who had attended literacy classes (52%), an Islamic school (70%), primary school (70%), secondary school (95%), high school (100%), grades 13 and 14 (100%), and university (100%). It is interesting to note that respondents who say they have had either some home schooling or some Islamic schooling (90%) have a higher literacy rate than those who have had formal primary schooling (86%), but this is probably the result of the low completion rate at primary school level.

Looking at numeracy, 80% of all respondents knew how much change they would get from 100 Afgs if they brought four pieces of nan bread at 20 Afgs each. For those with no education, 67% report that they know how much change they would get. For all those with some informal or formal education, 95% report that they know how much change they would get.<sup>77</sup>

There were regional variations in literacy rates. Regions in which respondents were most likely to be illiterate were the West (23%), North West (20%), and North East (19%) regions. The South East (5%), East (6%), and Central/Hazarajat (7%) regions had the lowest percentages of illiterate respondents.

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<sup>77</sup> The detailed breakdown by level of educational attainment is as follows: for those with some home schooling or who had attended literacy classes (75%), Islamic schooling (89%), primary schooling (95%), secondary schooling (98%), high school (98%), grades 13 and 14 (98%), and university (98%).



## 6 Governance

In order to comply with the reforms required under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), President Karzai issued Presidential Decree Number 45 in July 2012.<sup>78</sup> This 164-article decree emphasizes administrative reform, counter-corruption, and justice sector reform. The General Directorate of Administrative Affairs and the Cabinet have been tasked with monitoring and reporting on progress. The Decree is ambitious in scope and timeframe, and has proved challenging to implement.

Decree Number 45 directs key line ministries, the National Assembly, special offices, directorates, and commissions to take concrete action to improve government transparency, accountability, efficiency, responsiveness to citizen needs, and delivery of essential services across the country. Specific priorities include drafting and passing key pieces of legislation; improving water, electricity, and transportation infrastructure; improving the quality of education and health care; and supporting the agricultural sector and small and medium enterprise development. As the Afghan government addresses these challenges, over time it may result in increased positive public perceptions of government performance at various levels.

Although the decree has a strong focus on anti-nepotism and bringing corrupt officials to justice, progress has been challenging. Afghanistan remains at the bottom of a recent comparative ranking of public perceptions of corruption in numerous countries, at the same level as North Korea and Somalia.<sup>79</sup> While high-level political corruption often receives the greatest attention, the impact of administrative or “petty” corruption on Afghan citizens is equally distinctive. Administrative corruption limits and distorts Afghans’ access to essential public services, hinders economic development, and erodes trust in government and the rule of law.<sup>80</sup> In a positive trend, according to recent analysis the transparency of Afghanistan’s national budget improved from 21% in 2010 to 59% in 2012.<sup>81</sup> This exceeds the commitment of 40% made by Afghanistan at the Tokyo Conference in 2012. Fiscal transparency is one means of reducing corruption in the country, even if the capacity to implement budgetary reforms remains low.<sup>82</sup>

In the area of justice sector reform, priorities in Decree Number 45 include such measures as clearing case backlogs in the courts (with emphasis on corruption and land cases), activating and staffing all inactive courts in the country, and simplifying judicial procedures. These efforts, combined with the focus on reducing corruption in the justice sector and elsewhere, may increase Afghans’ trust in and use of the formal justice system for resolving disputes. The decree does not address the informal justice sector, the importance of which was formally recognized in the Bonn Agreement as having an

78 The Office of the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Decree on the execution of content of the historical speech of June 21, 2012 in the special session of National Assembly. July 29, 2012. [www.afghanistan-un.org](http://www.afghanistan-un.org).

79 Transparency International – Corruption Perceptions Index (<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results>).

80 United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime (2012). *Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends*. 34pp. December 2012.

81 Survey on budget transparency, participation and oversight in 100 countries around the world conducted in 2012 by the International Budget Partnership, - Afghanistan is now ranked 25th globally (at the same level as Poland). <http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf>

82 An assessment by the U.S. Government Accountability Office and the United States Agency for International Development found that none of the 38 ministries assessed were rated as being able to implement program budgeting reform without external assistance.

important complementary role to play in advancing citizens' access to justice. Local informal justice sector institutions include jirgas and shuras, which are consultative councils or assemblies of tribal elders that gather to discuss and resolve conflicts and disputes and make collective decisions about important social issues.

## 6.1 Satisfaction with government performance

### Key Questions:

**Q-37.** Members of the parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an OK job, a good job or a great job: [a. listening to constituents and representing their needs, b. delivering jobs and development, c. making laws for the good of the country, d. monitoring the President and his staff].

**Q-40:** Community development councils have been established as part of the National Solidarity Program, and members of the council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, do you know if there is a CDC in your community?

**Q-47:** Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [national government, provincial government, municipal authorities, district government] is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job?


**Q-49.** Has the Provincial Governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?

**Q-50:** Have you ever personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years?

**Q-52:** How satisfied are you with the job your community development council is doing? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

The survey explored Afghans' perceptions of how the national government is carrying out its responsibilities. Three quarters (75%) of respondents give national government a positive assessment, including 26% who say that the government is doing a very good job and 49% who say it is doing a somewhat good job. After a high point of 80% satisfaction in 2007 dropped to a low point of 67% in 2008, Afghans' satisfaction with national government performance has been gradually rising over the past five years (see Fig. 6.1 below).


**Fig. 6.1: Q-47.** *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the national government is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? || 2007-2013*



While respondents' level of satisfaction with national government remained constant from 2012 to 2013, satisfaction levels with all other levels of government declined in 2013 (see Fig. 6.2 below). The most notable decrease was in the level of satisfaction with provincial government performance, which fell from 80% in 2011 and 2012 to a seven-year low of 68% in 2013.




**Fig. 6.2: Q-47a/d:** *Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [national government, provincial government, municipal authorities, district government] is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job, or a very bad job? || 2008-2013*



Looking at respondents' level of satisfaction with municipal and local government, in 2013 59% of urban residents say that their municipal authorities are doing a somewhat good or very good job, and 66% of rural respondents say that the district government is doing a somewhat good or very good job. However, there has been some regional variation in these views on sub-national government since 2007. Respondents from the North West region are consistently the most likely to report that the provincial-level and district-level governments are doing a somewhat or very good job.


The 2013 survey also asked respondents how they would rate the performance of individual members of parliament in four specific areas of responsibility (see Fig. 6.3 below). Over one third of respondents say that their members of parliament are doing a bad job in the areas of listening to their constituents and representing their needs, and in delivering jobs and development. The survey also asked respondents about the overall level of confidence they have in parliament (see Fig. 6.7). Those interviewed rated individual parliamentary members slightly higher than the parliament itself (49% for members versus 47% for the legislative institution). However, respondents also expressed quite a low level of confidence in both, relative to other institutions.

**Fig. 6.3: Q-37.** *Members of the parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an okay job, a good job, or a great job?*




In an attempt to gauge how Afghan respondents may interact with individual political and public figures, this year the survey asked those interviewed if they had received help from a provincial governor in resolving a problem or issue affecting them (see Fig. 6.4 below). A little over one-quarter of all respondents (27%) said they had received such help. In urban areas, however, less than 20% indicated they had received any such aid, while one out of every three rural respondents stated they had obtained such help from a governor.

**Fig. 6.4: Q-49.** *Has the provincial governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?*



The survey also asked respondents if they have had any contact with a representative of the provincial council over the past two years for help in solving a personal or local problem. Twenty-four percent of respondents say they contacted a provincial council representative, which is slightly higher than 2012 (22%) but equal to the 2011 percentage (see Fig. 6.5 below). Since 2006, however, the trend line for this question has generally been going upward.


**Fig. 6.5: Q-50.** *Have you ever personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years?* || 2006-2013



Community development councils (CDCs) were established as part of the National Solidarity Program to function as elected governance bodies in rural areas, responsible for formulating and supervising development projects and serving as a liaison between communities, the Afghan government, and nongovernmental organizations. Current government policy indicates that CDCs are likely to play the role of village councils provided for in the Afghan Constitution until appropriate legislation is passed and elections are held to formally constitute such bodies.

Respondents received a brief explanation about CDCs, and were then asked whether they were aware of such institutions in their neighborhood. Over half of respondents (58%) say they are aware of a CDC in their area. Awareness of CDCs is noticeably higher among men (62%) than women (54%). Because CDCs operate exclusively in rural areas, it does not come as a surprise that awareness of them is more than twice as high among rural respondents (64%) than urban dwellers (37%). Since 2006 there has been a fairly steady increase in the number of respondents who said they were aware of CDCs (see Fig. 6.6 below).

**Fig. 6.6: Q-40.** *Community development councils (CDC) have been established as part of the National Solidarity Program and members of the council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, do you know if there is a CDC in your community? | 2006-2013*



Respondents who said they are aware of the CDC in their community were asked about their level of satisfaction with the CDC's overall performance. Sixty-three percent say they are satisfied with the performance of their local CDC, including 16% who are very satisfied.

The level of satisfaction with CDCs' job performance differs across regions. Respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region report the highest level of satisfaction (77% say they are very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with CDC performance). The region with the lowest satisfaction level is Central/Kabul (51% of respondents say they are very or somewhat satisfied with CDC performance).

## 6.2 Confidence in public institutions

### Key Question:

**Q-41.** I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?

In addition to their level of satisfaction with different levels of government, respondents also were asked about their level of confidence in a variety of officials, institutions, and organizations. Those who said they have a lot of confidence (phrased as "a great deal of confidence" in previous surveys) or are somewhat confident (phrased as "a fair amount of confidence" in previous surveys) were classified as having confidence in that particular entity. Those respondents who said they had not much or no

confidence at all in that official, institution, or organization were classified as not having confidence. Fig. 6.7 below provides a longitudinal comparison of Afghans' level of confidence in various entities.

**Fig. 6.7: Q-41a/p.** *I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all?*

#### CONFIDENCE IN OFFICIALS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS

	Confidence (%)							
	(A lot + some)							
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Afghanistan Land Authority	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71
Electronic media such as radio, TV	84	74	76	70	71	72	75	68
Religious leaders	-	-	-	-	-	74	73	66
Community shuras/jirgas	-	71	69	67	66	70	68	65
Community development councils	-	64	65	64	61	68	66	62
Provincial councils	-	69	65	62	62	67	66	57
Provincial government	-	-	-	-	-	67	65	59
Parliament as a whole	-	-	-	-	59	62	62	47
Your member of parliament	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
Government ministers	-	58	51	53	54	56	55	45
National NGOs	57	59	62	61	55	54	54	51
International NGOs	57	65	64	66	54	56	53	51
Local militias	31	33	36	37	34	36	39	32
District government	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61
People who take bribes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
The court system	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43

In general respondents expressed lower levels of confidence in 2013 than they did in 2012 for every public institution, organization, and official listed. Public confidence in parliament experienced the sharpest decline in respondents' level of confidence: a 15% drop from 2012 to 2013. In virtually all cases in 2013, respondents' stated level of confidence in these various institutions reached an eight-year low.

## 6.3 Corruption

### Key Questions:


**Q-25:** Please tell me whether you think corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas: [a. in your daily life, b. in your neighborhood, c. in your local authorities, d. in your provincial government, e. in Afghanistan as a whole].

**Q-26:** Please tell me how often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? [a. officials in the municipality/district office, b. customs office, c. Afghan National Police, d., Afghan National Army, e. judiciary/courts, f. state electricity supply, g. public healthcare service, h. when applying for a job, i. admission to schools/university, j. to receive official documents.]

**Q-27:** Do you think that your local district or provincial government is doing too much, about right, or not enough to fight corruption?

As described in Chapter 2, this year corruption was the second most frequently mentioned major problem facing Afghanistan as a whole, right after insecurity. Survey results reveal that Afghans see corruption as a major problem in all facets of life and at all levels of government (see Fig. 6.8 below). Forty-nine percent of respondents say corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood. Around equal percentages of respondents say corruption is a major problem in their daily life (56%) and in their local authorities (58%). More than two thirds say that corruption is a major problem in their provincial government (68%), and over three quarters say that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole (77%).

**Fig. 6.8:** Q-25a/e. Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas.




Nationally, when asked about corruption, respondents reported that it is a major or minor problem in the following categories: in Afghanistan as a whole (95%), in provincial government (93%), and in local authorities (90%). These figures have been consistently high since the first survey in 2006, with small changes from year to year.

For example, the percentage of respondents reporting that corruption is a major problem in their neighborhood fell slightly (by 2%) from 2012 to 2013. The perception that corruption is a major problem in Afghanistan as a whole is at its highest point in 2013 since the first survey was conducted in 2006. The lack of improvement in the assessment of corruption as a problem at these three levels of government is of interest when considering the commitment made by the government in the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework to address corruption.

The biggest recent change in Afghans' perception of corruption has been in the area of daily life. The percentage of respondents who say that corruption is a major or minor problem in daily life increased by 14% from 2006 to 2011, but fell by 4% from 2011 to 2013 (see Fig. 6.9 below).

**Fig. 6.9: Q-25a.** *Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following area. | | 2006-2013*



With corruption registering as one of the biggest problems facing Afghanistan, the survey sought to measure people's actual personal experience with corruption in various facets of life by asking how



often in the past year they had to give cash or a gift to, or perform a favor for, a government official in various institutions and situations (see Fig. 6.10 below).

The situation in which respondents most frequently encountered corruption in the form of an obligation to pay a bribe is when seeking public healthcare services (38%). Around a third of respondents also report encountering corruption when applying for jobs (31%), interacting with the judiciary/courts (33%), receiving official documents (28%) and in dealing with the Afghan National Police (31%). The lowest experience of bribery is recorded for contact with the Afghan National Army (21%).


**Fig. 6.10: Q-26a/j.** *Please tell me how often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations?*

### CORRUPTION: VARIOUS SITUATIONS

Institution	No cases	In some cases	Most cases	In all cases	Had no contact	Refused	Don't know	Overall
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Officials in the municipality/district office	23	12	11	6	47	0	1	100
Customs office	21	12	9	4	54	0	1	100
Afghan National Police	28	17	10	4	40	0	1	100
Afghan National Army	32	11	7	3	46	0	1	100
Judiciary/courts	21	15	12	6	45	0	1	100
State electricity supply	26	14	10	3	46	0	1	100
Public healthcare service	33	21	13	4	29	0	1	100
When applying for a job	25	15	11	5	43	0	1	100
Admissions to schools/university	31	13	10	3	43	0	1	100
To receive official documents	25	14	10	4	45	0	1	100

Overall, when asked to provide their assessment of provincial and district government efforts to fight corruption, 47% of Afghans say that government's level of effort is about right, and 37% say government is not doing enough. Respondents' views vary across the regions (see Fig. 6.11 below). The largest proportion of respondents in the Central/Kabul (43%) and North East (38%) regions say the government is not doing enough to fight corruption. This is likely influenced by the fact that the Central/Kabul region has among the highest proportion of respondents who say that corruption is a major problem across most levels of government. Most respondents in the South East and South West regions say the government's level of effort in fighting corruption is about right.

**Fig. 6.11: Q-27.** Do you think that your local district or provincial government is doing too much, about right, or not enough to fight corruption?



## 6.4 Dispute resolution and justice systems

### Key Questions:

**Q-68:** In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood-based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?

**Q-69:** What kind of a case or dispute was it?

**Q-71:** Where have you taken this case or dispute?

**Q-73:** Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department [a. are fair and trusted]?

**Q-74:** Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the State Courts [a. are fair and trusted, b. follow the local norms and

values of our people, c. are effective at delivering justice, d. resolve cases timely and promptly].

**Q-75:** Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based shuras/jirgas [a. are fair and trusted, b. follow the local norms and values of our people, c. are effective at delivering justice, d. resolve cases timely and promptly fair and trusted]

**Q-77:** How satisfied are you with the available dispute resolution mechanisms/services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?

Overall, 71% of Afghans say they are somewhat or very satisfied with the available dispute resolution mechanisms/services in their area. Nineteen percent say that in the past two years they have taken a dispute to the Huquq<sup>83</sup> (formal justice system) or village jirga/shura (local informal justice system). Of these respondents, 77% were either somewhat or fully satisfied with the outcome.

Looking at regional variations, respondents from the South East region (29%) were significantly more likely<sup>84</sup> and respondents from the Central/Hazarajat region (9%) were significantly less likely<sup>85</sup> than respondents from other regions to take a dispute that they could not settle to the Huquq or local village jirga/shura.


The four main categories of disputes taken to the Huquq or village jirga/shura, were related to land (41%), family matters (18%), commercial matters (12%), and other property disputes (12%) (see Fig. 6.12 below).

83 The Ministry of Justice Department of Huquq is tasked with settling citizen disputes related to debt, property, and family matters.

84 Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 1.3e+03$ ,  $p < 0.000$


85 Pearson  $\chi^2(1) = 424.7658$ ,  $p = 0.000$

**Fig. 6.12: Q-68 and Q-69.** *In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not? If yes, what kind of a case or dispute was it?*



Since 2009,<sup>86</sup> the percentage of respondents reporting that they have taken land disputes to the Huquq or to the village shura/jirga, has declined by 10% (See Fig. 6.13 below). The number of respondents reporting commercial disputes to the Huquq or the village shura/jirga has risen by 5% in recent years (8% in 2009 to 13% in 2013).

**Fig. 6.13: Q-69.** *What kind of a case of dispute was it? | Land 2009-2013*



86 The disputes over land option was not included in the 2010 questionnaire, and so there is no data for that year.

Of those respondents who reported a land dispute, there was regional variation, with respondents from the South East region (16%) being the most likely<sup>87</sup> and respondents from the Central/Hazarajat region (2%) being the least likely<sup>88</sup> to have taken this type of dispute to the Huquq or local shura/jirga. However, the percentage of respondents in the Central/Hazarajat region who report having taken land disputes to the Huquq or village shura/jirga (67%)<sup>89</sup> was the highest of any region.

Looking at which dispute resolution institutions respondents turned to for assistance, 36% of respondents took their disputes to local shuras/jirgas and 36% took their disputes to the Huquq, but 24% took their disputes to both institutions (see Fig. 6.14 below). This suggests that in these disputes, a satisfactory outcome may not have been achieved with the shura/jirga so the dispute was taken to the formal justice system. Whether they took a dispute to the local shura/jirga or to the Huquq depends on the type of dispute. Respondents were more likely to take disputes to the Huquq if the disputes involved divorce (52%) or traffic accidents (47%), but they were more likely to take disputes to the local shura/jirga if the disputes were about family problems (44%).

**Fig. 6.14: Q-69.** *What kind of a case or dispute was it? Where have you taken this case or dispute?* || Q-61 by Q-71

#### DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY INSTITUTIONS

	Huquq department state court	Village, neighborhood-based shura/jirga	Both	Other	Don't know	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Dispute over land	36	37	25	0	2	100
Other property dispute	36	31	31	0	1	100
Commercial dispute	38	38	24	0	0	100
Divorce	52	28	19	0	2	100
Family problems	30	44	22	0	3	100
Traffic accident	47	29	23	0	1	100
Drug smuggling	0	0	100	0	0	100
Reconstruction problem	100	0	0	0	0	100
Robbery	39	16	44	0	0	100
Dispute over inheritance	40	0	60	0	0	100
Refused	40	60	0	0	0	100
Don't know	4	24	4	0	68	100
Overall	36	36	24	0	3	100


87 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(1) = 16.9327, Pr = 0.000

88 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(1) = 15.0492, Pr = 0.000

89 n=40


Fig 6.15 below shows that the proportion of respondents who reported taking disputes for resolution to state courts or Huquq department decreased from 46% in 2012 to 36% in 2013. The same reduction appears in the informal justice system, where the proportion of respondents saying they use their village or neighborhood-based shura/jirga for dispute resolution decreased from 43% to 36%. However, the number of respondents who say they took their disputes both to the state court and shura/jirga shows a sharp increase, from 6% in 2012 to 24% in 2013.

**Fig. 6.15: Q-71. Where have you taken this case or dispute? || 2008-2013**



Given the high percentage of respondents who are satisfied with the available dispute resolution mechanisms/services in their area, it is not surprising that many respondents also somewhat agree or strongly agree with the statement that the Huquq department (72%), state courts (62%), and local shura/jirgas (81%) are fair and trusted. Fig 6.16 below compares Afghans' perceptions about state courts and shuras/jirgas on a range of issues.

**Fig. 6.16: Q-74.** *Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts?* Q-75. *Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras?*



The most noteworthy finding in the responses to this question is that the local informal justice system is considered by respondents to be more fair, trustworthy, effective, efficient, and in line with local norms and values than the formal state courts. The widest gap in respondents' perceptions is in their level of agreement with the statement about these institutions' ability to resolve cases in a timely and prompt manner. Sixty-seven percent say jirgas/shuras resolve cases in a timely and prompt fashion, while only 46% say the same of the state courts.

## 7 Political Participation

Afghanistan's next presidential and provincial council elections are scheduled for April 5, 2014. The perceived legitimacy of the electoral process is critical to the stability of the country's political system in the post-transition period. The 2009 presidential and provincial council elections and 2010 parliamentary elections were marred by violence and intimidation aimed at candidates and voters, and allegations and formal complaints of fraudulent practices like ballot stuffing and vote buying. It is against this backdrop that Afghans are formulating their views on the upcoming election in 2014.

In July 2013, a new Electoral Law and a Law on the Structure and Authorities of the Election Commission were approved. Despite this positive step, given past experience in Afghanistan the challenges to a free and fair election are considerable. The Afghan government and its development partners must place priority on developing and improving election dispute resolution mechanisms, the selection process for members of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC), the role of political parties, and the vote counting process. They must also ensure that all eligible Afghans are able to register and vote in the election. At the end of the first phase of voter registration in July 2013, only 23% of registered voters were women.

With respect to the exercise of broader political freedoms beyond the right to vote, the story is mixed. The Afghan constitution protects the rights to assembly and expression, but these rights are erratically upheld across the country. Demonstrators and protestors are occasionally met with excessive force. Media plays a critical role in conveying information about elections and other political issues to the general public and helping shape public opinion, as evidenced by a rapid recent increase in the number of political talk shows on television and radio. Selective government crackdowns on media encourage self-censorship, although the Afghan parliament's recent modification to the Media Law, which creates a commission for media-related complaints and violations, is another positive development. In the run-up to the 2014 election it is essential that Afghan citizens are able to freely access information and express their views on the political development of their country.

### 7.1 Exercising basic political freedoms

#### Key Questions:

**Q-30:** Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities [a. participating in a peaceful demonstration] with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?

**Q-31a:** In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. How strongly do you agree or disagree that in Afghanistan it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public?

**Q-31b:** In comparison to one year ago, do people in your community feel more safe, as safe as before, or less safe to express their opinions?

**Q-32:** What changes compared with the past do you think have made most people to feel more safe to express their opinions in the area where you live?

**Q-33:** Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their opinions?



In the area of freedom of expression, 23% of respondents in 2013 report that it is more safe for people in their communities to express their opinions than it was in 2012. Seventeen percent say it is less safe, and 56% say that it is no different than a year ago. Relative to other regions, the highest proportion of respondents from the South West (24%) and East region (23%) say it is less safe for people to express their opinions, and the highest proportion of respondents from the North East and Central/Kabul regions (both 29%) say it is more safe. While there were no major gender differences in the response to this question, there is a notable urban-rural difference, with 27% of urban respondents saying people in their area feel more safe to express their opinions, but only 22% of rural respondents saying people feel more safe.

It is particularly important to understand regional variations in respondents' perceptions of their freedom of expression during the lead up to the 2014 elections. In 2013 the data from this question were compared with the previous three years (2010-2012). The analysis shows that respondents felt that it was significantly<sup>90</sup> safer for communities to express their opinions in the Central/Kabul and the South East regions during 2013 compared to the national average figures for the previous three years. However, respondents in the West, North East, Central Hazarajat, and North West regions felt that it was significantly<sup>91</sup> less safe for communities to express their opinions in 2013 compared to the average for the previous three years.

Those who say people in their area feel more safe this year to express their opinions tend to attribute it to things like improvements in security conditions in their area (48%) and guaranteed free speech (26%). Respondents who say it is less safe to express opinions this year cite things like bad security conditions (35%) and the presence of the Taliban (18%).

However, analysis of responses to this question over time shows that there is a complex interplay of factors influencing whether respondents feel safe to express their opinions, including: insecurity, perceived freedom of speech, gender, literacy level, income level, the level of support for women's rights, fear for personal safety, fear of the ANA or ANP, and fear of foreign forces. Age does not have a significant impact, and income is only marginally significant.

There are some interesting correlations between respondents' views on this question about freedom of expression and their views on other questions in the survey. On average, a person who is afraid of foreign forces is 40% more likely<sup>92</sup> to report having fear to express opinions. Similarly, respondents who fear for their personal safety or that of their family are more likely<sup>93</sup> to feel less safe to express their opinions. These other influencing factors may also help to explain apparent inconsistencies in the survey responses. For example, of the 68% of respondents who either somewhat or strongly

90 Central/Kabul Region - Pearson  $\chi^2(2, n=5,888) = 48.6744, p < 0.000$ ; South East Region - Pearson  $\chi^2(2, n=2,766) = 14.6571, p < 0.001$

91 West Region - Pearson  $\chi^2(2, n=3,137) = 20.3828, p < 0.000$ ; North East Region - Pearson  $\chi^2(2, n=3,525) = 12.8603, p < 0.002$ ; North West Region - Pearson  $\chi^2(2, n=3,663) = 14.9499, p < 0.001$ ; Central/Hazarajat Region - Pearson  $\chi^2(2, n=1,225) = 49.5707, p < 0.000$

92 Probit regression of q31b, perceived safety to express opinions, on q30h, fear when encountering foreign forces. Beta = 0.40,  $p < .001$ , Pseudo  $R^2 = 0.04$ , LR  $\chi^2(1, n=3,580) = 196.37, p < 0.0000$

93  $r = +0.12, p < 0.0001$

agreed that it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public, 16% also felt that it was less safe for people in their community to express their opinions.<sup>94</sup>

Regarding freedom of assembly, 68% of respondents expressed fear about participating in a peaceful demonstration. On average, women are 27% more likely to be afraid to participate in a demonstration than men, even after accounting for regional differences. Interestingly, respondents who earn more money are more likely to be afraid to participate in peaceful demonstrations than those who earn less, and Pashtuns are more likely to report a lot of fear compared to Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. Fewer respondents in the South West region say they would fear participating in a peaceful demonstration this year (72%), compared to last year (81%). However, there were no significant differences between 2012 and 2013 on this question for any other regions.

The main reasons why respondents are likely to express fear of participating in a peaceful demonstration are: fear of foreign forces, fear of travel, fear of the ANP, and lastly fear of the ANA. For example, on average, a respondent who is afraid of foreign forces is 73%<sup>95</sup> more likely to be afraid of participating in a demonstration than someone who isn't afraid of foreign forces. This is independent of the effect of age, gender, and geographic region.


Respondents were then asked about the degree to which they think it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public. About three quarters of respondents (76%) strongly agree or somewhat agree that it is acceptable. Seventy-three percent of respondents in rural areas agree, while 83% of urban respondents are in agreement, revealing a fairly sizeable rural-urban difference. There are also some regional differences in views on this question (see Fig. 7.1 below). The highest level of agreement with the statement that it is generally acceptable to criticize the government is in the Central/Kabul region (83%). Relative to the other regions, fewer people in the West region (61%) agree that it is acceptable to criticize the government in public.

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94 83% of those respondents who somewhat or strongly agreed that it generally acceptable to criticize the government in public also felt that it is either more safe or as safe as it was in 2012 to express their opinions.

95 Stepwise probit regression of q30c (fear of participating in a peaceful demonstration) on fear of foreign forces, gender, urban-rural and region. Beta = 0.7257,  $p < 0.000$ , Pseudo  $R^2 = 0.0583$ , LR  $\chi^2(1, n=8,865) = 644.49$ ,  $p < 0.0000$

**Fig. 7.1: Q-31a.** *How strongly do you agree or disagree that in Afghanistan it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public?* || By region



## 7.2 Ability to influence government decisions

### Key Question:

**Q-34:** How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

Overall, 48% of respondents say they can have some or a lot of influence over local government decisions. This figure varies regionally, with 63% of respondents in the East region and 39% in the Central/Kabul region saying they can have some or a lot of influence. There are also variations by ethnicity and gender. Pashtuns are significantly more likely<sup>96</sup> than all other ethnic groups, Tajiks significantly less likely<sup>97</sup> than Pashtuns, and men significantly more likely<sup>98</sup> than women to think that they can have some influence over local government decisions.

It is somewhat difficult to report on a longitudinal trend for this question, because the word “local” was added to this question in 2013 in order to capture a more meaningful answer. This changed the question from referring to influence over government in general, to referring to influence over two specific institutions of subnational government (i.e., provincial and district). However, looking at the trendline from 2008 to 2012, there has been a steady decline in the percentage of respondents who feel that they have some or a lot of influence over government decisions, from a high of 66% in 2008 down to 52% in 2012, and then to 48% (referring only to local government decisions) in 2013.

96 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,151) = 58.3807, p = < 0.000

97 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=6,738) = 69.6076, p < 0.000

98 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,151) = 48.8091, p = < 0.000

## 7.3 Politics and religion


### Key Question:

**Q-28.** Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view?

The survey examined public opinion about the involvement of religious leaders in government decision-making. Respondents were asked whether they agree more with the idea that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e., that local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on problems facing an area), or that politics and religion should not mix. More than half (58%) of respondents say that religion and politics should mix, while just over a third (38%) say that politics and religion should not mix. Interestingly, there is a sizeable urban-rural difference in the responses to this question; 68% of urban respondents, but only 55% of rural respondents, agree that politics and religion should mix. There were no significant gender differences in the responses to this question.

Looking at regional differences (see Fig. 7.2 below), people in the Central/Kabul (71%) and South West (62%) regions were the most likely to agree that politics and religion should be mixed, while respondents from the North West (47%) and Central/Hazarajat (49%) regions were the least likely to agree.


**Fig. 7.2:** Q-28. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view? || By region



In addition, there are noticeable variations among ethnic groups' views on this issue. Tajik respondents were most likely to say that politics and religion should mix (63%), followed by Hazaras (59%) and Uzbeks (57%). Pashtun respondents (54%) were the least in agreement with the statement that politics and religion should be mixed.

The proportion of respondents who say politics and religion should be mixed (58%) has decreased considerably from 2011 and 2012, when 69%-70% of respondents agreed that politics and religion should be mixed (see Fig. 7.3 below).

**Fig. 7.3: Q-28.** *Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view? || 2006-2013*



## 7.4 Elections and voting decisions

### Key Questions:

**Q-30:** Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities [b. voting in a national or provincial election, d. running for public office] with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?

**Q-54:** Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair”: In general, do you think elections in Afghanistan are free and fair, or not?

**Q-55:** Tell me the reasons why you think they were not free and fair starting with the most important reason and then the next most important reason and so on.

**Q-56:** Please tell me which statement you agree with more: (a) each person should vote for oneself regardless of what his/her community thinks, or (b) each person should vote the way his or her community votes?

**Q-57:** From the following four sources – mosque, community shuras, friends/family, and bazaars – which one do you use most often for obtaining information about elections and who to vote for?

**Q-58.** Does security, by this we mean participating and traveling to polling stations, play a part in deciding whether you will vote in an election?

**Q-59.** In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have no impact on your life?

**Q-84:** If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

It was explained to respondents that “free” generally means that all people have the chance to vote as they wish, and that “fair” generally means that all candidates/parties follow the rules, are given equal access to the public, and the votes were counted correctly and not manipulated.

When asked about elections in Afghanistan, in 2013 61% of respondents say that in general they are free and fair. It is difficult to compare the 2013 responses to the question on free and fair elections with the question that was asked in the previous two years. In the 2013 survey the meaning of the term “elections” was purposefully made more general (i.e., it refers to the three main types of elections, presidential, parliamentary, and provincial council) rather than just referring to the 2010 parliamentary elections (as was the case for the question in the previous two years). Although Afghans’ responses on these two questions are not directly comparable, it is interesting to note that in 2011, 49% of respondents said that the 2010 parliamentary elections were free and fair.

The reasons that respondents provide in 2013 for why they think elections in Afghanistan are not free and fair mostly concern corruption: for example, corruption in counting the votes (23%), corruption in the election process in general (16%), and vote buying (14%). Eleven percent mentioned lack of security. Although the results are not directly comparable, it is still interesting to note that the reasons given in recent years for why the parliamentary elections were not free and fair mirror the results of 2013, but with different emphasis. In 2011, the two main reasons volunteered by respondents for why the elections were not free and fair were vote buying (42%) and fraudulent vote counting (35%), and in 2012 the main reasons given were general elections fraud (76%) and bribery (10%).

When asked about the level of fear they would have to run for public office, 58% of respondents said they would have some or a lot of fear. Regarding regional variations in the response to this question, respondents from the South East (77%), South West (76%), and West (76%) regions are the most afraid of running for political office, while respondents from the North East (48%) and Central/Kabul (49%) regions would have significantly<sup>99</sup> less fear compared to all other regions. It is also important to note that the level of fear when running for public office significantly<sup>100</sup> increased in 2013 compared to all previous years of the survey.

Women (67%) would be more afraid of running for public office than men (56%). This finding is interesting when paired with information from the IEC that in nine provinces, no women have registered as candidates for the provincial council positions. Regionally, women would be the most afraid of running for public office in the South West (88%), West (84%), and South East (79%) regions, and least afraid in the Central/Kabul (54%), Central/Hazarajat (56%), and North East (59%) regions.

Compared to 2012, both men and women would be significantly<sup>101,102</sup> more afraid of running for public office in 2013.

99 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (2, n=8,885) = 158.0376 p = < 0.000


100 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (7, n=53,753) = 477.0139, p < 0.000

101 Men: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (2, n=9508) = 9.4678, p = < 0.009

102 Women: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (2, n=5416) = 20.6305, p = < 0.000

Fifty-nine percent of respondents report that they would experience some or a lot of fear when voting in a national or provincial election (see Fig. 7.4 below). The trend for this question peaked in 2010 after the national elections and has risen by 3% since 2012, but overall it appears to be on an upward trajectory. This should be a matter of concern for those planning the 2014 elections.

**Fig.7.4: Q-30.** *Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities [voting in a national or provincial election] with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?* || 2006-2013



There were regional and ethnic variations in the level of fear of voting in a national or provincial election. Respondents in the South West (74%), South East (72%), and West (71%) regions have the most fear, and respondents in the North West (48%), Central/Hazarajat (44%), and North East (43%) regions have the least fear. Respondents from the Central/Kabul (51%) and the West regions (71%) have significantly<sup>103</sup> more fear in 2013 than they did in 2012. Lastly, Pashtuns are significantly<sup>104</sup> more afraid of voting in a national or provincial election than other ethnic groups in 2013.

In response to a question about whether a person should make his or her own decision when voting or vote according to the views of the community, 81% of respondents agree that each person should vote for himself/herself, regardless of what the community thinks.

Regionally, respondents in the Central/Kabul region (86%) were most likely to agree that a person should make his or her own voting decision, and respondents in the South East region (73%) were the least likely to agree. Regarding ethnic differences, Pashtuns are significantly<sup>105</sup> more likely than any other ethnic group to say that people should decide for themselves. However, this may be because the Pashtun vote is traditionally split between multiple candidates, unlike the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek ethnic groups, which tend to only have one or very few candidates at the national level.

103 Central/Kabul Region: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=3,239) = 23.2507, p = < 0.000; West Region: Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(1, n=1,755) = 22.5057, p < 0.000


104 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9177) = 325.7802, p = < 0.000)

105 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(1, n=9,203) = 66.3136, p = < 0.000

Nationally, 53% of respondents think women should decide for themselves who they should vote for (see Fig. 7.5 below). Twenty-five percent say that men should decide for women, and 21% say that women should decide with the advice of men. However, the figures vary significantly between provinces and by gender. Respondents in Zabul (17%), Paktika (19%), and Nooristan (20%) are significantly<sup>106</sup> less likely to say that women should decide for themselves than other provinces, and respondents in Panjshir (79%) and Bamyan (78%) are significantly<sup>107</sup> more likely to say that women should decide for themselves.

Sixty-two percent of women say that women should decide on their own how to vote, compared to only 45% of men who said that women should decide on their own (see Fig. 7.5 below). Female respondents are significantly<sup>108</sup> more likely to say that women should decide for themselves. Urban respondents are significantly more likely<sup>109</sup> to say that women should decide who to vote for by themselves (66%) compared to rural respondents (49%) (see Fig. 7.5). Looking at ethnic differences, 65% of Hazaras, 58% of Tajiks, 53% of Uzbeks, and 45% of Pashtuns say that women should decide their vote for themselves.

**Fig. 7.5: Q-84.** *If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?* || Overall and by gender and settlement



This year the survey asked a new question concerning respondents' main source of information about elections. Respondents by far and most frequently identified relatives and family members as their main source (48%) (see Fig. 7.6 below). This is a particularly important source of information for women in rural areas, who are more confined to their homes and have low literacy levels; male house-

106 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(2, n=9,141) = 233.0293, p < 0.000

107 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(2, n=9,141) = 221.7624, p < 0.000


108 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup>(2, n= 9,141) = 284.0800, p < 0.000

109 An OLS regression was conducted to determine the effect of living in urban areas, ethnicity, occupation, income and region on q84, whether or not women should decide for themselves who to vote for. Living in urban areas significantly increased perceptions of whether or not women should decide for themselves (Beta=0.2503, t=11.73, p < 0.000, F [6, n=9,113] p < 0.000, R<sup>2</sup> = 0.05), after controlling for ethnicity, occupation, income and region.



hold members relay information obtained from outside the home to the female household members. Eighteen percent of respondents say the weekly community shura is their main source of election information, and 13% say the mosque, specifically the mullahs' Friday sermons. The twice-weekly village markets and bazaars were identified by 5% of respondents as their main election information source.


**Fig. 7.6: Q-57.** *From the following four sources — mosque, community shuras, friends/family, and bazaars — which one do you use most often for obtaining information about elections and who to vote for?*



In recent elections in Afghanistan, one of the biggest problems on election day has been security. To explore this issue, in 2013 the survey incorporated a new question that solicited respondents' opinions about the degree to which security conditions on election day (i.e., the conditions they would face when participating in the election and traveling to the polls) influence their decision whether or not to vote. A very high proportion of respondents (81%) say that election day security conditions are a factor in their decision. Urban respondents (84%) were slightly more likely to say that security is a factor in their decision to vote than rural respondents (80%).

With the next presidential election slated for the spring of 2014, this year's survey asked respondents if they think the outcome of that election will make a difference in their lives. Encouragingly, more than half of those interviewed (56%) say that the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make their lives better (see Fig. 7.7 below). Twenty-four percent of Afghans say that the election will make no difference in their lives, and only 15% anticipate that it will make their lives worse.

**Fig. 7.7: Q-59.** *In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have no impact on your life?*





## 8 Access to Information

The physical communications infrastructure in Afghanistan is rapidly expanding. As a measure of the progress that has been made in the last decade, it is remarkable that 85%<sup>110</sup> of the country is now covered by mobile phone networks. The number of radio and television stations has increased significantly over the last few years, and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) has started to issue more licenses to private internet service providers (ISPs) with the goal of increasing internet access across Afghanistan. At the same time, the cost of internet access is decreasing rapidly due to a major expansion of the fiber-optic network supported by Afghanistan's development partners. As more Afghans have access to mobile and internet technology, Afghanistan's rapidly growing and evolving social media sector will have an increasingly important impact on public opinion and the level of public engagement on critical social and political issues.

The impact of the expansion of the physical communication infrastructure and the availability of different forms of information sharing has mostly been felt in urban areas, where access to information is easier and electricity supplies more stable. In rural areas, the role of jirgas and shuras as both governing bodies and one of the main channels of information has been reinforced by decades of war, the destruction of the media infrastructure, and widespread illiteracy.<sup>111</sup> Casual word of mouth, the mosque, and radio also continue to be major sources of information for rural Afghans. However, in rural areas in particular, the expansion of the mobile phone network is likely to have significant impacts beyond simply improving communication. Mobile phones transcend social, economic, and geographic boundaries, and are quickly becoming tools for the delivery of services in Afghanistan, including the provision of agricultural information and mobile banking.

One of the impacts of the 2014 transition process on access to information is likely to be a decline in funding for Afghan media organizations from international donors, especially those organizations that produce programs for broadcast on local radio. In addition, the draft media law that is currently being discussed could allow the government to restrict media activities, especially those of news channels. The draft law would also restrict the ability of media to debate or report on topics such as national security and religion.

### 8.1 Physical sources of information

#### Key Question:

Q-7. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information? [a. radio, b. TV set, c. mobile phone, d. computer, e. fixed phone line, f. the internet]

Overall, 80% of respondents use a radio, 54% use a television, and 57% use a mobile phone, but only 2% use a computer and 3% use the internet for obtaining information. The use of a fixed phone line


110 Yacoobi, Sakena. "Literacy and Education for Afghan Women through Texting." June 4, 2013. The Huffington Post. <http://www.huffingtonpost.org>

111 Rawan, S. M. (2002). Modern Mass Media and Traditional Communication in Afghanistan, *Political Communication* Vol.19 (2), pp.155-170.

was less than 1%. In 2012, respondents were asked whether they *owned* a radio, television, mobile phone, or computer. In 2013, the question was modified to ask whether respondents *use* a radio, television, mobile phone, or computer for obtaining information. This change was made in order to provide more useful data.

Previous survey data shows that between 2007 and 2012, radio ownership in rural areas was about half that of radio ownership in urban areas. However, radio ownership and radio use for obtaining information are not the same thing. While in 2013 84% of rural respondents say that they use radio for obtaining information, in 2012 only 40% said that they owned a radio, suggesting that rural respondents are regularly accessing radios that are owned by others. It is quite common in rural Afghanistan for villagers to gather around a radio in or just outside the home of the families that own radios. In 2013, respondents in rural areas (84%) were more likely to use a radio for obtaining information than urban residents (65%), probably because urban residents have easier access to other means of obtaining information (see Fig. 8.1 below).

**Fig 8.1** Q-7. *Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information?* || Rural and urban



Looking at provincial radio use in more detail, in 16 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan more than 90% of respondents report using a radio for obtaining information. The provinces with the highest overall use of radio as a means of obtaining information were Kandahar (99%), Parwan (99%), Logar (99%), and Khost (99%). Radio use was significantly<sup>112</sup> lower in Sar-i-Pul (36%), Nimroz (59%), Bamyan (54%), and Daikundi (51%) than in other provinces, and radio use in Sar-i-Pul was significantly<sup>113</sup> lower than in any other province. In these four provinces, the percentage of women using radio to obtain information was also significantly<sup>114</sup> lower than for any other province (Sar-i-Pul (12%),

112 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=9,260) = 839.0022, p < 0.000$

113 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=9260) = 317.2942, p < 0.000$


114 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=3,136) = 346.8250, p < 0.000$

Nimroz (40%), Bamyan (49%), and Daikundi (33%), compared to the 72% radio use by women at the national level).

Looking at the use of television for obtaining information (see Fig. 8.1 above), 54% of respondents report that they use a television set, but in contrast to the data on radio use, more women (61%) report using a television for obtaining information than men (49%). Ninety-three percent of respondents living in urban areas use a television for obtaining information, compared to 41% of those living in rural areas. This is probably partly due to the poor electricity supply in rural areas.

There was a sharp increase in ownership of mobile phones from 2007 to 2012 (see Fig. 8.2 below), but compared to 2013 data on mobile phone use, a relatively low percentage of respondents (57%) reported using a mobile phone for obtaining information. There was no significant difference between men and women in the use of mobile phones, but there is a significant<sup>115</sup> difference in the use of mobile phones as a means of accessing information between urban respondents (83%) and rural respondents (50%) (see Fig. 8.1 above).

**Fig. 8.2:** *Mobile phone ownership.* || 2007-2012



As noted above, the reported use of computers is still very low (2% of respondents). However, even though the number of respondents reporting that they use a computer was small, four times as many men (4%) as women (1%) use a computer. Internet use mirrors this pattern, with 3% of respondents reporting that they use the internet to obtain information, and four times as many men (4%) as women (1%) using the internet for this purpose, and urban respondents (11%) using the internet to obtain information at a much higher rate than rural respondents (1%).

115 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,260) = 462.6391, p < 0.000

In summary, there is a significant difference between rural and urban areas in their use of communication technology, with respondents in rural areas relying most on radio<sup>116</sup> and respondents in urban areas relying most on television<sup>117</sup> and mobile phones for obtaining information.

## 8.2 Social sources of information

### Key question:


**Q-8.** Which one of the following sources do you use most often for obtaining information? [mosque, community shuras, friends and family, bazaars, other sources]

In terms of social sources of information, the most common means of obtaining information reported by respondents is from family and friends (46%). The next most common sources among the choices offered in the survey are mosques (16%), community shuras/jirgas (12%), and bazaars (5%). Twenty percent of Afghans say that they use other sources as their primary source of information.

The wording of this question has changed several times over the years in which the survey has been implemented, making longitudinal comparisons difficult. However, looking at the averages for 2006-2010, the top three categories were family and neighbors (52%), community elders (14%), and mullahs (10%).

In 2013 there are important differences between urban and rural respondents' responses, with the overall reported use of these different social sources of information being significantly<sup>118</sup> lower in urban areas than in rural areas (see Fig. 8.3 below).

**Fig. 8.3:** Q-8. Which one of the following sources do you use most often for obtaining information? || Rural and urban



116 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=9,260) = 95.9146, p < 0.000$

117 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=9,259) = 1.2e+03, p < 0.000$

118 Pearson  $\chi^2(4, n=9,230) = 494.1944, p < 0.000$

For example, the reliance on family and friends as a key source of information is lower in urban areas (40%) than in rural areas (48%). Nine percent of urban respondents most often use a mosque for obtaining information, compared to 18% of rural respondents. Perhaps less surprising is that rural respondents (15%) rely much more heavily on local shuras/jirgas for obtaining information than do urban respondents (4%). Access to other forms of information is more limited in rural areas, and shuras/jirgas are a well-established and trusted traditional source of information. However, the high percentage of urban respondents (43%) who say they use “other sources” for information suggests that urban respondents may have been confused about the difference between social sources and physical sources of information when considering this question. Lastly, there are some interesting gender differences in the reliance of different sources of social information. Women (61%) are significantly<sup>119</sup> more likely to use family and friends as a main source of information compared to men (32%), but women (7%) are significantly<sup>120</sup> less likely to use a mosque as a main source of information than men (25%).

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119 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=9,260) = 799.3620, p = < 0.000$

120 Pearson  $\chi^2(1, n=) = 420.3291, p = < 0.000$





## 9 Women in Society

In the midst of the ongoing security and economic transitions in Afghanistan, and looking towards the political transition and transformational period to come, Afghan women face significant challenges. The past decade has seen tremendous gains for women, particularly in the realms of health and education, with maternal mortality reducing by 80% and girls' enrollment in schools increasing to 3.2 million. This past year, however, there have been some major setbacks for both women's rights and the gains that have been made.

The withdrawal of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and international security forces has resulted in girls' schools temporarily closing or shutting down entirely in some areas until some level of stability can be achieved by government security forces. With the loss of PRT funding and security, women have lost jobs, access to services, and mobility. Lack of economic opportunities and unemployment will continue to be major obstacles facing Afghan women, as new government policies make it increasingly difficult for women to register their own companies and apply for business loans. The Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) law, enacted by a presidential decree in 2009, was celebrated as a major step forward for women's rights in Afghanistan, but it has yet to be ratified by parliament.

In the past decade, women's participation in politics has increased and has consistently been held up as a major achievement for women's rights since the fall of the Taliban. There are currently 68 women members in parliament's lower house, 28 women senators in the upper house, a total of 117 women in all 34 provincial councils, three women ministers, and one female governor. This year, however, women's quota provisions in the new elections law were systematically taken out. While a 20% quota for women in provincial council seats was negotiated back into the law in July 2013, the 5% reduction (down from a previous quota of 25%) eliminated 21 women's seats in the provincial councils. A low number of female candidates may contribute towards further curbing women's quotas and female voter turnout. There is currently a strong push to register women to vote in the 2014 elections, after the effort got off to a slow start.

This year has been a year of transitions: security transition with the final tranche of PRTs closing, the beginning of the political transition with voters and candidates registering for the next presidential election, and economic transition as the reduced number of international personnel and projects starts to affect local economies and as unemployment rises with the youth bulge. It will be important for the Afghan government and its international development partners to ensure that the rights and role of women in Afghan society continue to be a priority in the post-2014 period.

## 9.1 Rights and justice

### Key Questions:

**Q-66a.** I'm going to read some statements. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. [a. Everyone should have equal rights under the law regardless of their gender]

**Q-74e.** Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts? [e. State courts treat men and women equally]

**Q-75e.** Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras? [e. There should be local women's jirgas and shuras]

**Q-76a/c.** Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements? [a. the practices of baad, and baadal in Afghanistan, b. The guardian of a female should wait until she is of adult age and should always consult her first before arranging her marriage, c. if a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to part of mahr]

**Q-78.** What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today?

**Q-79.** In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?

**Q-80.** What organization, institution, or authority is that?

An overwhelming majority of Afghans (90%) agree with the idea that everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, including 59% who strongly agree. However, a higher proportion of women (66%) than men (53%) express strong support for equal rights under the law. There is also a notable urban-rural split on this question: while 71% of urban respondents strongly agree, only 56% of rural respondents strongly agree that women and men should have equal rights under the law.

Looking at regional differences in the response to this question (see Fig. 9.1 below), only 6% of respondents in the Central/Kabul region strongly disagree or somewhat disagree with the view that women should have equal rights under the law. In contrast, 17% of respondents in the West region disagreed with that statement: a percentage close to double than that of most other regions.

**Fig.9.1 Q-66a.** *I'm going to read some statements. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. [a. Everyone should have equal rights under the law regardless of their gender] | | By region*



Despite this overall strong support for equal rights under law for Afghan women, women's rights were high on respondents' minds this year when asked about the biggest problems facing women. Chapter 2 (National Mood) provides an overview of the results for this question; the top three responses for problems facing women were education/illiteracy (27%), lack of job opportunities for women (12%); and women's rights issues in general (10%). However, many of the other less frequently mentioned responses to this open-ended question are actually core rights issues, including domestic violence, forced marriages/dowry, women not being able to leave home, and women being under the control of men (i.e., men having power over women). Combined, these women's rights issues comprise 30% of all responses to the question about the biggest problems facing Afghan women, making women's rights issues the most frequently mentioned problem, just ahead of education/illiteracy.


Please see Chapter 2 for detailed analysis of some of the statistically significant differences in responses to this question based on respondents' gender, ethnicity, and other factors. As noted in Chapter 2, the list and ranking of the biggest problems facing women in Afghanistan has not changed much over the past eight years, which suggests that the public may not be seeing much direct impact of the numerous initiatives to improve the rights and roles of women.

This year the survey included three new questions about specific aspects of women's rights. First, respondents were asked about their level of agreement with the practices of baad and badal in Afghanistan. Baad is a traditional practice of giving a daughter to another party as penalty or payment for some offense. Badal marriage involves the exchange of daughters between families for marriage. Nationally, 62% of respondents disagreed (either strongly or somewhat) with these practices (65% of women, and 60% of men).

When asked whether they agree with the statement that a girl's guardian should wait until she is of adult age and should always consult her first before arranging her marriage, the majority of respondents (74%) either strongly or somewhat agreed. Respondents with university education (75%) were more likely to agree than respondents with only primary education (70%). Looking at regional differences, respondents from the North East (79%) and North West (80%) were more likely to agree as well. Men and women disagreed with the statement in near equal proportions (23% of female respondents and 26% of male respondents). As noted above, forced marriage/dowry is one of the leading women's rights problems facing Afghan women today, mentioned by 9% of respondents (and nearly equal percentages of men and women).

The third new survey question involves the issue of inheritance. Respondents were asked whether they agree with the statement that if a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to a portion of mahr. Mahr (or mehr) is a provision of Shariah law that obligates a husband at the time of marriage to give a gift of money, possessions or land to the wife, the aim being to provide some financial security for the wife. The wife may take the gift at the time of marriage or defer receiving all or part of the gift until a later date. Overall, while a majority of respondents agree that a widow should be entitled to a portion of mahr, 26% of respondents strongly or somewhat disagree, with men (30%) more likely to disagree than women (18%). Looking at differences by ethnicity (see Fig. 9.2 below), Pashtuns (31%) are most likely to disagree with the statement and Hazaras (20%) show the lowest rate of disagreement.

**Fig. 9.2: Q-76a.** *Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? [a. If a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to part of mahr] | |*  
By ethnicity



Less than a quarter (21%) of all women surveyed say that they know of a place where women can take their problems to be resolved. When asked which institution or organization they are thinking

of, 46% said the Directorate of Women's Affairs, 13% said the Human Rights Council, and 9% said the district government office. While the Directorate of Women's Affairs was equally recognized in both urban and rural areas, urban women referred to the Human Rights Council (20%) and women's shuras (9%) more frequently than rural women, and rural women referred to district government offices (12%) more frequently than urban women.

The survey looked at the issue of women's access to justice in both the formal and informal sectors. When asked if the state courts treat women and men equally, around half (54%) of respondents strongly or somewhat agreed. There is not a significant difference between men and women in the level of agreement with the statement. Regionally, respondents from the Central/Hazarajat (66%) region were more likely to agree than those in the West (43%) region.

Respondents also were asked if there should be special local jirgas and shuras for women only. Overall, 68% of respondents say there should be such jirgas and shuras, including 72% of female respondents and 66% of male respondents. A majority of both urban respondents (71%) and rural respondents (67%) say they endorse the idea.

## 9.2 Political participation

### Key Questions:

**Q-34.** How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (district/provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

**Q-58.** Does security, by this we mean participating and traveling to polling stations, play a part in deciding whether you will vote in an election?


**Q-59.** In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have no impact on your life?

**Q-83.** Do you think that elected government positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?

**Q-84.** If women vote, do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

Afghans' support for equal representation of men and women in elected government positions is at 44% in 2013. Looking at the longitudinal trend for this question (see Fig. 9.3 below), over time there has been a slight but noticeable decline in support for equality in leadership positions, down from a high of 50-51% in the 2006-2008 period. The trendline for the view that elected government positions should be mostly for men has undergone a corresponding slight increase. In 2013, 42% of Afghans say that such positions should only be for men. Notably, women (60%) are more likely to support equal representation than their male (35%) counterparts.

**Fig.9.3: Q-83.** *Do you think that elected government positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?* | | 2006 -2013



Interestingly but perhaps not surprisingly, of those respondents who support equal leadership positions for both men and women, the majority (83%) agree that women should be allowed to work outside the home.<sup>121,122</sup>

It is also interesting to compare the data above with Afghan's views on the level of fear they would have when running for public office (reported in Chapter 7, Political Participation). Women (67%) are more afraid of running for public office than men (56%).

When asked how women should decide for whom to vote, over half of the respondents (53%) said that women should decide for themselves while just a quarter (25%) said men should advise them, and less than a quarter (21%) said women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men. This shows that close to half of the respondents (46%) believe that men should somehow be involved in women's voting decision-making process. Not surprisingly, women (62%) are more likely than men (45%) to say that women should decide themselves for whom to vote, while men (30%) are more likely than women (19%) to say that men should decide for whom women should vote. However, men with a high level of education (56%) are more likely than men with no education (42%) to say that women should make their own decision when voting. Please see Chapter 7 for additional detailed analysis of some of the statistically significant differences in responses to this question based on respondents' region, ethnicity, and other factors.

When asked about their perceived level of influence over local government decisions, 48% of respondents say they can have some or a lot of influence. However, men (53%) are significantly more likely<sup>123</sup> than women (42%) to think that they can have influence.

121 Pearson chi2 (18,n=9260) = 4.2e+03 Pr < .000

122 r = .44 ,P < .00

123 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,151) = 48.8091, p = < 0.000

In response to a question about whether security conditions will play a part in their decision to travel to a polling station to vote in 2014, male and female respondents were equally likely (each 81%) to say that security will play a part in their decision.

As reported in Chapter 7, 56% of respondents think the results of the 2014 presidential election will make their lives better, 24% said it will make no difference, and 15% say the results will make their lives worse. A slightly higher proportion of men (58%) than women (54%) said the 2014 election will make their lives better.

### 9.3 Education

#### Key Questions:

**Q-81.** Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? Strongly or somewhat?

**D-5.** What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?

Education and illiteracy were most frequently cited as the main problems facing women in Afghanistan. Access to education for girls is currently constrained by many factors including the security situation, costs, the lack of qualified female teachers, and cultural norms.

The survey explored the issue of gender equality in education by asking respondents whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: “Women should have the same opportunities as men in education.” The vast majority of respondents (83%) agreed with the statement (either strongly or somewhat), while only 16% disagreed. Fig. 9.4 below shows a steady decrease in the level of strong support for gender equality in education between 2006 (58%) and 2013 (43%). However, the overall level of support (i.e., including those who either strongly or somewhat agree with equal opportunities for women in education) has stayed high and constant.


**Fig.9.4:** Q-81. *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? | 2006–2013*

OPPORTUNITIES IN EDUCATION: EQUAL FOR MEN AND WOMEN								
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Strongly agree	58	56	57	55	50	50	48	43
Agree somewhat	33	33	32	32	37	35	39	40
Disagree somewhat	5	7	6	8	7	9	9	12
Strongly disagree	3	3	3	4	4	5	3	4



Ninety percent of female respondents say that women should have the same opportunities in education as men (56% strongly agree and 34% somewhat agree). Women (90%) were significantly more likely to agree than men (78%)<sup>124</sup> (see Fig. 9.5 below).

**Fig.9.5: Q-81.** *Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion?*



Urban residents (91%) are significantly more likely to support equal educational opportunities for women compared to rural residents (81%).<sup>125</sup> Across the country, respondents from the West (21%) and South West (15%) regions were most likely to disagree with gender equality in education, while those in the Central/Hazarajat region (3%) were least likely to disagree. While Hazaras (88%) appear to be slightly more likely to be supportive of equal educational opportunities for women, overall there were no notable differences across ethnic groups.

Despite advances in improving girls' access to education over the last decade, the majority of women surveyed (76%) have received no education at all, compared to only 44% of men (see Fig. 9.6 below). As noted in Chapter 5 (Development and Service Delivery), Uzbek (84%) women were significantly less likely to have had formal education at any level<sup>126</sup> than other ethnic groups, closely followed by Pashtun (83%) women. By contrast, Hazara women (28%) were significantly<sup>127</sup> more likely to have had formal education at any level than women from any other ethnic group.


124 Pearson chi2(5,n=9200) = 471.2275, Pr < .000

125 Pearson chi2(5,n=9260) = 194.5250 Pr < .000

126 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=9,251) = 31.5141, p = < 0.000

127 Pearson Chi<sup>2</sup> (1, n=3,134) = 17.2541, p = < 0.000

Fig. 9.6: D-5. *What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed?*



Younger female respondents were significantly more likely to be educated than older female respondents,<sup>128</sup> reflecting some progress on educational opportunities for women and girls in Afghanistan. Those advances notwithstanding, the proportion of women respondents who have a university-level education is strikingly low (1%). Although the overall level of university education among respondents is only 2%, among those respondents with some university education, 88% are male, and only 12% are female, revealing a striking gender gap.

## 9.4 Economic opportunities

### Key Questions:

Q-82. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?

D-3. Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or looking for work?

D-18b. Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?

D-18c. How much of your household's total income comes from female members of the household?

Respondents were asked to give their opinion on gender equality related to employment opportunities. When asked whether women should be allowed to work outside the home, the majority of respondents (63%) agree, while 36% say that they should not be allowed to work outside of the home.

Since 2006, a majority of respondents have supported the view that women should be allowed to work outside the home (see Fig. 9.7 below). Support for women working outside the home was on a modest decline from 2006-2010 but appears to have leveled off through 2013.

128  $r = -0.2102, p < 0.000$

**Fig.9.7: Q-82.** *Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this? | | 2006-2013*

	WOMEN'S INDEPENDENCE TO WORK OUTSIDE THE HOME							
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	71	70	69	67	64	62	66	63
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	27	28	27	29	33	35	33	36

Women are significantly more likely to be of the opinion that women should have the right to work outside of the home (82%) than men (51%). Residents of urban areas (77%) are more likely than residents of rural areas (58%) to support women working outside of the home.<sup>129</sup> Opinions on gender equality and employment opportunities also varied across regions. The highest levels of support for women working outside of the home were in the Central/Hazarajat (79%), North West (75%), and North East (69%) regions. Respondents in the South West region showed the least support (57%) for women working outside of the home.

Among different ethnic groups, support for women being allowed to work outside the home is strongest among Hazaras (80%), followed by Uzbeks (71%) and Tajiks (69%). Pashtuns were the least likely to support the idea that women should be allowed to work outside their homes (50%).

The majority (92%) of respondents who support gender equality in employment also support gender equality in education.<sup>130, 131</sup> Only a small number of respondents (7%) support equal educational opportunities for women and men while also thinking that women should not be allowed to work outside the home. Marital status does not have a significant effect on Afghans' opinions on gender equality and employment opportunities.

As reported in Chapter 4 (Economic Growth and Employment), when asked about their employment status (i.e., whether they are receiving wages for work), 5% of all women and 79% of all men say they are employed. Only 17% of respondents report having female members of the household contributing to household income. Women from households in rural areas (20%) are more likely<sup>132</sup> to contribute to household income than women in urban areas (13%). Chapter 4 provides additional analysis on ethnic and regional differences in responses to this question.

129 Pearson chi2(3,n=9260) = 175.6649, Pr < .000

130 Pearson chi2(15) = 1.9e+03 Pr = 0.000

131 r = -.023, p < .000

132 Pearsons Chi<sup>2</sup>(3) = 30.8231, p < 0.000

## Appendix 1: Target Demographics

### Gender and Region

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
<b>Gender</b>	(%)	(%)	(%)
Male	62	66	50
Female	38	34	50
<b>Region</b>	%	%	%
Central/Kabul	24	14	56
East	10	11	4
South East	10	13	2
South West	11	12	8
West	13	14	10
North East	14	16	9
Central/Hazarajat	3	4	*
North West	14	15	12

### Employment Status And Age Group

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
	%	%	%
Working	51	55	38
Retired	1	1	1
Housewife	33	31	40
Student	8	7	12
Unemployed	7	7	10
Other	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	0
Don't know	*	*	0
<b>Age Group</b>	%	%	%
18-24 Years old	25	25	26
25-34 Years old	29	29	29
35-44 Years old	25	25	24
45-54 Years old	14	14	13
Over 55 years	8	8	8

### Main Occupation

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	4802	3962	840
<b>Base: Working or retired 4802</b>	%	%	%
Farmer (own land/tenant farmer)	36	43	6
Farm laborer (other's land)	9	10	2
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	8	8	8
Informal sales/business	9	8	13
Skilled worker/artisan	10	9	14
Government office - clerical worker	4	3	8
Private office - clerical worker	1	1	4
Government office - executive/manager	1	1	4
Private office - executive/manager	1	1	2
Self-employed professional	6	5	16
Small business owner	6	6	9
School teacher	5	4	6
University teacher	*	*	1
Military/Police	3	2	7

### Farming Land

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	5357	4949	408
<b>Base: Farmers 9260</b>	%	%	%
Less than 1 Jerib	9	9	12
1 - 2 Jerib	29	29	31
2 - 3 Jerib	22	22	25
More than 3 Jerib	38	39	28
Don't know	1	1	5

## Educational Status

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
<b>Base: All respondents 9260</b>	%	%	%
Never went to a school	56	60	43
Informal schooling at home or at a literacy class	2	3	1
Islamic education at a Madrassa	3	4	2
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	6	6	5
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	4	4	4
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	5	5	5
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	3	3	4
High School incomplete (classes 10-11)	5	5	7
High School complete (finished class 12)	9	7	14
14th grade incomplete (class 13)	2	1	3
14th grade complete (finished class 14)	3	2	5
University education incomplete (have no degree diploma)	1	*	2
University education complete (have degree diploma)	1	1	4
Refused (vol.)	*	*	0
Don't know (vol.)	*	*	0

## Spoken Languages

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
<b>Base: All respondents 9260</b>	%	%	%
Dari	79	75	93
Pashto	51	51	50
Uzbeki	9	11	5
Turkmeni	3	3	3
Balochi	1	1	*
Pashaye	1	1	*
Nooristani	1	1	0
Shignee	*	*	0
Arabic	1	1	1
English	5	3	12
Urdu	2	2	4

Hindi	*	*	1
Russian	*	*	*
German	*	0	*
French	*	*	*

### Marital Status

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
<b>Base: All respondents 9260</b>	%	%	%
Single	19	18	23
Married	79	80	74
Widower/Widow	2	2	3
Divorced	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	*	*	*

### Ethnicity Status

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
<b>Base: All respondents 9260</b>	%	%	%
Pashtun	43	47	29
Tajik	32	27	50
Uzbek	7	9	3
Hazara	10	9	12
Turkmeni	2	2	3
Baloch	1	1	*
Kirghiz	*	*	0
Nooristani	1	1	*
Aimak	1	1	*
Arab	2	2	1
Pashaye	*	*	*
Sadat	1	1	1
Qazalbash	*	*	*
Gujar	*	*	0
Don't know	*	0	*

## Average Monthly Household Income

Characteristics	All	Rural	Urban
	9260	7108	2152
<b>Base: All 9260</b>	%	%	%
Less than 2,000 Afs	6	7	3
2,001 - 3,000 Afs	11	13	6
3,001 - 5,000 Afs	24	26	18
5,001 - 10,000 Afs	30	29	33
10,001 - 15,000 Afs	15	14	18
15,001 - 20,000 Afs	8	7	12
20,001 - 25,000 Afs	3	2	5
25,001 - 40,000 Afs	1	1	3
More than 40,000 Afs	1	*	2
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	2	2	1





## Appendix 2: Methodology

### 1 Summary

The 2013 *Survey of the Afghan People* is Afghanistan's longest-running and broadest annual nationwide survey of adult Afghan attitudes and opinions. With this comes significant responsibility to ensure data quality, which consists of five major components: validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and integrity. Each of these will be addressed in this appendix.

There are five major improvements in this year's survey compared to last year:

1. *Overall size* - increased by 47%, which helps to reduce the margin of error
2. *Representation* - insecure areas were targeted to boost responses from those areas
3. *Length* - the average interview time decreased from 45 minutes last year to 38 minutes this year
4. *Tests* - new statistics and logic tests were introduced this year to determine if figures showed meaningful differences
5. *Accuracy* - The 2013 total margin of error with 95% confidence at  $p=.5$  is  $\pm 2.25\%$ . This is a decrease of 2.85% from the 2012  $\pm 5.1\%$  margin of error

As in previous years, survey fieldwork was conducted by ACSOR-Surveys for The Asia Foundation in Afghanistan. This year, the Foundation conducted additional in-house quality control and for the first time, independent, third-party monitoring was conducted by Sayara Media Group.

A national sample of 9,260 Afghan citizens (see Figure 1 below) across all 34 provinces was selected using stratified finite sampling techniques. Each citizen was surveyed face-to-face between July 17 and July 25, 2013, within the same 30 calendar day period, consistent with previous surveys. A project timeline is provided in Figure 2 below. Respondents were all 18 years of age or older, including 14% from urban households and 86% from rural households. The average interview length was 38 minutes, with a range of 20 to 80 minutes.

Several quality control procedures were employed throughout the project. Field interviewers were observed by supervisors and a third-party validator. Field supervisors and the third-party validator conducted back-checks of interviews. During the data entry phase, 20% of interviews underwent double data entry, and any resulting discrepancies were resolved. Finally, during the data cleaning phase, the Hunter program (see section below on quality control) was used to search for patterns or anomalies in the data that may indicate an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer (e.g., gender "male" and occupation "housewife"). For this survey, 140 cases were deleted from the data set for having over 95% similarities in responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test).

To meet more aggressive margins of error, this year's sample size represents nearly a 47% increase from previous years (see Figure 1 below). Additional advances were made in quality control, and will continue to improve in the 2014 survey. The 2013 survey includes three new substantive checks for quality control:


- a. Nonresponse analysis (Don't Know and Refused responses) over time by province, district, enumerator, gender, ethnicity, and number of observers present for the interview;
- b. Logic tests to check for bias, as well as question reliability and validity; and
- c. Scales for increased reliability and validity, including cross-analysis against key trend questions.

As in 2012, deteriorating security was a key challenge for accessing sampling points in 2013. While sampling points are randomly identified, opinions on key trends may differ significantly between safe and unsafe districts. In an effort this year to reduce the negative impact of sampling replacements on representativeness, this year's survey included 840 "intercept" interviews, a technique where respondents from insecure districts are intercepted while shopping or traveling in more secure ones, in addition to 2,079 respondents from "man-only" districts, where female enumerators cannot travel due to security concerns.

As a result of efforts to survey insecure areas, this year reflects an oversampling of men (64%) compared to women (34%), as well as an oversampling of rural areas compared to urban areas. However, due to the increase in sample size, the total number of women surveyed this year is more than most previous years. Results were weighted for national urban/rural distributions, as well as provincial-level population distributions. Results were not weighted for gender. This decision was consistent with previous years, and arose from the concern that weighting for gender would bias 2013 results. Women from secure areas, whose views are overrepresented in the data, may have significantly different views from women living in insecure areas, whose views are underrepresented in the data.

All figures reported in this methods appendix represent unweighted figures, unless otherwise specified.

**Fig.1:** Survey sample size by year, 2006-2013



## How Don't Know or Refused answers are handled in the analysis

In order to maintain consistency with reports from previous years, all data are reported by quoting percentages based on the inclusion of any “Don't Know” and “Refused” answers given by the respondents, except where not relevant to the analysis method used as is the case with the following types of statistical test: regressions, correlations and Chi<sup>2</sup> tests.

## How multiple response questions are reported

The survey questionnaire had a number of questions<sup>1</sup> in which the respondent was allowed to give more than one answer (those questions that ask for a first, second and sometimes a third mentioned answer). This leads to a greater number of answers than respondents who gave these answers. There are two different ways to report the results for such questions. The results can either be expressed as the percentage of “cases” or as the percentage of all the different types of “responses” given.

- The percentage of “cases” is the total frequency of a particular type of answer (response) given to the question by all respondents, expressed as a percentage of the total number of respondents.
- The percentage of “responses” is the total frequency of a particular type of answer (response) given to the question by all respondents, expressed as a percentage of the total number of all answers (responses) given.

For a full understanding of the results presented in this report, it is important to note that: the results for all multiple response questions are reported as the percentage of cases.

**Fig. 2:** *Project timeline*

Project Phases	Start Date	End Date	Comments
Translation	June 24, 2013	June 27, 2013	Backtranslation will be added for quality control in 2014
Briefings	July 15, 2013	July 17, 2013	Ramadan started on July 9
Fieldwork	July 17, 2013	July 25, 2013	
Quality Control	July 17, 2013	October 20, 2013	
Data Processing	July 27, 2013	September 4, 2013	Eid holiday August 8-10; Independence Day August 19

<sup>1</sup> Q3a/b: Reasons Right Direction; Q4a/b: Reasons Wrong Direction; Q5a/b: Reasons Some Right/Some Wrong; Q6a/b: Biggest Problems Facing Afghanistan as a whole; Q10/Q11: which countries have provided the most aid; Q24a/b: what kind of corruption affects you personally; Q30a/b: Safe to express opinions; Q31a/b: Freedom to express political opinions; Q56a/b: Most important achievements of government; Q73a/b/c: what kinds of problems (who taken to)

## 2 Survey Preparation

### Survey design

As an opinion trends survey, The Asia Foundation survey has maintained a core set of questions for longitudinal comparison. These are kept on the basis of producing reliable results, and most are cross-checked against other questions. Each year, however, some questions inevitably do not make the cut, for good reason. This year a team of Asia Foundation experts, both Afghan and international, reviewed all questions in the 2012 survey against the raw data from 2006-2012 to determine whether the questions were valid, reliable, and useful. Pre-determined evaluation criteria were used to select candidate questions for elimination or modification. These criteria consist of two general principles and three tests.

### Principles for question evaluation

Respondents must be able to answer the question meaningfully. A meaningful answer is characterized as informed and credible. Informed means the respondent has enough awareness or knowledge to answer, and is not guessing. Credible means the question does not introduce fear, confusion, or a strong desire to please the interviewer.

Questions must be useful for analysis. The addition of unnecessary questions burdens respondents and increases the risk of respondent fatigue.

### Tests

**Is the question original?** Conceptually duplicative questions are eliminated unless used in a scale or logic test.

**Is the question valid?** Questions that do not clearly measure an intentional concept are eliminated or modified.

**Is the question reliable?** Does it produce consistent answers across diverse contexts and years, for comparison? Questions that produced large (30+ point) fluctuations from year to year were eliminated or revised.

Validity and reliability are informed by a combination of qualitative and quantitative evaluations. Qualitative evaluation by Asia Foundation staff compared Dari, Pashto, and English translations of the 2012 questionnaire to identify questions that may have been confusing, poorly worded, or otherwise conducive to biased responses. Problematic questions were categorized by four types, outlined below. Quantitative evaluation was then conducted by one statistical consultant and one cultural psychologist using a combination of correlation analysis, logic tests, and nonresponse analysis.

### Question types that increase non-sampling bias

**Double-barrel question.** This refers to any question that asks multiple questions in a single question, when we have discovered that respondents may have different opinions about each component. For example, Q-58/b in 2012 asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or religion.” The question was broken into three separate questions for 2013. More than 600 respondents in 2013 agreed with one question, but disagreed with the other two.

**Memory test.** This refers to any question that we found may test a respondent’s memory, rather than their opinions, attitudes, or behaviors of interest. For example, questions with long lists of options (e.g. 7+ options, such as W-3 in 2012) are both hard for participants to keep in mind at once. Questions with long lists tend to show primacy bias, which is the tendency for respondents to choose an option presented at the beginning or end of a list, simply because those are easier to remember.

**Leading questions.** Leading questions have assumptions built into them that can bias respondent answers. For example, “Do you think the government is doing enough to stop the increase in violent crime?” is a leading question because it assumes violent crime is increasing, the government is already doing something about it, and that the respondent already accepts that it is the government’s responsibility to stop violent crime.

**Questions with unreliable options.** Reliability requires the use of standardized instruments that are evenly and precisely applied. In theory, different enumerators should be able to use the same questionnaire for the same respondents and obtain the same answers. However, certain kinds of question designs leave more discretion to enumerator coding than others.

Whenever a category is required to be read aloud to a respondent, the respondent can speak for him or herself. When a category is not read aloud to the respondent, however, the enumerator must use his or her individual discretion to represent the respondent. This discretion introduces additional dangers to reliability, such as inconsistent interpretations of ambiguous responses, or inconsistent applications of unspoken or “hidden” categories. In both questions mentioned above, the third “neutral” option (“some in right, some in wrong”; “no difference”) is hidden from the respondent. To eliminate categories that may be unevenly or inconsistently applied by different enumerators, enumerators are sometimes required to verbalize all key options, including Don’t Knows.

**Questions with social desirability bias (SDB).** This refers to any question that invite respondents to answer in a way that they think is socially or politically correct, rather than true to their private attitudes and opinions. This is particularly a concern for sensitive questions. Any tabulated result for a question with SDB, when reported as a raw percentage, should be taken with this understanding in mind. However, a question with SDB may nonetheless be useful for analysis. For example, whether or not someone has confidence in the ANP may be less useful for decision-makers than the question of why some agree more than others. For regression analysis, questions with SDB are useful as long as they contain a wide distribution of responses.<sup>2</sup>

Social desirability bias depends upon the respondent’s awareness of, and response to, the social context. In most cases, at least one additional person is watching or observing the respondent, beyond the enumerator. There are methods of identifying high-risk questions in face-to-face opinion surveys.

Two quantitative indicators were used to identify high-risk candidates for SDB in the 2013 survey. These included (1) a series of logic tests, explained later in this section, and (2) significant correlations between answers and the number of observers witnessing the interview. For example, between 2007-

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<sup>2</sup> In comparable surveys conducted by ACSOR, such as the USAID-funded MISTI survey, similar questions use expanded scales. MISTI’s first question asks, “Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or the wrong direction?” Then the respondent is asked, “Is that a lot or a little?” which creates a 1-4 scale, rather than a 1-2 scale (right/wrong). This variance becomes important for correlation and regression analyses, for instance.

2011, respondents were asked if they could read various languages, as an indicator of literacy. When respondents were asked if they could read Pashtu, significantly more participants said “yes” in the presence of outside observers compared to when sitting alone with the enumerator. This remained true even after controlling for other variables, such as region and gender, for example.<sup>3</sup> The question was eliminated in 2012, and in 2013, two new measures for literacy have been introduced. However, even the new literacy questions appear to be sensitive to SDB.

A third indicator might be an unusually high number or an absence of Don’t Know (DK) and Refused responses to a question. However, these are unreliable indicators, as fluctuation in DKs appears linked to a wide variety of other factors besides SDB, to be explained later. Finally, qualitative feedback from field supervisors points our attention to sensitive questions where SDB is more likely to be a problem.<sup>4</sup>

### 3 Sample Design

As in previous years, the survey was designed to include 50% female and 50% male respondents. Insecurity, transportation conditions, and local norms for female interviewers created challenges to access to women in certain districts. Sampling points that were planned for interviews with women but could not be covered by female interviewers were replaced with male interviews in the same village. The sample was then stratified by province, urbanity, and district using population data released by the Central Statistics Office of the Afghan government (2010-2011 estimates).<sup>5</sup>

The sample was drawn using a multi-stage systematic sampling approach. ACSOR used the 2010-2011 updated figures provided by Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office. Similar to the 2006 update, much of the 2010-2011 update is based on data drawn from the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development relying on results from the National Reconstruction Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA). The NRVA is based on a detailed cataloging of households to help inform the updates in a systematic, replicable way. While the proportions by provinces have changed in mostly a uniform and formulaic manner, the additional use of NRVA data adds to the detail of the estimates.

#### Sampling methods

Target Population:	Afghan adults in 34 provinces
Target Sample:	9,200 Afghan adults in 34 provinces
Achieved Sample:	9,260 Afghan adults in 34 provinces

3 Beta = .036,  $p < .0001$ . When  $z7\_1$  (reading Pashto) is regressed on  $z14$  (number of observers),  $z1$  (gender), and  $m6$  (region), the model explains 4.43% of the variance in reported Pashto reading literacy.  $F(3, 14248) = 220.10$ ,  $Pr < .0001$ ,  $R^2 = .044$ .

4 In the 2013 survey, ACSOR supervisors in Ghor, Paktika, and Nimroz reported sensitivities for questions Q1, Q2, Q19, Q20, Q28, Q42, Q44, Q62, Q64, Q78, Q84, and D18b. These questions address personal exposure to violence, attitudes toward women’s rights, sympathy for armed opposition groups, attitudes toward the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, and beliefs about the mixing of politics and religion.

5 There is no official census of Afghanistan. The Central Statistics Office (CSO) of the Afghan government has attempted to provide updates since 2003, but their base is influenced by figures from the 1979 census. The CSO has received support from the UN, the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, and the World Food Programme to issue updates. ACSOR completed a review of 2010-2011 updates from the CSO and reported that these were acceptable as replacements for the 2006 estimates.

**Step 1:** A minimum of 200 interviews were carried out in each province. In 11 provinces of interest, the number of interviews was boosted to 400: Wardak, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghor, Baghlan, Bamyan, and Samangan. Due to its size, Kabul was allocated 576 interviews.

Within each province, the sample was stratified by urban and rural population figures from the 2010-2011 Central Statistics Office estimates. Villages are considered rural while, towns, cities, and metro are considered urban.

**Step 2:** The sample was then further distributed across the available districts in each province using the population estimates for each district, also from the CSO. Districts were selected via probability proportional to size systematic sampling. This maintains both elements of random selection of sampling points, as well as probability proportional to size.

In order to obtain some information on the perceptions of those living in insecure areas that are not accessible to the enumerators, “intercept” interviews were held with people coming out of these areas to towns/bazaars in more secure areas. For the 2013 survey, approximately 9% of the interviews (n=840) were intercept interviews. Intercept interviews were done in 45 districts across 22 provinces. These intercept interviews are identified by the variable “Method 2” in the data set.

**Step 3:** The settlements within districts were selected by simple random sampling. Within urban strata we use neighborhoods (called “nahias” from cities and metros) and towns, while in rural strata we use villages. As population data for settlement sizes does not exist, a simple random selection among all known settlements was used to select locations. In this survey, six interviews were conducted per sampling point.

- a. The instability and frequent fighting in some provinces can cause a sampling point to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence. A complete listing of replaced sampling points can be found in Figure 18.
- b. ACSOR interviewing was gender-specific, with female interviewers interviewing only females and males interviewing only males. Some provinces with significant insurgent activity or military operations had male-only samples depending on conditions. In the case that a sampling point designated for female interviews was only accessible to male interviewing, it was fielded as a male sampling point at the originally selected location.

**Step 4:** Field managers then used maps generated from several sources to select starting points within each settlement. In rural areas, ACSOR implemented a new system that requires interviewers to start in one of five locations (Northern, Southern, Eastern, or Western edges) of the rural settlement and perform a random walk heading in toward the center, using a different edge for each village. For every fifth village, the interviewer started from the center of the settlement and worked in a pre-determined direction (North, South, East, or West) outward toward the edge of the settlement.

**Step 5:** A random walk method with a fixed sampling interval was performed from the starting point. For example, selecting every third house on the right in rural areas and every fifth house on the right in urban areas.



**Step 6:** After selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent<sup>6</sup> within the household. Members of the household are listed with their names and their age in descending order and then the respondent is selected according to the rules of the Kish grid.

Figure 3 below provides population percentages for each province as supplied by the Central Statistics Office, the unweighted sample, and the weighted sample.

**Fig. 3:** *Sampling targets by province*

	Percentage in Population	Percentage in Unweighted Sample	Percentage in Weighted Sample (wgt1) <sup>1</sup>
Kabul	15.08%	6.20%	15.08%
Kapisa	1.66%	2.20%	1.66%
Parwan	2.49%	2.00%	2.49%
Panjshir	0.58%	2.20%	0.58%
Nangarhar	5.65%	4.40%	5.65%
Kunar	1.69%	2.20%	1.69%
Laghman	1.68%	2.20%	1.68%
Nooristan	0.56%	2.20%	0.56%
Wardak	2.24%	4.50%	2.24%
Logar	1.47%	2.20%	1.47%
Ghazni	4.62%	4.40%	4.62%
Paktika	1.64%	2.20%	1.64%
Paktia	2.07%	2.20%	2.07%
Khost	2.16%	2.20%	2.16%
Helmand	3.47%	4.40%	3.47%
Kandahar	4.51%	4.40%	4.51%
Zabul	1.14%	2.20%	1.14%
Badghis	1.86%	2.10%	1.86%
Herat	6.98%	2.20%	6.98%
Farah	1.90%	2.20%	1.90%
Nimroz	0.62%	2.10%	0.62%
Badakhshan	3.57%	2.20%	3.57%
Takhar	3.68%	2.20%	3.68%
Baghlan	3.40%	4.40%	3.40%
Kunduz	3.75%	2.20%	3.75%
Samangan	1.46%	4.40%	1.46%
Balkh	4.88%	2.20%	4.88%

<sup>6</sup> Interviewers are not allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the respondent selected by the Kish grid. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after callbacks, then the interviewer must move on to the next household according to the random route.

Jawzjan	2.02%	2.20%	2.02%
Sar-i-Pul	2.10%	2.20%	2.10%
Faryab	3.74%	2.10%	3.74%
Uruzghan	1.32%	4.30%	1.32%
Ghor	2.60%	4.00%	2.60%
Bamyan	1.68%	4.40%	1.68%
Daikundi	1.73%	2.20%	1.73%
Total	100%	100%	100%

## Weighting

Three weights were created for the 2013 *Survey of the Afghan People*. They are “wgt1,” “wgt2,” and Final weight\_scaled. “wgt1” is recommended to be used for analysis of the data.

1. The “wgt1” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status to account for the booster samples by simple inverse cell weighting.
2. The “wgt2” variable is a weight by province and urban/rural status and gender by simple inverse cell weighting.
3. In Final weight\_scaled, the sample was post-stratified by raking the baseweight to match demographic targets. The raking variables were Strata (Province by Urbanity) and d1 (Gender). As there are no official estimates for gender in Afghanistan, a 50/50 split of males and females was assumed. Urbanity was coded as Rural for villages and Urban for all other geographies. The base weight and final weight were then scaled back to the sample size by multiplying the total weight by the sample size over the sum of the weights.

## 4 Contact Procedures

As noted above, after selecting a household, interviewers were instructed to utilize a Kish grid for randomizing the target respondent within the household. Members of the household were listed with their names and age in descending order. The Kish grid provides a random selection criteria based on which visit the household represents in his or her random walk and the number of inhabitants living in the household.

Under no circumstances were interviewers allowed to substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refused to participate or was not available after three call-backs, the interviewer then moved on to the next household according to the random walk.

Typically interviewers were required to make two call-backs before replacing the household. These call-backs are made at different times of the same day or on different days of the field period, in order to provide a broader schedule in which to engage the respondent. Due to security-related concerns, the field force has had difficulty meeting the requirement of two call-backs prior to substitution in many rural areas.

In this survey, while interviewers were able to complete some call-backs, the majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt: first contact 99.3%, second contact .6%, third contact .1%. Due to the high rate of unemployment, and choosing the appropriate time of day for interviewing, completion on the first attempt is common in Afghanistan.

### Sample disposition

The American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) publishes four different types of rate calculations used in AAPOR reporting (response rates, contact rates, cooperation rates, and refusal rates). ACSOR uses AAPOR's Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2 as their standards.

Acronyms used in the formulas;

I	=	Complete Interview
P	=	Partial Interview
R	=	Refusal and break-off
NC	=	Non-contact
O	=	Other
UH	=	Unknown if household/occupied household unit
UO	=	Unknown, other
e	=	Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

$$\text{Response Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Cooperation Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + R}$$

$$\text{Refusal Rate 2} = \frac{R}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Contact Rate 2} = \frac{(I + P) + R + O}{(I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)}$$

For this sample, the response rate 3 is 79.1%, the cooperation rate 3 is 95.2%, the refusal rate 2 is .04%, and the contact rate 2 is 83.4%.

Figures 4 and 5 below show the disposition rates and the breakdown of non-response rates by region.

Fig. 4: Disposition rates

Survey Management Section			
ACSOR Code	AAPOR Code	Description	
	1.0/1.10	Completed Interviews	9260
		Average Survey Length (minutes)	38.05
UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD ELIGIBILITY			
	3.170	Unable to Reach/Unsafe Area (This comes from the replaced sampling points and inaccessible district list)	840
2	3.130	No one at home after three visits	373
3	4.100	No adults (18+) after three visits	346
4	4.500	Non-Residential or empty house	151
		<b>Total Unknown Household</b>	<b>1710</b>
NON-CONTACTS			
1	2.230	Door or gate locked and no one came to open it	24
6	2.200	Respondent long-term absence/for the field work period	135
13		Selected respondent not available for interview	156
		<b>Total Non-Contacts</b>	<b>315</b>
REFUSAL			
7	2.111	Outright refusal at the door	179
8	2.112	Not feeling informed to answer the questions	81
9	2.112	Respondent got angry because of question and aborted interview	15
10	2.112	Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	116
11	2.112	In a hurry/No time	79
	2.112	Selected respondent initial refusal Cumulative (sums all '2.112' codes)	291
		<b>Total Refusal</b>	<b>470</b>
OTHER			
12	2.32	Physically or mentally unable	19
5	2.332	Respondent unable to complete interview in languages available	8
		<b>Total Other</b>	<b>27</b>
DISPOSITION RATES			
RATES	FORMULA/CALCULATION		PERCENT
Value for e	Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible		0.952
Response Rate 3	$I / (I) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)$		0.791
Cooperation Rate 3	$I / (I + R)$		0.952
Refusal Rate 2	$R / (I) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)$		0.04
Contact Rate2	$(I + R + O) / (I) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)$		0.834

**Fig. 5:** *Breakdown of non-response rate by region*

1. Central/Kabul = 55 refusals, 47 non-contacts
2. East = 43 refusals, 41 non-contacts
3. South East = 135 refusals, 93 non-contacts
4. South West = 99 refusals, 22 non-contacts
5. West = 16 refusals, 8 non-contacts
6. North = 69 refusals, 51 non-contacts
7. Central/Hazarajat = 53 refusals, 53 non-contacts

## 5 Field Reports

ACSOR supervisors were asked to note any political, social, or other newsworthy events that occurred during the fieldwork period that may have affected the survey. Problem questions, history effects, and other concerns are listed below in Figure 6.

**Fig. 6:** *Supervisor original, unedited written reports by province*

No	Province	Important event/issue in the field	Action taken
1	Helmand	There were fighting and existence of Taliban insurgents and mines and bombs in Torma (Sp#686), Chardara (Sp#728) and Panizai (Sp#729).	Supervisor changed the Sampling points to Aabazan (Sp#686), Sangin Lora (Sp#728) and Koz Mullah Zai (Sp#729).
2	Nooristan	There were threats and problems created by Taliban and other insurgents in Awyak village.  In Mandol district the Pashkel village was inaccessible due to the far distance and the problems created by Taliban.  The security conditions were not good in Waygal and Bargi Matal of Kamdesh, there were Pakistani Taliban and Arabs in the area and made the situation worse for people.  Questions were very interesting for the respondents and they felt very good during the interviews.	Changed Awyak village to Sheren.  Changed the village to WerGado.
3	Panjshir	No problems have been reported.	
4	Paktia	No problems have been reported.	
5	Laghman	No problems have been reported.	

6	Ghor	There were no security issues in the field, but the problem was with some of the questions in the questionnaire, interviewers mentioned possible sensitivities regarding questions Q19, Q20, Q42, Q44, Q62 and Q64.	We recommend revisiting these questions for possible modification or omission in future waves.
7	Farah	No problems have been reported.	
8	Khost	No problems have been reported.	
9	Uruzgan	An explosion occurred in injured 2 police and some local people; one interviewer was also among the injured people.	We were still able to conduct the interviews.
10	Paktika	When I was traveling to Kabul, the security along the road was very bad. Insurgents were asking for people who are working with the government or other offices, but I still made it for Kabul to participate in the training. Respondents displayed discomfort with Q30, Q41 and Q42.	
12	Ghazni	No problems have been reported.	
13	Jawzjan	No problems have been reported.	
14	Sar-i-Pul	There were security problems in some of the villages. Respondents had difficulty giving answers to Q1, Q2, Q63 and Q64 questions.	We have discussed this issue with the Kabul office and they gave us replacements for those villages.
15	Kapisa	A girl was killed in Koh Band district by unknown gunmen, that's why all people were worried and scared and they were answering the questions with fear. Tagab district is completely under the control of Taliban. In Nijrab district there were also some insecure villages.	We have discussed this issue with the Kabul office and they gave us replacements as needed.
16	Faryab	No problems have been reported.	
17	Kunar	Interviewers told the supervisor that people were answering the questions about the Taliban and security with fear.	
18	Herat	No problems have been reported.	
19	Nangarhar	One village initially appeared to be accessible to interviewers but residents were unwilling to participate once fieldwork began.	The village was replaced.
20	Kandahar	No problems have been reported.	

21	Balkh	We faced a problem in Sp#1371. The head of the village told us that you do not have the right to conduct interviews in this village.	But then I went to the area and took a letter that we got from the provincial office and convinced the head of village that we have a permit and it is our right to do the interviews.
22	Bamyan	<p>There was fighting between Taliban and government troops in Do Aab and Yakhzarin areas, in which many were killed and injured from both sides. Most of the villages were located near these areas. That's why we weren't able to conduct interviews in these areas.</p> <p>We also changed some villages in Yakawlang district as well due to insecurity and existence of insurgents.</p> <p>Beside this, there were security problems in another village as well. Employees of the government and other organizations have not able to visit this village for 2 to 3 years.</p>	We change and selected other villages as per ACSOR field team instructions.
23	Takhar	There were some transportation and road blocks problem in some of the villages during the field work.	We changed the villages that we did not have access to.
24	Badakhshan	There were problems with transportation in some villages.	We selected other villages for those.
25	Baghlan	<p>A road side bomb exploded on by the head of the police of Baghlan province. He survived from the incident, but the explosion killed and injured some people.</p> <p>The number of kidnapping cases has been increased in Baghlan, which made people worried.</p>	
26	Kunduz	There were security problems in some of the villages in Kunduz province.	We changed the sampling points and conducted the interviews there.
27	Badghis	No problems have been reported.	
28	Samangan	No problems have been reported.	
29	Logar	No problems have been reported.	
30	Wardak	No problems have been reported.	
31	Zabul	There are still security problems in Zabul because of US military activities. This made things worse and difficult for us to conduct interviews in the field.	
32	Daikundi	No problems have been reported.	

33	Nimroz	There were no security problems in the area, but respondents were uncomfortable with some questions, such as (Q28, Q78, Q84, Q62, Q64 and D18b).	Interviewers used responses taught in standard interviewer training to make respondents feel comfortable, including reminding respondents of anonymity.
34	Parwan	16 people, including women and children, have been killed and injured due to the clash between irresponsible gunmen in Jabel Saraj district of Parwan province. In another incident, a person killed in 6 <sup>th</sup> district of the city.	No change to field plan was needed.

## 6 Enumerators

Figures 7 and 8 below provide information about the gender, experience, and provincial deployment of the survey enumerators.

**Fig. 7:** *Enumerators by gender and experience*

	Female	Male	Total
Number of female/male interviewers	366	596	962
Number of interviewers previously used in D3 project	361	579	940
Number of interviewers new to a D3 project	5	17	22

**Fig 8:** *Enumerators by gender and province*

	Number of Supervisors	Number of Female Interviewers	Number of Male Interviewers	Total Number of Interviewers
Kabul	1	34	31	65
Kapisa	1	9	18	27
Parwan	1	13	14	27
Wardak	1	17	21	38
Logar	1	4	14	18
Ghazni	1	15	24	39
Paktia	1	6	13	19
Paktika	1	0	21	21
Khost	1	7	12	19
Nangarhar	1	20	25	45
Laghman	1	13	11	24
Kunar	1	6	15	21
Nooristan	2	3	13	16
Badakhshan	1	6	14	20



Takhar	1	12	12	24
Baghlan	1	17	29	46
Kunduz	1	17	17	34
Balkh	1	14	12	26
Samangan	1	13	20	33
Jawzjan	1	13	14	27
Sar-i-Pul	1	8	14	22
Faryab	1	12	15	27
Badghis	1	8	15	23
Herat	1	8	9	17
Farah	1	5	18	23
Nimroz	1	10	13	23
Helmand	1	10	18	28
Kandahar	1	18	24	42
Zabul	1	2	25	27
Uruzghan	1	8	33	41
Ghor	1	6	21	27
Bamyan	1	17	17	34
Panjshir	1	7	9	16
Daikundi	1	8	13	21
Total	35	366	595	960

### Enumerator training

The central training for provincial supervisors was held in Kabul on July 15, 2013, and was led by ACSOR project manager Nazir Ekhlass. Thirty-four ACSOR supervisors were in attendance. Shammim Sarabi, Ahmad Shahim Kabuli, and Samuel Schueth of The Asia Foundation were also present.

Topics that were covered during the training include:

1. Proper household and respondent selection.
2. Review of the questionnaire content.
3. Proper recording of questions.
4. Appropriate interviewing techniques.
5. Mock interviews were conducted to get a better understanding of the logic and concept of the questions.


Following the Kabul training, ACSOR project managers who had participated in the Kabul training traveled to Nangarhar, Balkh, Herat, and Kandahar to lead the provincial training sessions for these

large provincial teams. The other provincial trainings were led by the provincial supervisors in their respective provinces.

## 7 Quality Control

Quality control consists of five major components: validity, reliability, timeliness, precision, and integrity (see Figure 9 below). Timeliness has been addressed in earlier sections, so we now turn to steps taken to ensure precision, integrity, validity, and reliability.

**Fig. 9:** *Components of quality control*



### Precision: margin of error and design effect

The expansion of the sample size in 2013 was a great success, as 2013 sampling error margins reflect clear improvement over the 2012 margins. Among provinces that had a sample size of around 400, the largest sampling error was 5.16% (Ghor Province). In total, only three out of 22 sampling errors were out of the targeted  $\pm 5\%$  bounds. Among provinces that had a sample size of around 200, the largest sampling error was -7.66% (Faryab Province). In total, only one of 46 sampling error estimates were out of the targeted  $\pm 7.5\%$  bounds. Over 80% of these sampling errors were within  $\pm 7.0\%$  bounds.

A bootstrap re-sampling method was used to derive the actual sampling errors in the 2013 survey data. Specifically, to estimate the sampling errors of the overall sample, 2000 random samples were drawn with replacement from the overall sample. For the survey question Q-3 (whether the country is going in the right/wrong direction), the percentages of option endorsement from the 2000 random samples created an empirical distribution of the sample percentage of option endorsement after applying for the recommended weight (i.e., the “wgt1” variable, which is a weight by province and urban/rural status) to each sample. This provided the actual 95% confidence intervals of the sample percentage for the survey option endorsement. The sampling errors for each response category were then calculated as the percentage errors following the formulas below:

- Lower-bound percentage error = Lower confidence margin – point estimate
- Upper-bound percentage error = Upper confidence margin – point estimate

Following the statistical methods described above, The Asia Foundation derived sampling errors of the overall sample (N = 9260) for the responses to Q-3 (right/wrong direction). Both the sampling error margins and design effects for percentage estimates of response options are presented in Figure 10 below. Specifically, all the sampling error margins are within +/- 1.10%. In addition, the weighted average design effect was 2.29 for lower error margin and 2.37 for upper error margin, respectively. These findings suggest that the overall sample size and sampling strategy used in 2013 survey was appropriate in achieving small sampling errors at the country level after sampling weight was applied in the analyses.

**Fig. 10:** Error margins and design effects for Q-3 (right/wrong direction)

Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?												
		Fre- quency	Percent	Vaild Percent	Cumu- lative percent	Lower	Upper	Relative Lower Margin Error(%)	Relative Upper Margin Error(%)	Theoretical Margin of Error_Ran- dom_Sam- pling_Weight Applied(%)	Design Effect (Lower Margin Error)	Design Effect (Upper Margin Error)
valid	Right direction	5293	57.2	57.2	57.2	56.2	58.2	-0.98	1.09	0.432	2.28	2.52
	Wrong direction	3507	37.9	37.9	95	36.8	38.9	-1.07	1	0.432	2.49	2.32
	Refused (vol.)	10	0.1	0.1	95.1	0	0.2	-0.07	0.07	0.432	0.16	0.17
	Don't know (vol.)	450	4.9	4.9	100	4.4	5.3	-0.41	0.45	0.432	0.95	1.04
	Total	9260	100	100						Weighed Average	2.29	2.37

## Integrity

Thirty-five supervisors observed interviewers' work during fieldwork. Approximately 40% of the interviews were subject to some form of back-check. The back-checks consisted of:


- Direct observation during the interview (260 interviews, 3%),
- A return visit to the residence where an interview took place by the supervisor (2,559 interviews, 28%),
- A return visit to the interview location by a central office field manager (281 interviews, 3%), or
- Back-check by an external validator (570 interviews, 6%).

The 2013 *Survey of the Afghan People* included a new component: validation by a third-party called Sayara Media Group. ACSOR supervisors provided the fieldwork schedule to Sayara following the training briefings. Sayara validators met with ACSOR interviewers during the field period and verified the correct administration of the starting point, the random walk, and the implementation of the Kish grid in 95 sampling points. They also conducted back-checks of selected interviews. Interviewers did not report any difficulties coordinating meetings with the validators, and Sayara did not raise any concerns about field procedures during or following fieldwork.

### Validity and reliability tests

Five tests for validity and reliability (see Fig. 11 below) are used to check whether key questions are consistent and measure what they intend to measure. Surveys and questions that fail initial tests by ACSOR (the duplicates test, the equality test, and the nonresponse tests) are flagged and sometimes removed. Questions that fail secondary logic and nonresponse tests, conducted in-house at The Asia Foundation, are flagged for revision in 2014. Finally, the addition of scales and statistical tests for significance are used to test whether observed differences in frequencies or between groups are statistically real.

Fig. 11: *Validity and reliability tests*



### Coding, data entry, and initial logic tests

When the questionnaires are returned to the ACSOR central office in Kabul they are sorted, and open-ended questions are coded by a team of coders familiar with international standards for creating typologies for codes.

The questionnaires are then sent for data entry. ACSOR key-punches all questionnaires on-site to protect the data and closely control the quality of the data entry process. During this process, the key-punching team utilizes logic checks and verifies any errors inadvertently committed by interviewers.

ACSOR randomly selected 1,934 questionnaires of the total 9,400 for double entry. The results of the double entry showed that 371 questionnaires were found to have minor differences with the originally punched questionnaires. The average was five variables out of 378 with discrepancies. After reviewing the original questionnaires, it was found that in some cases the discrepancies were in the double punching and the original was correct. Any differences were rectified in the final data files based only on a review of the original questionnaire by a data manager.

Following the data cleaning process and logic checks of the dataset, ACSOR used a program called Hunter that searches for additional patterns and duplicates that may indicate that an interview was not properly conducted by an interviewer.

The Hunter program includes three tests:

1. Equality test – compares interviews for similarities, grouped by interviewer, within sampling point, province, or any other variable. Typically, interviews with an interviewer average of 90% or higher are flagged for further investigation.
2. “Don’t Know” (i.e., non-response) test – determines the percentage of Don’t Knows for each interviewer’s cases. Typically, if an interviews with 40% or higher DK responses are flagged for further investigation.
3. Duplicates test – compares cases across all interviewers and respondents to check for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Typically, any cases that have a similarity of 95% or higher are flagged for further investigation.

Any interview that does not pass Hunter is pulled out for additional screening. If the interview does not pass screening, it is removed from the final database before delivery.

For the 2013 survey, 140 cases were deleted for being over 95% similar in substantive responses to another interview (i.e., failing the duplicates test). No cases failed the equality test, and zero cases failed the non-response test.

### **Problem questions identified**

Response patterns with several questions related to self-reported respondent characteristics were noted during data processing. Responses that were flagged during logic checks were verified against the completed questionnaires.

- D-7: Some respondents did not list the language in which the interview was conducted as a language they can speak or read.
- D-8 and D-9: Some respondents did not reply that they can read any language in D-9 but said that they can read a letter in D-6.

- D-19c: Some respondents gave inconsistent replies to questions regarding their ability to purchase basic items and luxuries.
- Questions for literacy (D-6a, D-6b) and household standard of living (D-19) will be revised for 2014.

### Addition of statistical tests and scales

To test whether reported differences between groups of interest are real rather than simply perceived, this year included in-house tests for statistical significance on key questions in the 2013 report. T-Tests, correlation tests, Chi Square tests, and regression/probit tests were used. A statistical cutoff of  $p < .01$  was selected for reporting results from all tests. Regression models that explained less than 1% of the variance in the dependent variable were also excluded from the report.

Scales are required to have Cronbach alphas  $> .7$  and EVs  $> 1$ , preferably with no other competing factors. Scales provide what single-question measures do not: robust reliability, as well as the ability to cross-check questions of interest, for validity testing.

### Secondary logic tests

Questions suspected of bias are subjected to logic tests using other available questions.

#### An illustration follows:

##### Target Question

*Q-52: How satisfied are you with the job your Community Development Council is doing? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (similar to X34J)*

*X34J: Do you have a great deal of confidence, a fair amount of confidence, not very much confidence, or no confidence at all in Community Development Councils?*

##### Unweighted Result

6,265 respondents (67.66%) reported feeling “somewhat” or “very satisfied” with the job their CDC is doing. An additional 467 (5.04%) report that they don’t know.

##### Logic Test


100% of respondents who express satisfaction with the CDC in their community should answer “yes” to Q-40: “Tell me, do you know if there is a CDCs in your community?”

##### Outcome

Over 2,000 respondents very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the CDC in their community later reported that they were unaware of a CDC in their community (see Figure 12 below). While this

question reveals significant social desirability/satisficing bias, it remains useful as a comparison trend: respondents with knowledge of the CDC are significantly more likely to report satisfaction than those without knowledge of the CDC. A trend in the opposite direction would also be useful. Therefore the information remains useful and valid, so long as it is combined with logic tests, and as long as variance, rather than raw percentages, are used for analysis.

**Fig. 12:** Logic test for Q-52 (2013)



Questions that fail logic tests are considered on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, they are merely flagged for caution when reporting. Others are flagged for revision in 2014. Still others are maintained, for use in scales that add needed reliability and validity.

### Secondary nonresponse analysis: don't knows

Don't Know (DK) responses were tallied for all years (2006-2013) and analyzed using Stata software for statistical analysis. The average number of DK responses per participant is significantly explained by gender (women report consistently higher DKs than men; see Figure 16 below), by year of survey implementation (2009-2013 reflects a steady decrease across questions; see Figures 13 and 14 below), and by the number of observers present (as the number of observers increases, the number of DK responses also tends to increase; see Figure 17 below).<sup>7</sup>

A province-by-province analysis (see Figure 15 below) reveals fluctuations by supervisor territories. Wide ranges and wide standard deviations in the number of DK responses, province-by-province, suggests that supervisors administer and code these questions with different frequencies. Overall, between 2006-2013, provinces with the highest average number of DK responses were Paktia (M=5.81), Khost

<sup>7</sup>  $r = +.05, p < .0001$

(M=5.76), and Sar-i-Pul (M=5.40), while the lowest were Helmand (M=1.42), Laghman (M=1.13), and Balkh (M=1.51).

This evidence suggests that some DKs may have nothing to do with Afghan opinion at all. As indicated above and as shown in Figure 15 below, a study of ACSOR data over time reveals a significant and consistent decrease in the average number of DK and Refusal responses per participant in recent years. This change is unlikely to mean that Afghans are less opinionated in 2012 than 2009. Instead, the trend likely reflects improved capacity by ACSOR supervisors and enumerators to manage DKs and standardize supervisor training, as well as improvements in survey design.

**Fig. 13:** *Decrease in the % of Don't Know responses for Q-3 (right/wrong direction)*






Fig. 14: Average number of Don't Know responses per interview, (2006-2013\*)







Fig. 15: Average number of Don't Know responses per respondent (2013)



**Fig. 16:** Average number of Don't Know responses by gender || 2006-2013\*

\*All differences are statistically significant at the  $p < .01$  level, except for 2009, which is marginally significant ( $p = .03$ )

**Fig. 17:** Average number of Don't Know responses by number of observers

### Types of don't knows

There are many reasons for which a respondent may say “don't know,” and there are at least three different types of DK responses. For the survey, DKs are classified according to three different types: Illogical DKs, Avoidant DKs, and Satisficing DKs. In terms of reasons, respondents may genuinely have no opinion or attitude to report for a particular question. Alternatively, however, research sug-

gests that many respondents report “don’t know” as a strategy for providing acceptable or satisfactory answers to survey questions. Research also suggests that this tendency, called “satisficing,” may even be linked to personality traits.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, DKs can be avoidant, rather than satisficing. A busy farmer may answer “don’t know” if he thinks it will end the survey sooner, even if the response is illogical. Such responses can enable respondents to answer a question without having to engage cognitively. This tendency is likely to be increased in surveys where respondent fatigue may take place. The 2013 questionnaire included 123 substantive questions and lasted, on average, roughly three quarters of an hour.

Satisficing behavior in particular is expected to be strong in Afghanistan, where “saving face” and hospitality are important cultural dimensions. In general, satisficing behavior tends to result in preferences for:

- Explicitly offered no-opinion response options
- Socially desirable responses
- Non-differentiation when a list of questions asks for ratings of multiple objects using the same rating scale (e.g., Q-41 in the 2013 survey); and
- “Acquiescence response bias,” which is the tendency to agree with any assertion, regardless of its content.

## 8 List of Replaced Sampling Points

**Fig. 18:** *Replaced sampling points (original, unedited written reports provided)*

Province	SP	Projected District/ Village	Replaced with	Reason
1. Kabul	81	TAJEKAN KHOWAJA HA. Village	KhanjarKhail. Village	No village with this name was found
	84	GOSFAND DARA. Village	Kando Sang. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	85	DAWOOD SHAH KA- LAY. Village	Bakhtyaran. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	86	QALA NAWA. Village	Mullah Nader. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	90	QALA NAHIM. Village	Khair Abad. Village	No village with this name was found
	91	PACHE. Village	Shaghasi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	92	GULDARA. Village	Rahmat Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	93	SAYIDAN GULESTAN. Village	PoshtaBadamBagh. Village	No village with this name was found
	95	DALAK HA. Village	SayaBagh. Village	Sayabagh is the real name of this village

8 Simonson, I. & Sela, A. (2001) On the heritability of consumer decision making: An exploratory approach for studying genetic effects on judgment and choice. *Journal of Consumer Research*. 37(6): 951-966.

2. Kapisa	122	SHAIGHARI. Village	DehQazi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	123	NAKSH CHA. Village	RozaKhail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	125	HARARA YA LAYSA. Village	HesmatKhail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	126	NAL KHA. Village	Reza Khail. Village	There was fighting between tribes
	127	PUSHTA. Village	DehNawAskini. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
3. Parwan	131	NemGuzarKhal Mohammad. Village	Parchai 8. Village	People of area didn't allow to interview
	133	KhwajaRoh. Village	Tapa Shohada. Village	People weren't willing to be interviewed
	135	ZARD ALLOW GAK. Village	ChaharDeh. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	151	BALAQ. Village	MiskenKhak. Village	There was armed thieve on the way
	153	GUL GHOUNDI - DAHI ZARGRAN. Village	Do Lana. Village	People weren't willing to be interviewed
	157	SAHDULLAH HULYA. Village	QalaWazir Khan. Village	There was a funeral ceremony
158	SONDAR KHAIL. Village	Matak. Village	No village with this name was found	
4. Wardak	178	SHAIR JAN. Village	Deh Muslim. Village	There was fighting between Taliban and HezbIslami
	180	BALOCH KHAIL. Village	KaNasrat. Village	There was fighting between Taliban and HezbIslami
	182	RAQOUL. Village	Zeyolat. Village	Due to Operation of ISAF
	184	KOTA QAZI. Village	QoulTazaGul. Village	Due to Operation of ISAF
	194	BALA QALA KOHNA KHUMAR. Village	Kotagi. Village	There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF
	196	KOTA ASHRO. Village	LatoKhail. Village	There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF
	230	KOZ KHAIL. Village	AmanKhail. Village	There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF
232	MOSHK KHAIL. Village	PayendaKhail. Village	There was fighting between Taliban and ISAF	

33. Panjshir	268	DAHI YAOW JAWA. Village	Pitab Jaw. Village	There was funeral ceremony
	270	PAZGARAN. Village	Pamir. Village	People of village weren't willing to be interviewed
	272	PEYAWASHT BALAQ. Village	Shast. Village	Malik of the village didn't allow the interview
	273	RAHMATULLAH KHAIL SHAST. Village	JahfarKhail. Village	There was surveyed before
	276	BAKHSHI KHAIL SHAKHA. Village	BakhshiKhailPayen. Village	Malik of the village didn't allow the interview
	277	DAHI SHAH WALI. Village	DehShadi. Village	No village with this name was found
	278	BARAK. Village	Malsapa. Village	People of village weren't willing to be interviewed
	280	QOUL TARI. Village	RahmanKhail. Village	There was surveyed before
	281	ABCHAKAN. Village	BazarakKhas. Village	There was surveyed before
	286	PARYAN CHAMAR. Village	ChamarBala. Village	There is two village named Chamar, so we interviewed in ChamarBala
	290	BAD KHAM. Village	DehKalan. Village	This village is related to Unaba district
	291	BAYGARA. Village	LalaMirzaKhail. Village	This village is related to Unaba district
	292	WARKHI. Village	ShaheedanBala. Village	There was surveyed before
	296	SAFID CHAHIR MAJ- LOM. Village	Zaria. Village	Malik of the village didn't allow the interview
	297	SAFID CHAHIR YA DAHI MUSKEN. Village	Dal Zor. Village	People of village weren't willing to be interviewed
298	KHAR PAYA. Village	Pawat. Village	People of village weren't willing to be interviewed	
10. Nangarhar	318	PER SAHIB KALAY. Village	QalaJanan. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	331	HOTAKE. Village	Takia. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	338	SHAHBAZ KHAIL. Village	Sultan Khail. Village	No village with this name was found
	356	SHATOUR. Village	Sera Meran. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	367	KAR WANDA. Village	Bar Bayar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	369	PATOK SHAIKH ABAD. Village	PeraKhail. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

11. Laghman	372	SHADI BAGH. Village	MansoorKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	373	HAZARA BANDA. Village	SayedanoKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	374	SEEN ZAI. Village	Dehandar. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	375	GAR KASH. Village	Karim Abad. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	376	RAGI TAHNA. Village	QalaSader. Village	There was operation of army forces
	378	SALO HULYA. Village	Shaikhan. Village	There was operation of army forces
	383	DAK MALY. Village	DakKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	384	KUNDA GAL. Village	Bar Kott. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	385	MANJELAM. Village	QalaNajel. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	386	PALAK WATO. Village	AchakZai. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	389	BANDA. Village	Ghazi Abad. Village	There was operation of foreign forces
	390	DUM LAM. Village	QalaBaya. Village	There was operation of foreign forces
	395	BARAN GUL. Village	Shah Guzar Baba. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	396	MANO. Village	DehSharana. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	398	ARSALLAH KALAY. Village	Misken Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
12. Kunar	407	DEWARA. Village	Kalmani. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	408	SPAIDADO. Village	Dar WarakTangi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	411	ROSHAN KANDAK. Village	Hazar Mir Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	412	ARAT GAR POZ. Village	KozNoorgal. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	415	SHARBAT KALAY. Village	PachahBagh. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	416	JABGE. Village	Bar Narang. Village	There was fighting
	417	ZARKANDA. Village	SpeenKar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	418	KHOSHAL BANDA. Village	KozNarang. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	419	GODLE. Village	ShekarTangiPulGhundi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	420	SAMLAM. Village	ZardAlo. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	421	PASHANGAR. Village	NariManzKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	422	BATASH. Village	Jaba. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	423	DOHZ JADED. Village	Shingam. Village	There was fighting
	424	DAHZ BADNAKHAIL. Village	Shar Got. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	426	BAROTE. Village	Tango Kamp. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	427	GHASHTO KACH. Village	JejiKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	428	TARI GULI. Village	ZorAsmarKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	429	SHABAZI. Village	Kara Mar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
431	AZORI. Village	Neshgam. Village	The village is under control of Taliban	
432	JEGAL. Village	NawiKalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban	

13. Nooristan	440	AWYAK. Village	Sheren. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	453	PASHKEL. Village	WerGado. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	455	SHALA DOR. Village	BalaMandol. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
8. Paktika	582	HANIF WAL. Village	Mullahyan. Village	There was fighting of Taliban
	584	ATTA GUL. Village	AkhtoKalai. Village	The way was blocked by Taliban
26. Nimroz	650	MULLAH ABDUL AZIZ. Village	Sadiq Abad. Village	Due to lack of water people shifted from this village
	652	MAH WALLI. Village	Abdul Ghafar. Village	Due to lack of water people shifted from this village
27. Helmand	686	TOORMA. Village	AabBazan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	728	CHAR DIH. Village	Sangin Lora. Village	There was landmine to the way of this village
	729	PANI ZAI. Village	Koz Mullah ZaiYaNaso-Zai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
28. Kandahar	801	DAMAN. Village	NawiKalai. Village	No village with this name was found
	802	Agha Shin. Village	SpenaGhundi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	803	AjiKhudaydad. Village	Markaz Shah WaliKott. Village	There was operation of army forces
29. Zabul	817	MUQAM. Village	Hassan Kariz. Village	There was landmine on the way to this village
	840	PATAW. Village	Sado Khan Qala. Village	There was court of Taliban so we couldn't go there
	847	TUGHRAT. Village	Takbar. Village	There was landmine on the way to this village
23. Badghis	926	SHAH MIRA. Village	BolMisna. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	927	DARA BOOM PAYEN. Village	Qarchaghi. Village	There was operation of army forces
	929	KHAIR KHANA SUFLA. Village	BuzBai Ha. Village	There was operation of army forces
	939	SAYID AZIM HOTAK. Village	Waremat. Village	There are no houses here
	941	SANG ZOR. Village	Payal. Village	There are no houses here
	943	BALOCH HA LODEN. Village	Haqak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
24. Herat	969	CHASHMA BAZ ALI. Village	ChaharBurjak. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	970	AFARD. Village	Pahlawanan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	971	SHALME ABAD. Village	GulBaf Ha. Village	No village with this name was found
	984	ZANG SABAHA. Village	GandumMana. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

25. Farah	989	KARAIZ KHUDAY RAHM. Village	Kohna Kan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	993	ARTOOGHNAK. Village	Shewan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	994	KHARAK. Village	Ganj Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	995	HUSSAIN ABAD. Village	KalQala. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	996	ASSLE ZER KOH. Village	Seya Jangal. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	997	KHAR SAKI. Village	ShaikhLala. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	998	GAD SANGAR. Village	Sai Joi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1001	WENG. Village	Ghuzni. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1002	REZA GARZANAK. Village	Khum Rashid. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1003	SHAH WOLLAYAT. Village	Larti. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1004	GARZANAK MIR KHUSH. Village	Shah Toot. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1005	NAR MAKI. Village	Kariz Mohammad Saheed. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1006	QALA LAHL MOHAMMAD. Village	Masaw. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1011	RABAT. Village	Joi Chashma. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1012	KHAIR ABAD. Village	Musa Qala. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1013	KARAIZ GOW. Village	KorGhundi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1014	JOWZARA. Village	Deno. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1018	KARAIZ AGHA BENAN. Village	MarkazWoloswali. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1019	KARAIZ NAGHAK. Village	Bajera. Village	There was landmine on the way
	1020	KARAIZ MALIK. Village	Hawzak Abdul Qader. Village	There was landmine on the way



31. Ghor	1022	SHAI TAKHT. Village	Tapa Khair Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1023	VINI. Village	AkhtaKhanaPayen. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1024	DAH KHALIL. Village	Jar Zard. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1025	SHALAKHTAN. Village	Meyanji. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1027	SOPAR MAN. Village	KhwajaGhar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1028	SHAH MAK. Village	DehSabz. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1029	SHOR KAN. Village	Sofak. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1031	KANDAYAK. Village	WajGuna. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1032	KASHKAK. Village	Tapa Shohada. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1033	ZAMIN JAI. Village	Kasi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1035	KARAI ZAK. Village	Shaikh Ha. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1039	QAZAGHAK. Village	Ali Baik. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1043	SEYA DASHT. Village	KhumShor. Village	No village with this name was found
	1068	SEYA DARA. Village	KarizKhoshk. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1085	KHAIRS BAIDANK. Village	Shanya. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
1086	KHOSHKAK. Village	Gundab. Village	The village is under control of Taliban	
1087	JOWINASER. Village	KajAbro. Village	The village is under control of Taliban	
14. Badakhshan	1096	NOW ABAD DOGHAL-TA. Village	Haqelan. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1097	MADRASA. Village	Qalah. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1098	YOJAYKEL. Village	Murghabi Dan. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1099	PAHAN DARA PAYEN. Village	SokhtaKohBala. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1100	PAYAN MOR. Village	Hassan Baigi. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1101	MAMYALIK. Village	KapaDara. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1107	KHAJOW. Village	DehSangan. Village	No village with this name was found
	1121	SENI MAYET. Village	Azan. Village	No transportation way for vehicles

15. Takhar	1128	BOLTI. Village	SarElenak. Village	This village is related to Kulangan district
	1136	GOZAR-BALA-GARGAN. Village	Tolki Bain. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1140	GUL SAI. Village	Ali Qatan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1141	OLGAR NOW ABAD. Village	Aqpara. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1143	NOOR ABA. Village	Seya Jar. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1145	KAJ DARAH. Village	Naw Abad. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1146	ERPAN. Village	Khanqa. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1153	PAMIR QESHLAQ. Village	ChaparQeshlaq. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
16. Baghlan	1181	NASIRY. Village	HodKhail. Village	No village with this name was found
	1183	HABIBULLAH WA MATA KHAIL. Village	DauodZai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1186	KAJ NOW HAJI SAYYID TIMORY. Village	Naw Abad SarShakh. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1187	MIRZA QAQ. Village	SarGhalat. Village	No village with this name was found
	1190	PAITAWAK. Village	Guzar. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1195	TALE. Village	Barqi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1196	WALI KHAIL. Village	Sadat AraKash. Village	This village completely has been shifted to Sarak 12
	1200	DAHI MULLAH ZIYA. Village	QariaChaman. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1201	HAJI SAFAR MOHAMMAD. Village	Do Aabi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1205	HAZAR LAR KHABI. Village	Naw Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
1208	SHUSH KAM. Village	Qara Cha. Village	The village is under control of Taliban	
17. Kunduz	1237	SHERKHAN BANDAR. Village	QariaKozma. Village	Sherkhan Bandar is a big area and Qaria-Kozma is a part of it
	1238	SHEER MAHAI. Village	QaraKotarma. Village	No village with this name was found
	1247	DAWLAT-YAR. Village	KhwajaPesta. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1248	LAR KHABI. Village	JanatBagh. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1253	BAZ QUM. Village	Mang Tapa. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1254	ALMAN TODA. Village	Basos. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1255	AQ SHAKH. Village	SajaniUlya. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1257	BAGHRAIKOL. Village	Dana Jee. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

32. Bamyan	1266	NOOR QOUR BO. Village	Ajka. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1268	ACHANI. Village	QoulMiran. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1269	ISPI DAK. Village	QalaWakil. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1270	SHAH BAIDAK. Village	QalaSokhta. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1272	DAHAN PALAN. Village	Mandigak. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1273	AMROD HULYA. Village	DehGero. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1274	ISPA SANG. Village	Borgho Sang. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1277	SEYA KHARAK. Village	SarDasht. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1280	HAZAR CHASHMA PAITOW. Village	Gazak. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1281	DAHAN GHASHAR. Village	QalaShagat. Village	Security problem
	1282	ISPI DARK. Village	Pas Naw. Village	Security problem
	1284	BOGHRI. Village	DashtUlya. Village	Security problem
	1285	BAYARAK. Village	MeyanaDeh. Village	Security problem
	1286	KHOWJA KAFSHA. Village	Tezab. Village	Security problem
	1287	KHALAF SHAIR. Village	Sar Bom Sabz Dara. Village	Security problem
	1288	ZEAR GHAR. Village	ChaharDewal. Village	Security problem
	1289	SOKHTAGI DAM DASHT. Village	DashtSechak. Village	Security problem
	1291	KHAR BAIDAK. Village	RashibSabzDara. Village	No village with this name was found
	1292	DARA UOD. Village	SarlarNetaq. Village	Security problem
	1293	SAFID SANG BALENA. Village	Degah. Village	Security problem
	1294	GUMBAD. Village	Langar. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1295	SPEN HOW. Village	Jamah Ali. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1304	SORKHAK TANGI. Vil- lage	Bust. Village	No village with this name was found
	1306	KEJAK. Village	Toyak. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1307	SORKH NAW. Village	GhojNaw. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1312	GHAR GHARA SALIH. Village	Deh Barat. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1313	KACH QOUL. Village	Qala. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1315	GUL SAI. Village	Dew Khana. Village	No village with this name was found
	1317	LOWRANJ. Village	Sang Chel. Village	Security problem
	1318	BANI KABOT DOWRO. Village	Qaghor. Village	Security problem
	1319	MADAR. Village	Ahangaran. Village	Security problem
	1320	YAKHAK HULYA. Village	Naw Abad. Village	Security problem
1321	KARIMAK. Village	Nabaq. Village	Security problem	
1322	BAYKOI. Village	Gumbad. Village	No village with this name was found	
1323	BALDAR GHAN. Village	Bor Sang. Village	No village with this name was found	
1324	DO WAREED. Village	Qalai Mullah. Village	No transportation way for vehicles	
1325	GUM AB. Village	KohnaQala. Village	Security problem	
1326	HADIRA. Village	Shanya. Village	No transportation way for vehicles	
1327	LAGHARAK. Village	DashtKamPari. Village	No transportation way for vehicles	
1328	MOSSA DARA. Village	QaraKhwal. Village	No transportation way for vehicles	

34. Daikundi	1330	ZANQAFI. Village	QoghZar. Village	No village with this name was found
	1332	ALAK. Village	Walrag. Village	There was mistake in name of village
	1335	AWGIR. Village	Jawz. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1341	DAHAN RAMU. Village	Sewak. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1342	BOR KUSHTA. Village	ShorAab. Village	No village with this name was found
	1343	DAHANA-IUOR. Village	SorkhBaid. Village	There was few houses in this village
	1345	SHAH NOOR. Village	Kaja. Village	No village with this name was found
	1348	DAHAN-I-NAJAK. Village	DarwanaGak. Village	No village with this name was found
	1349	GHARAK. Village	Seya Deh. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1355	TAQARNAKAK. Village	Safed Sang. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1363	NIK. Village	Dona Lagak. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
18. Balkh	1380	QAFAN. Village	Qarshigek. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1385	NAQELIN NOW SHAR. Village	Jar Qala. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1386	LOCHAK ARAQ. Village	Ahmad Abad. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1390	SHAHRAK KOHNA. Village	Langar Abad. Village	There was landmine on the way
	1397	SHADEYAN. Village	MarkazWoloswali. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
19. Samangan	1403	AKA KHAIL. Village	Omar Khail. Village	This village was uninhabited
	1408	KHOWJA KHAKI-HA. Village	Karta Sabz. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1412	MULLAH TASH. Village	GuzarMirza Barat Ali. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1414	YATI KHONAK. Village	Beni Malang. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1418	DOWLATA. Village	Saheed Ha. Village	No village with this name was found
	1427	KHAN MOHAMMAD KAMAR. Village	LarSokhta. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1433	NOW AMAD QOUDYA. Village	Takaw. Village	No village with this name was found
	1445	QASHQA. Village	Seya Qotan. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
	1447	HAZEEM. Village	DaraShamsuddin. Village	No transportation way for vehicles
1451	DAHAN TANGLI. Village	Dawlat Abad. Village	This village is related to FerozNakhcher district	
20. Jawzjan	1475	BAKAWOL TURKMAN-YA. Village	BakawolKhurasan. Village	No respondent was found there
	1484	ALAM LAIK. Village	Khatab. Village	No village with this name was found
	1489	CHOOB BASH. Village	AylekRubat. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1493	MULLAH BURHANUD-DIN. Village	Fateh Abad. Village	No village with this name was found
	1496	QEMARAQ PAYAN. Village	Koliqal. Village	Malik of village didn't allow to interview

21. Sar-i-Pul	1504	TURKMANYA. Village	AngotUzbekia. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1509	ARMANI MULKI. Village	ShahrakBalkhabi. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1511	RAJAB ABAD. Village	Achabar. Village	No village with this name was found
	1513	MOHAMMAD AYUB. Village	QeshlaqBeland. Village	No village with this name was found
	1514	SHEEN. Village	KhwajaQalha. Village	No village with this name was found
	1523	CHAGHDAN PAYEN. Village	Tatar. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1524	AQ GEER AFGHANIYA. Village	Koran. Village	No village with this name was found
	1525	SAYAD TOYE. Village	Khurasan. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
	1526	MASJED SAFID. Village	Karan. Village	No village with this name was found
	1533	HAJI AZIZ. Village	Kamarak. Village	No village with this name was found
22. Faryab	1544	KHOWJA SAHADUL-LAH. Village	KhwajaQoul. Village	No village with this name was found
	1556	AQCHER. Village	Tejam. Village	No village with this name was found

## Appendix 3: Interview Questionnaire

### Region

Base: All Respondents	9260
Central/Kabul	24%
East	10%
South East	10%
South West	11%
West	13%
North East	14%
Central/Hazarajat	3%
North West	14%

### Geographic Code

Base: All Respondents	9260
Villages	77%
Towns	5%
City	6%
Metro (Kabul)	13%

### Province

Base: All Respondents	9260
Kabul	15%
Kapisa	2%
Parwan	2%
Wardak	2%
Logar	1%
Ghazni	5%
Paktia	2%
Paktika	2%
Khost	2%
Nangarhar	6%
Laghman	2%

Kunar	2%
Nooristan	1%
Badakhshan	4%
Takhar	4%
Baghlan	3%
Kunduz	4%
Balkh	5%
Samangan	1%
Jawzjan	2%
Sar-i-Pul	2%
Faryab	4%
Badghis	2%
Herat	7%
Farah	2%
Nimroz	1%
Helmand	3%
Kandahar	5%
Zabul	1%
Uruzghan	1%
Ghor	3%
Bamyan	2%
Panjshir	1%
Daikundi	2%

## NOTE TO INTERVIEWERS:

REMEMBER THAT THIS IS A CONVERSATION. MAKE THE PERSON COMFORTABLE. MAKE EYE CONTACT.

BE RESPECTFUL. DO NOT TRY TO LEAD THE RESPONDENT DURING THE INTERVIEW OR GET THE “DESIRED” ANSWERS FROM THEM. MAKE SURE YOU TELL THEM THAT THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS, YOU JUST WANT THEIR OPINIONS.

DURING THE INTERVIEW, BE POLITE BUT INQUISITIVE. DO NOT ACCEPT ONE-WORD ANSWERS. DRAW OUT RESPONDENTS TO GIVE DETAILED RESPONSES BY FURTHER PROBING – SAY: “WHY DO YOU SAY THAT?” “ANYTHING ELSE?” “TELL ME MORE.”

Asalaam Valeikum, I am from ACSOR-Surveys, an independent research organization. We regularly conduct surveys among people like you to find out what you feel about issues of public interest. I just want to ask you some questions about “matters of interest to Afghans.” I am interested in your opinion. Your name will not be given to anyone and your views will be analyzed along with those of thousands of others.

If I come to a question that is sensitive and you feel uncomfortable answering it, please let me know. We can either decide to ignore that particular question or else I will explain what the question is about in more detail so that you can decide whether to answer it or not.



## MAIN SURVEY QUESTIONS

Q-1. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the right direction?

Q1a. First Mention \_\_\_\_\_

Q1b. Second Mention \_\_\_\_\_

	1st mention	1st & 2nd mention
<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	9260	18520
Reconstruction/rebuilding	20%	32%
Good security	14%	24%
Don't know	4%	18%
Improvement in education system	7%	13%
Schools for girls have opened	7%	13%
Having active ANA and ANP	7%	13%
Peace/end of the war	4%	7%
Economic revival	3%	6%
Democracy/elections	3%	6%
Good government	2%	5%
Road reconstruction	2%	5%
Freedom/free speech	2%	4%
International assistance	2%	3%
More job opportunities available	1%	3%
Nothing is going in the right direction	1%	3%
Reduction in level of administrative corruption	1%	3%
More electricity supply than before	1%	3%
Reduction in poppy cultivation	1%	2%
Removing Taliban	1%	2%
National unity	1%	2%
Foreign forces leaving Afghanistan	1%	2%
Good communication system	1%	2%

Having a parliament	1%	2%
Having a legal constitution	1%	2%
Presidential elections	1%	2%
Clinics have been built	1%	2%
Development of agriculture	1%	2%
Disarmament	1%	2%
Existence of foreigners	1%	1%
Women can now work	*	1%
More attention to human rights	1%	1%
Development of healthcare system in general	*	1%
Better justice	*	1%
Women have more freedom	*	1%
Clean drinking water	*	1%
Respecting women rights	*	1%
Refugees return	*	1%
Refused	*	1%
Prevention/Elimination of crimes	*	1%
Establishing High Peace Jirga/Shura	*	1%
Better relations with foreign countries	*	*
Free movement/travel possible	*	*
Decrease in crimes	*	*
Low prices	*	*
Better and more media	*	*
New technology is available	*	*
Removing terrorism	*	*
Having a legitimate president	*	*
Detecting and defusing mines	*	*
Establishment of factories	*	*
Transfer of security responsibilities	*	*
Respecting Islam	*	*
Preventing the intervention of foreign countries	*	*
Mining of natural resources	*	*

Prevention/Elimination of suicide attacks	*	*
Creation of Arbakais	*	*
Better transportation	*	*
Decrease in number of accidents	*	*
Better treatment of addicts	*	*
Decrease in kidnapping	*	*
Abandonment of assistance with Pakistan	*	*
Having active governors	*	*
Access to products	*	*
Having active airports	*	*
Hezb-e-Islami is getting weaker	*	*
Industrial programs	*	*
Decrease in US arbitrary attacks	*	*
Endorsement of strategic agreement	*	*
Increase in salary of government employees	*	*
Banking services	*	*
Total	100%	200%

Q-2. Generally speaking, based on your own experience, what are two reasons to think that Afghanistan is going in the wrong direction?

Q2a. First Mention \_\_\_\_\_

Q2b. Second Mention \_\_\_\_\_

	1st mention	1st & 2nd mention
<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>	<b>18520</b>
Insecurity	16%	24%
Corruption	14%	23%
There is unemployment	9%	20%
Don't know	4%	18%
Suicide attacks	6%	11%
Presence of Taliban	5%	9%
Bad economy	4%	8%

Bad government	3%	6%
Administrative corruption	4%	6%
Poor education system	3%	6%
High prices	3%	6%
Ethnic problems	2%	4%
Increase in drug trade	2%	4%
Injustice in the country	2%	4%
No reconstruction has happened	2%	4%
Neighboring countries cause problems	2%	4%
Too many foreigners are getting involved	2%	4%
Interfere of foreigners in Afghanistan's military affairs	1%	3%
Increase in crimes	1%	3%
Innocent people being killed	1%	2%
Existence and interference of foreigners	1%	2%
Kidnapping of children	1%	2%
Lack of unity	1%	2%
Water & power supply problems	1%	2%
Poor leadership	1%	2%
Presence of Warlords	1%	2%
Lack of coordination between ISA/Coalition forces and ANP/ANA during fights against AOGs	1%	2%
Lack of implementation of the law	1%	1%
Pakistan's rocket attacks on Afghanistan	1%	1%
Placing bombs on the roads	1%	1%
Weak ANA and ANP	1%	1%
Women's rights	*	1%
Healthcare problems	1%	1%
Lack of aid/no development assistance	*	1%
Terrorism	*	1%
Unfair elections	*	1%
Weak parliament	*	1%
Western influence is too great	*	1%

Nothing	*	1%
Foreign aid causes problems	*	1%
Disarmament hasn't taken place	*	1%
Lack of shelter	*	*
There is no progress	*	*
Lack of food for people	*	*
Refused	*	*
People disillusioned with the government	*	*
There is danger to Islam	*	*
Lack of attention to agriculture	*	*
US arbitrary attacks	*	*
The government is supporting Taliban and Al-Qaeda	*	*
Lack of factories for manufacturing	*	*
Don't have trust in the peace process	*	*
Lack of freedom of speech	*	*
Theft	*	*
Transportation problems	*	*
Too much luxury	*	*
Disrespecting Islamic values	*	*
Lack of investment	*	*
Too much freedom	*	*
Exit of foreigners	*	*
Creation of Arbakais	*	*
Political resistance	*	*
High levels of pollution	*	*
Lack of military equipment	*	*
Existence of Hizb-e-Islami	*	*
Rape/sexual harassment	*	*
Lack of communications system	*	*
Existence of Northern allies	*	*
Lack of specialized cadres	*	*
Poisoning the school children	*	*

Misuse of power	*	*
Endorsement of strategic agreement	*	*
Bonn agreement	*	*
Americans blocking roads	*	*
Lack of firewood	*	*
Total	100%	200%

Q-3. Overall, based on your own experience, do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction, or do you think they are going in the wrong direction?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Right direction	57%
Wrong direction	38%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	5%

Q-4. (ASK ALL) In your view, what are the two biggest problems facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Write down answer)

Q4a. First Mention \_\_\_\_\_

Q4b. Second Mention \_\_\_\_\_

	1st mention	1st & 2nd mention
<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>	<b>18520</b>
Insecurity/attacks/violence/terrorism	17%	30%
Corruption	15%	26%
Unemployment	13%	25%
Poor economy	5%	10%
Poverty	4%	9%
Education/schools/literacy	4%	9%
Suicide attacks	5%	9%
Presence of Taliban	4%	7%
Interference of Pakistan	4%	7%
High prices	2%	6%

Don't know	1%	6%
Government/weak government/central authority	2%	5%
Tribal issues/Partisanship	2%	5%
Interference of foreign countries	3%	5%
Presence of foreign troops	2%	4%
Drug smuggling	2%	4%
Scarcity of electricity	2%	4%
Injustice	1%	3%
Innocent people being killed	1%	2%
Presence of warlords	1%	2%
Crime	1%	2%
Lack of national unity	1%	2%
Reconstruction/rebuilding	1%	2%
Roads	1%	1%
Health care/clinics/hospitals	1%	1%
Lack of efficient ANA and ANP	1%	1%
Drinking water	1%	1%
Kidnapping of children	*	1%
Lack of (proper) shelter	1%	1%
No attention to women's rights	*	1%
Roadside bombings	*	1%
Disrespect for Islamic Laws	*	1%
Water for irrigation	*	1%
Weak parliament	*	1%
Unfair elections	*	1%
Interference of Iran	*	*
Irresponsible armed people	*	*
Agricultural problems	*	*
Lack of factories	*	*
Establishment of political parties	*	*
Lack of foreign assistance	*	*

Lack of mines/Lack of mining for natural resources	*	*
Foreign forces' air strikes	*	*
Lack of food	*	*
Transportation problems	*	*
No freedom	*	*
Rape	*	*
Low salaries for government employees	*	*
Misusing power	*	*
Refused	*	*
Lack of production companies	*	*
Exit of foreign forces	*	*
Lack of military equipment	*	*
Peace has been maintained	*	*
Foreigners' arbitrary operations	*	*
Existence of private prisons	*	*
Too much luxury	*	*
Disrespect to our culture	*	*
Returnees' problems	*	*
Lack of respect for elders	*	*
Population levels are too high	*	*
No problems	*	*
Discrimination	*	*
Pollution	*	*
Lack of natural gas	*	*
Existence of armed groups or militias	*	*
Business problems/struggles	*	*
Family problems	*	*
Weak judiciary system	*	*
Lack of fuel	*	*
Establishment of peace council	*	*
Infidels' government	*	*



Poisoning of school children	*	*
Improvement in communications	*	*
Development of private banks	*	*
Lack of barricades	*	*
Total	100%	200%

Q-5. (ASK ALL) What are the biggest problems in your local area? (Write down answer)

Q5a. First Mention \_\_\_\_\_

Q5b. Second Mention \_\_\_\_\_

	1st mention	1st & 2nd mention
<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>	<b>18520</b>
Unemployment	14%	27%
Electricity	14%	24%
Roads	10%	19%
Drinking Water	11%	19%
Insecurity/attacks/violence	9%	14%
Healthcare/clinics/hospitals	6%	13%
Education/schools/literacy	5%	11%
Don't know	1%	10%
Poverty	3%	7%
High prices	3%	6%
Poor Economy	2%	5%
Reconstruction/rebuilding	1%	4%
Corruption	2%	3%
No problems	2%	3%
Pollution	2%	3%
Crime	1%	3%
Water for irrigation	1%	3%
Ethnic problems	1%	2%
Taliban	1%	2%

Lack of (proper) shelter	1%	2%
Drug smuggling	1%	2%
Presence of warlords	1%	2%
Government/weak government/central authority	1%	1%
Lack of unity	1%	1%
Lack of agricultural tools /equipment	1%	1%
Transportation problems	1%	1%
Roadside bombs	1%	1%
Injustice	*	1%
Innocent people being killed	*	1%
Addiction to drugs	*	1%
Presence of foreign forces/searching houses	*	1%
Kidnapping of children	*	1%
Lack of food	*	1%
Municipalities not doing their job well	*	1%
Women's rights	*	1%
Suicide attacks	*	1%
Lack of ANA and ANP	*	*
Lack of law implementation	*	*
Presence of foreigners	*	*
Interference of Pakistan	*	*
Gas	*	*
Dikes and drains to protect against floods	*	*
Lack of industrial projects	*	*
Night raids	*	*
Arbakais (Armed groups supported by the government)	*	*
Lack of communication system	*	*
Family problems	*	*
Existence of terrorism and Al-Qaeda	*	*
Lack of fuel	*	*

Lack of foreign assistance	*	*
Natural disasters	*	*
Lack of entertainment opportunities	*	*
Lack of factories	*	*
Lack of mosques	*	*
AOGs take money from people	*	*
Governor grabbing lands	*	*
Lack of bakeries	*	*
Elections	*	*
Moral corruption	*	*
People not feeling responsible	*	*
Refused	*	*
Returnees' problems	*	*
Too much freedom	*	*
Less access to technology	*	*
Mine extraction	*	*
Lack of cold storage houses (for fruit)	*	*
Bad/corrupt governor	*	*
Lack of Shuras	*	*
Setting schools on fire	*	*
Iranian interference	*	*
Disrespecting Islamic values	*	*
Existence of Hizb-e-Islami	*	*
Population levels are too high	*	*
The people's representatives cannot solve the problems	*	*
Negative effects of western tradition	*	*
Total	100%	200%

Q-6. Overall, for you and your family, which of these periods was the best economically?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Most recent period after the Taliban	76%
Taliban period	10%
No difference (vol.)	13%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	*

Q-7. Do you or do you not use any of the following for obtaining information?

	Yes	No	Refused	Don't know
a) Radio	80%	20%	*	*
b) TV set	54%	46%	*	*
c) Mobile phone	57%	43%	*	*
d) Computer	2%	98%	*	*
e) Fixed phone line	1%	99%	*	*
f) The internet	3%	97%	*	*

Q-8. Which one of the following sources do you use most often for obtaining information (Interviewer: Read out the options below; circle the ONE used most often)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Mosque	16%
Community shuras	12%
Friends and family	46%
Bazaars	5%
Other sources	20%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	*

Q-9. I would like to ask you about today's conditions in the village/neighborhood where you live. Would you rate (insert item) as very good, quite good, quite bad, or very bad in your area?

	Very Good	Quite Good	Quite Bad	Very Bad	Refused	Don't know
a) The availability of clean drinking water	33%	41%	17%	9%	*	*
b) The availability of water for irrigation	19%	34%	26%	17%	1%	3%
c) The supply of electricity	18%	23%	22%	37%	*	1%
d) The availability of clinics and hospitals	13%	39%	31%	16%	*	*
e) The availability of medicine	13%	37%	33%	15%	*	*
f) The availability of education for children	27%	45%	20%	8%	*	*
g) The condition of roads in your area	11%	32%	32%	25%	*	*

Q-10. In the last 12 months, do you know of, or have you heard of any project or program in this area/district covering any of the following?

	Yes	No	Refused	Don't know
a) Reconstruction/building of roads, bridges	36%	64%	*	*
b) Water supply for drinking	31%	69%	*	*
c) Water supply for irrigation	19%	79%	*	1%
d) Electricity supply	20%	79%	*	1%
e) Healthcare (primary health center, regular visits of doctors, etc.)	29%	71%	*	1%
f) Education (reconstruction/opening of school, more teachers etc.)	37%	62%	*	1%
g) De-mining	15%	84%	*	1%
h) Demilitarization/disarmament	12%	87%	*	1%
i) Reconstruction/programs in agriculture	19%	80%	*	1%
j) Reconstruction/programs in industry	10%	89%	*	1%
k) Building new mosques	22%	77%	*	1%
l) Humanitarian programs – help in food, medicines, shelter, production materials etc.	13%	85%	*	1%

Q-11. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” to any items in Q-10a-l) Which countries do you think have provided the most funding for these types of projects in your area/district?

Q11a. First Mention (country): \_\_\_\_\_

Q11b. Second Mention (country): \_\_\_\_\_

Q11c. Third Mention (country): \_\_\_\_\_ \

	Q11a	Q11b	Q11c	Q11a+Q11b+Q11c
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Aware of projects	6439	6439	6439	6439
USA	27%	13%	6%	46%
Japan	10%	9%	5%	24%
Germany	7%	7%	3%	16%
India	5%	6%	5%	16%
Afghan Government	7%	3%	2%	12%
China	2%	3%	2%	7%
United Kingdom (Britain)	2%	2%	2%	6%
Turkey	2%	2%	2%	6%
Iran	2%	2%	1%	5%
Saudi Arabia	2%	2%	2%	5%
France	1%	2%	2%	5%
Sweden	2%	2%	1%	5%
Canada	1%	2%	1%	4%
Italy	2%	1%	*	3%
Pakistan	1%	1%	1%	2%
Norway	1%	1%	*	2%
Denmark	1%	1%	*	2%
Russia	1%	1%	1%	2%
National Solidarity Program	1%	*	*	2%
Poland	1%	1%	*	2%
Korea	*	*	*	1%
Spain	*	*	*	1%
Australia	*	*	*	1%

Holland	*	*	*	1%
Tajikistan	1%	*	*	1%
Foreign countries	*	*	*	1%
World Bank	*	*	*	1%
UN agencies	*	*	*	1%
Foreign NGOs	*	*	*	1%
European countries in general	*	*	*	1%
Jordan	*	*	*	1%
No country	1%	1%	1%	1%
Thailand	1%	*	*	1%
Bangladesh	*	*	*	*
Hungary	*	*	*	*
Uzbekistan	*	*	*	*
Belgium	*	*	*	*
Turkmenistan	*	*	*	*
Switzerland	*	*	*	*
Finland	*	*	*	*
PRT	*	*	*	*
Lithuania	*	*	*	*
WFP	*	*	*	*
Indonesia	*	*	*	*
Kuwait	*	*	*	*
Egypt	*	*	*	*
DAKAR agency	*	*	*	*
Red Cross	*	*	*	*
South Africa	*	*	*	*
Greece	*	*	*	*
Kazakhstan	*	*	*	*
UNICEF	*	*	*	*
Agha Khan foundation	*	*	*	*
HABITAT	*	*	*	*
Nepal	*	*	*	*
Malaysia	*	*	*	*

UNOPS	*	*	*	*
Czech Republic	*	*	*	*
Care Organization	*	*	*	*
Brazil			*	*
Albania			*	*
IOM	*	*	*	*
New Zealand	*	*	*	*
Dubai	*	*	*	*
Romania	*		*	*
Qatar	*	*	*	*
NATO	*	*	*	*
Libya	*	*	*	*
Sudan	*	*	*	*
Argentina	*	*	*	*
Singapore	*	*	*	*
Iraq	*	*	*	*
Bulgaria	*	*	*	*
Iceland	*	*	*	*
GTZ	*	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*	*
Don't know	15%	35%	58%	15%

Q-12. (ASK ALL) Now I would like to ask you some questions about your water supply Where do you usually get drinking water for your family?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Piped water inside the compound (garden/plot)	12%
Personal well (in home)	34%
Well or piped water at a neighbor's house	9%
Public, community well	20%
Public, community tap	5%
River/stream/spring	18%
Water seller	1%
Water supplied by NGO	1%
Ganda (water stored on ground in dug holes)	*



Q-13. (ASK ALL) Do you use water for irrigation?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	52%
No	48%

Q-14. (Ask if answered Code 1 “Yes” to Q-13) How would you evaluate the amount of water available for irrigation in your area last year?

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Water for irrigation users	4825
[1] Very good	22%
[2] Good	58%
[3] Bad	15%
[4] Very bad	5%
Don't know (vol.)	*

Q-15. (Ask if 3 or 4, Bad or Very bad, to Q-14) Please list the main reasons why the amount of water for irrigation is bad or very bad:

Q15a. Write First Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

Q15b. Write Second Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

	Base: Bad or Very bad amount of water available for irrigation	Less water in springs	Lack of attention and care from municipality	Lack of attention from government	Not having proper canals	Lack of development councils	Refused	Don't know
Q15a	1000	76%	3%	6%	8%	*	*	6%
Q15b	1000	10%	6%	10%	13%	1%	*	60%
Q15a+Q15b	1000	86%	9%	16%	21%	1%	*	6%

Q-16. (ASK ALL) Over the last 5 years, has your household generally had enough water?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	42%
Sometimes	45%
No	13%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-17a. What is the main source of energy that you use for cooking at home? (Code in the first column below)

Q-17b. And what is the main source of energy that you use for heating your home? (Code in the second column)

	Q17a	Q17b
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents	9260	9260
Electricity	4%	3%
Firewood	48%	26%
Coal	3%	11%
Animal dung/manure	14%	20%
Grass or other plant biomass	7%	19%
Charcoal	2%	8%
Kerosene	*	1%
Bottled gas/LPG	21%	12%
Diesel	*	*
Don't know (vol.)	*	14%

Q-18. How often do you fear for your own personal safety or security or for that of your family these days? Would you say you always, often, sometimes, rarely, or never fear for you and your family's safety?

Base: All Respondents	9260
[1] Always	13%
[2] Rarely	23%
[3] Sometimes	32%
[4] Often	14%
[5] Never	18%

Q-19. Have you or has anyone in your family suffered from violence or of some criminal act in the past year? (please note that in the text this question has undergone regression analysis for correlation purposes. As a result the percentages in the text are not the same as the respondents' answer percentages)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	19%
No	81%

Q-20. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-19) What kind of violence or crime did you or someone in your family experience in the past year? (READ OUT LIST. Multiple Response)

Base: Victims	2223
Physical attack or beating	21
Racketeering /extortion	12
Theft of livestock	10
Burglary/looting	10
Pick-pocketing	8
Foreign forces actions	6
Suicide attacks	6
Militant/Insurgent actions	6
Motor vehicle theft/Property stolen from vehicle or theft	5
Murder	5
Physical attack or beating	21
Racketeering /extortion	12
Theft of livestock	10
Burglary/looting	10
Pick-pocketing	8

Q-21. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-19) Still thinking about any violent or criminal act you or your family may have experienced in the past year, was it reported to anybody outside your family or not?

Base: Victims	1791
Yes	64%
No	34%
Refused	*
Don't know	2%

Q-22. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-21) Who did you report the crime to? (Multiple Response. Do Not Read Codes)

Number of cases	1756
Afghan National Police	26%
Shura/ Elders	18%
Tribal leader/Malik	12%
District governor/ woleswal	11%
Afghan National Army	10%
Mullah Sahib	5%
Provincial authority	3%
Public prosecutor	3%
Courts	2%
Taliban	2%
Local militia (Arbakai)	2%
Local commander or warlord	2%
Just my family	1%
Central government	1%
Office of UN organization(s)	1%
Local PRT	1%
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission	*
Press or other media	*
Don't know (vol.)	*

Q-23. (ASK ALL) If you were a victim of violence or any criminal act, how much confidence would you have that the guilty party would be punished? Would you have:

Base: All Respondents	9260
[1] A great deal	13%
[2] A fair amount	38%
[3] Not very much	29%
[4] No confidence at all	18%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-24. In your view, what is the biggest cause of crime in Afghanistan? (Do NOT Read codes. Write down answer)

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Base: All Respondents	9260
Unemployment	23%
Corruption	14%
Illiteracy	9%
Poverty/weak economy	8%
Insecurity	8%
Lack of government attention/Weak government	5%
Taliban	4%
Drugs	3%
Existence of irresponsible armed groups	3%
Lack of law implementation	3%
Discrimination	3%
Presence of international forces	3%
Pakistan's interference	2%
Injustice	2%
Terrorism	1%
Murders	1%
Robberies	1%
Criminals released without punishment	1%
Family problems	1%
Suicide attacks	1%
Lack of reconstruction	*
Having weak/low-paid police	*
Returnees	*
Western countries	*
Rapes	*
Kidnapping of children	*
Powerful people misusing their power	*
Poorly protected borders	*
Arbakais	*
Business disputes	*
Iranian interference	*
Disrespecting culture	*
Human trafficking	*

High prices	*
Not collecting weapons from people	*
Violence	*
Too much freedom for women	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	4%

Q-25. (ASK ALL) Please tell me whether you think that corruption is a major problem, a minor problem, or no problem at all in the following areas.

	Base: All Respondents	Major problems	Minor problems	Not a problem	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
a) In your daily life	9260	56%	28%	16%	*	*
b) In your neighborhood	9260	49%	35%	15%	*	1%
c) In your local authorities	9260	58%	32%	9%	*	1%
d) In your provincial government	9260	68%	25%	5%	*	2%
e) In Afghanistan as a whole	9260	77%	18%	4%	*	1%

Q-26. Next I am going to list several different organizations or situations in which people have said they have experienced corruption in the past. Please tell me how often in the past year have you had to give money, a gift, or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Please answer "In all cases," "In Most Cases," "In some cases," "In No Cases" if you have not had any experience of this sort of corruption, or "Had no contact" if you have not had contact with the organization or experienced the situation in the past year.

(Rotate items on the list)

	Base: All Respondents	In all cases	Most cases	In some cases	No cases	Had no contacts	Refused	Don't know
a) Officials in the municipality/district office	9260	6%	11%	12%	23%	45%	*	1%
b) Customs office	9260	4%	9%	12%	21%	54%	*	1%
c) Afghan National Police	9260	4%	10%	17%	28%	40%	*	1%
d) Afghan National Army	9260	3%	7%	11%	32%	46%	*	1%
e) Judiciary/courts	9260	6%	12%	15%	21%	45%	*	1%

f) State electricity supply	9260	3%	10%	14%	26%	46%	*	1%
g) Public healthcare service	9260	4%	13%	21%	33%	29%	*	1%
h) When applying for a job	9260	5%	11%	15%	25%	43%	*	1%
i) Admissions to schools/university	9260	3%	10%	13%	31%	43%	*	1%
j) To receive official documents	9260	4%	10%	14%	25%	45%	*	1%

Q-27. Do you think that your local District or Provincial Government is doing too much, about right, or not enough to fight corruption?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Too much	12%
About right	47%
Not enough	37%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	4%

Q-28. Some people say that politics and religion should be mixed (i.e. local religious leaders should be regularly consulted on the problems facing an area), while others think that politics and religion should not mix. Which is closer to your view?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Politics and religion should be mixed	58%
Politics and religion should not mix	38%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	4%

Q-29. If your household were to have one of the following four problems, from whom would you ask for help to resolve it? (Interviewer: Ask about each type of problem listed at the top of the chart; circle only ONE response in each column)

	Q29a	Q29b	Q29c	Q29d
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents	9260	9260	9260	9260
Line departments	11%	17%	7%	29%
District authorities	8%	7%	5%	11%
Elders of the local shura/jirga	48%	25%	15%	9%
Provincial governor/ authorities	4%	3%	4%	7%
Friends and family	1%	3%	29%	6%
Malik/Khan	9%	17%	12%	5%
Provincial Council	2%	3%	3%	5%
Community development council	1%	3%	2%	4%
A member of parliament	3%	4%	1%	3%
Mullah	2%	3%	6%	3%
Afghan National Army	2%	4%	3%	2%
Afghan National Police	6%	7%	5%	2%
PRT	*	1%	1%	2%
NGO	*	*	1%	2%
Human Rights Commission	*	*	4%	2%
National Solidarity Program	*	1%	*	2%
Don't know (vol.)	1%	1%	1%	2%
Foreign forces	*	*	*	1%
Municipality	1%	1%	*	1%
Taliban	*	*	*	1%
Doctors	*	*	*	1%
No one	*	*	*	*
Courts	*	*	*	*
Other	*	*	*	*
Refused (vol.)	*	*	*	*



Q-30. Now I will read you a list of different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me, whether you would participate in the following activities with “no fear,” “some fear,” or a “lot of fear”?

	Base: All Respondents	No fear	Some fear	A lot of fear	Refused	Don't know
a) When participating in resolving problems in your community	9260	57%	34%	8%	*	1%
b) Voting in a national/provincial election	9260	41%	40%	19%	*	1%
c) Participating in a peaceful demonstration	9260	28%	40%	28%	*	3%
d) To run for public office	9260	37%	39%	19%	1%	4%
e) When encountering ANP	9260	46%	37%	15%	*	2%
f) When encountering ANA	9260	49%	34%	15%	*	2%
g) When traveling from one part of Afghanistan to another part of the country	9260	24%	46%	29%	*	1%
h) When encountering international forces	9260	20%	43%	34%	*	2%

Q-31a. In some countries, people do not feel able to publicly criticize their government while in other countries they feel quite free to do so in public. How strongly do you agree or disagree that in Afghanistan it is generally acceptable to criticize the government in public?

Base: All Respondents	9260
[1] Strongly agree	27%
[2] Agree somewhat	49%
[3] Disagree somewhat	18%
[4] Strongly disagree	5%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-31b. In comparison to one year ago, do people in your community feel more safe, as safe as before, or less safe to express their opinions?

Base: All Respondents	9260
More safe to express their opinions	23%
As safe as before to express their opinions	56%
Less safe to express their opinions	17%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%

**Q-32.** (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 'More safe' in Q-31b) What changes compared with the past do you think have made most people to feel more safe to express their opinions in the area where you live? (Write down answer)

Q32a. Write First Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

Q32b. Write Second Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

	Q32a	Q32b	Q32a + b
<b>Base: More safe</b>	<b>2107</b>	<b>2107</b>	<b>2107</b>
The security conditions are good (in our area)	34%	14%	48%
Freedom of speech is guaranteed	17%	10%	26%
Peace and democracy	10%	9%	19%
Having ANP and ANA	6%	4%	10%
Good government	2%	4%	6%
Better education	2%	3%	6%
(Respect for) Human rights	2%	2%	4%
People's cooperation with the government	2%	2%	4%
Increase in the level of people's awareness	1%	2%	4%
Unity among people	2%	2%	4%
Freedom of press is guaranteed	2%	1%	3%
Having a legal constitution	2%	2%	3%
Taliban removal	2%	1%	3%
Bad security	2%	1%	3%
Presence of CDC	1%	1%	2%
The removal of local militias	1%	*	1%
Having (working) parliament and local shuras	1%	1%	1%
Presence of ISAF/Coalition forces	1%	1%	1%
Presence of PC	1%	*	1%
Disarmament	*	*	1%
Reconstruction	1%	1%	1%
Corruption has decreased	*	*	1%
More attention to women's rights	*	1%	1%
Better justice system	*	*	1%

Better economic situation	*	*	1%
Threats by Taliban	*	*	1%
Injustice	*	*	1%
Illiteracy	*	*	1%
Unemployment	*	1%	1%
Bias and disunity	*	1%	1%
Annihilation of narcotics	*	*	1%
Weak government	*	*	1%
Lack of democracy and freedom of speech	*	*	1%
Creation of Arbakais	1%	1%	1%
Islamic party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has been removed	*	*	*
No one	*	*	*
Night raids	*	*	*
Threats by warlords	*	*	*
Don't have permission	*	*	*
Threat by elders	*	*	*
More corruption	*	*	*
Increase in crimes	*	*	*
Existence of international terrorism	*	*	*
Fear of the government	*	*	*
US arbitrary attacks	*	*	*
Killing of people	*	*	*
Crimes have decreased	*	*	*
Fear of spies	*	*	*
They are the residents of our village	*	*	*
Kidnapping	*	*	*
Suicide attacks	*	*	*
Non-implementation of laws	*	*	*
Interference of neighboring countries	*	*	*
Transfer of power from foreigners to Afghans	*	*	*
Refused	1%	1%	1%
Don't know	3%	30%	3%

**Q-33.** (Filtered. Ask if answered code 3 'Less safe' in Q-31b) Why don't people in your area have the freedom to express their opinions? (Write down answer)

Q33a. Write First Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

Q33b. Write Second Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

	Q33a	Q33b	Q33a + b
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
<b>Base: Less safe</b>	<b>1582</b>	<b>1582</b>	<b>1582</b>
Security conditions are bad in this area	25%	9%	35%
Presence of Taliban	12%	6%	18%
Fear for personal safety	9%	5%	14%
The government doesn't allow freedom of political opinion	7%	5%	12%
Threats by AOGs	5%	4%	9%
Presence of warlords	3%	2%	6%
Fear of police	4%	3%	6%
No real democracy	2%	2%	5%
The government doesn't care about people's opinions	3%	2%	5%
Ethnic discrimination	1%	2%	4%
Lack of justice	2%	3%	4%
Fear of revenge	2%	2%	4%
Lack of education	2%	1%	3%
Fear of people	2%	1%	3%
Women are under the control of men	1%	1%	2%
Fear of coalition/foreign forces	2%	1%	2%
Elders/Mullahs don't allow freedom of opinion	1%	*	2%
Lack of awareness of legal rights	1%	1%	2%
Fear of Malik	1%	1%	2%
Corruption	1%	1%	2%
Unemployment	*	1%	2%
Fear of spies	1%	1%	2%

Threats by district governor	1%	1%	2%
Don't trust anyone	1%	1%	2%
No disarmament	*	1%	1%
Not interested in/Lack of information about politics	1%	1%	1%
Afraid of family members	1%	*	1%
Suicide attacks	*	*	1%
Existence of terrorism	*	1%	1%
Animosity between government employees	*	1%	1%
Kidnapping	*	*	1%
Interference of neighboring countries	*	*	1%
Killing of innocent people	1%	*	1%
Political parties/partisanship	1%	*	1%
Fear of militias	1%	*	1%
Poverty/Weak economy	*	1%	1%
Existence of smugglers	*	*	
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	6%	36%	6%

Q-34. (ASK ALL) How much influence do you think someone like you can have over local (District/Provincial) government decisions – a lot, some, very little, or none at all?

Base: All Respondents	9260
[1] A lot	10%
[2] Some	38%
[3] Very little	28%
[4] None at all	23%
Refused	*
Don't know	1%

**Q-35.** On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the process of decision-making in your community (not your opinion on how good the decisions made were for you personally). Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the process?

Base: All Respondents	9260
[1] Very satisfied	20%
[2] Somewhat satisfied	50%
[3] Some what dissatisfied	21%
[4] Very dissatisfied	7%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%

**Q-36.** In your opinion, which of the following does your member of parliament care about most? Is it about ... (Interviewer: Read out options)

Base: All Respondents	9260
National issues	16%
Provincial issues	20%
District or municipality issues	11%
Ethnic issues	19%
Personal interests	31%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%

**Q-37.** Members of parliament have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an okay job, a good job, or a great job?

	Base: All Respondents	Bad job	OK job	Good job	Great job	Refused	Don't know
a) Listening to constituents and representing their needs	9260	36%	43%	17%	4%	*	1%
b) Delivering jobs and development	9260	37%	33%	23%	5%	*	1%
c) Making laws for the good of the country	9260	30%	35%	24%	9%	*	1%
d) Monitoring the president and his staff	9260	29%	36%	24%	9%	*	2%

Q-38. Provincial council members have various responsibilities. How would you rate their performance on each of the following duties? Would you say they are doing a bad job, an okay job, a good job, or a great job?

	Base: All Respondents	Bad job	OK job	Good job	Great job	Refused	Don't know
a) Listening to constituents and representing their needs	9260	32%	46%	17%	4%	*	1%
b) Delivering jobs and development	9260	33%	35%	25%	6%	*	1%
c) Improving delivery of basic services	9260	30%	37%	25%	6%	*	1%
d) Helping resolve disputes	9260	28%	39%	25%	8%	*	2%

Q-39. Please tell me which statement you agree with more (Read statements).

Base: All Respondents	9260
Statement A	33%
Statement B	66%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-40. Community development councils (CDC) have been established as part of the National Solidarity Program and members of the Council are representatives of various groups in your community. Tell me, do you know if there is a CDC in your community?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes, aware of CDC in your community	58%
No, not aware of CDC in your community	40%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%

Q-41. I would like to ask you about some officials, institutions, and organizations. As I read out each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them to do their jobs. Do you have a lot, some, not much, or no confidence at all? If you don't know, it's ok, just say you have no opinion. (Interviewer code: 99 "Don't Know" if they have no opinion)

	Base: All Respondents	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	Not much confidence	No confidence at all	Refused	Don't know
a) Afghanistan Land Authority	9260	32%	39%	15%	11%	*	3%
b) Community development councils	9260	21%	41%	23%	10%	*	5%
c) Community shuras/jirgas	9260	24%	41%	22%	10%	*	4%
d) District government	9260	20%	41%	25%	12%	*	2%
e) Government ministers	9260	12%	33%	32%	20%	*	2%
f) International NGOs	9260	14%	37%	29%	17%	*	3%
g) Local militias	9260	9%	23%	28%	35%	*	5%
h) Media such as newspapers, radio, TV	9260	30%	38%	20%	10%	*	1%
i) People who take bribes	9260	5%	13%	18%	61%	*	3%
j) National NGOs	9260	12%	39%	29%	16%	*	3%
k) Parliament as a whole	9260	12%	35%	30%	18%	*	5%
l) Provincial councils	9260	16%	41%	26%	15%	*	1%
m) Provincial government	9260	19%	40%	26%	13%	*	2%
n) Religious leaders	9260	31%	35%	21%	12%	*	1%
o) The court system	9260	10%	33%	33%	22%	*	2%
p) Your member of parliament	9260	10%	39%	28%	21%	*	2%



**Q-42.** I'm going to read some statements to you about the Afghan National Army (ANA). ANA soldiers are the ones who wear dark green and brown camouflage uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): Would you say strongly or somewhat?

	Q42a	Q42b
<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>	<b>9260</b>
[1] Strongly agree	58%	57%
[2] Agree somewhat	35%	34%
[3] Disagree somewhat	5%	6%
[4] Strongly disagree	2%	3%
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%	1%

**Q-43a.** (Ask if answered 3 "Somewhat disagree" or 4 "Strongly disagree" to Q-42a) Can you tell me why you disagree with the statement "ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people"?

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with "ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people"	617
Unprofessional behavior with people	20%
They take bribes	12%
Nationalism	9%
They don't respect elders	8%
Firing on civilians	7%
They are addicts	5%
They don't punish the AOGs	5%
They are very brutal	5%
They are illiterate	5%
They kill innocent people	3%
They misuse their power	3%
They have Taliban members among them	1%
Their monthly pay is low	1%
They work on foreigners' orders	1%
They can't maintain security	*
Refused (vol.)	1%
Don't know (vol.)	14%

**Q-43b.** (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-42b) Can you tell me why you disagree with the statement “ANA helps improve the security”?

Q-43b. \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANA helps improve the security”</b>	<b>823</b>
Insecurity	20%
Not well-trained	11%
They take bribes	10%
Not well-equipped	7%
Nationalism	5%
Never act on time	5%
The law is not implemented equally	5%
Killing innocent people	5%
They support Taliban	4%
Disrespecting people	3%
They are drug addicts	2%
They are being paid less	2%
Misuse their power	2%
They destroy the country	2%
ANA is not present in our area	2%
Misusing their vehicles	1%
They support foreigners	1%
Taliban have spies among them	1%
Refused (vol.)	1%
Don't know (vol.)	12%

Q-44. I'm going to read some statements to you about Afghan National Police (ANP). ANP officers are the ones who wear solid blue-grey colored uniforms. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask): Would you say strongly or somewhat?

	Q44a	Q44b	Q44c
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents	9260	9260	9260
[1] Strongly agree	44%	43%	38%
[2] Agree somewhat	41%	43%	42%
[3] Disagree somewhat	10%	9%	11%
[4] Strongly disagree	4%	5%	7%
Refused (vol.)	*	*	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%	1%	1%

Q-45a. (Ask if answered 3 "Somewhat disagree" or 4 "Strongly disagree" to Q-44a) Can you tell me why you disagree with the statement "ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people"?

Q-45a. \_\_\_\_\_

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with "ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people"	1400
They are corrupt	29%
They are not well-educated	13%
They don't respect elders/people	13%
They are bad people	10%
They are nationalist	6%
Misuse their power	6%
Insecurity	5%
They are drug addicts	3%
Driving fast/misuse their vehicles	2%
We don't have ANA in our area	1%
Their salaries are low	1%
They are not well-equipped	1%

They harass women	1%
They are Afghan	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	7%

**Q-45b** (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-44b) Can you tell me why you disagree with the statement “ANP helps improve the security”?

Q-45b. \_\_\_\_\_

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
<b>Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANP helps improve the security”</b>	<b>1298</b>
They don't perform their jobs	17%
Bad security	16%
They don't have the skills of war	9%
The are not bound by law	6%
They are illiterate	6%
They respect people	5%
They are hired by references	4%
They support terrorists	4%
They are drug addicts	2%
Misuse their power	1%
No ANP in our area	1%
They take bribes	*
They kill innocent people	*
They are nationalist	*
They are being paid less	*
Refused (vol.)	1%
Don't know (vol.)	7%

**Q-45c** (Ask if answered 3 “Somewhat disagree” or 4 “Strongly disagree” to Q-44c) Can you tell me why you disagree with the statement “ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes”?

Q-45c. \_\_\_\_\_

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
<b>Base: Somewhat disagree or Strongly disagree with “ANP is efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes”</b>	1780
They are corrupt	33%
Existence of AOGs	10%
Courts will free the criminals	10%
The don’t know the law	10%
They don’t have war skills	9%
They are illiterate	6%
They are nationalists	4%
They support terrorists/criminals	4%
Misuse their power	2%
They are drug addicts	1%
There is no ANP in our area	1%
They are low-paid	*
Refused (vol.)	1%
Don’t know (vol.)	10%

**Q-46.** Now, please tell me if you think that the following need foreign support to do their job properly at the moment? Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly?

	Q46a	Q46b
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	9260	9260
[1] Strongly agree	42%	38%
[2] Agree somewhat	35%	37%
[3] Disagree somewhat	13%	14%
[4] Strongly disagree	8%	9%
Refused (vol.)	*	*
Don’t know (vol.)	1%	1%

Q-47. Thinking of the different levels of government in Afghanistan, do you think that overall the [insert item], is doing a very good job, somewhat good job, somewhat bad job or a very bad job?

	Base: All Respondents	A very good job	Somewhat good job	Somewhat bad job	Very bad job	Refused	Don't know
a) National government	9260	26%	49%	17%	7%	*	1%
b) Provincial government	9260	20%	48%	23%	8%	*	1%
c) Municipal authorities (Ask urban residents only)	2152	13%	46%	27%	13%	*	1%
d) District government (Ask rural residents only)	7108	18%	48%	26%	8%	*	1%

Q-48. Has the member of parliament (MP) for your province ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	24%
No	74%
Refused	*
Don't know	2%

Q-49. Has the Provincial Governor ever been involved in helping to resolve a problem or issue (masala/masael) that affects you in the last 2 years?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	27%
No	71%
Refused	*
Don't know	2%

Q-50. Have you ever personally tried to contact a representative on the provincial council for help in solving any of your personal or community problems in the last 2 years?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	24%
No	75%
Refused	*
Don't know	1%

Q-51. (Filtered. Ask if answered "Yes" in Q-50) How satisfied were you with the outcome?

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Contacted a representative on the provincial council	2287
[1] Very satisfied	23%
[2] Somewhat satisfied	50%
[3] Some what dissatisfied	18%
[4] Very dissatisfied	9%
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-52. (ASK ALL) How satisfied are you with the job your community development council (CDC) is doing? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? Or if you don't know what they're doing, or are not aware that you have a CDC, just say "I don't know."

Base: All Respondents	9260
Very satisfied	16%
Somewhat satisfied	47%
Some what dissatisfied	22%
Very dissatisfied	8%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	6%

Q-53. Lets focus on elections. Please tell me if there was an opportunity to vote for each of the following types of elections in your area.

	Base: All Respondents	Yes	No	Refused	Don't know
a. District shura	9260	43%	55%	*	2%
b. Community development council	9260	47%	51%	*	2%
c. Provincial council	9260	64%	35%	*	1%
d. Parliamentary	9260	70%	29%	*	1%
e. Presidential	9260	78%	22%	*	1%

**Q-54.** When people talk about elections, they often describe them as free and fair. By “free” they generally mean that all people have the chance to vote as they wish. By “fair” they generally mean that all candidates/parties follow the rules, are given equal access to the public and votes were counted correctly and not manipulated. Thinking about what is meant by “free” and “fair”:

In general, do you think elections in Afghanistan are free and fair, or not?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Yes, free and fair	61%
Not free and fair	35%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	4%

*“Please note the text in chapter 7 indicates 61% think elections are free and fair. This is because the 4% “don't know” has been excluded”*

**Q-55.** (Filtered. Ask if answered “No” to Q-54, not free and fair) Tell me the reasons why you think they were not free and fair starting with the most important reason and then the next most important reason and so on. (Interviewer: Allow up to 4 responses)

	<b>Q55a</b>	<b>Q55b</b>	<b>Q55c</b>	<b>Q55d</b>	<b>Q55a+ b+c+d</b>
<b>Column percents</b>	<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>Base: All Respondents</b>
<b>Base: Was free and fair</b>	<b>3425</b>	<b>3425</b>	<b>3425</b>	<b>3425</b>	<b>3425</b>
Corruption in the election	16%	15%	10%	5%	46%
Corruption in counting the votes	33%	20%	10%	3%	66%
Buying votes	14%	16%	10%	3%	42%
Not everyone participated in election	2%	3%	3%	1%	9%
People hired for election process where illiterate	1%	2%	2%	1%	5%
Nationalism/Bias	2%	2%	2%	1%	7%
Lack of security	11%	9%	8%	4%	32%
One individual voting multiple times	2%	3%	2%	2%	9%



Interference of foreigners	5%	4%	4%	2%	15%
Warlords played a big role	4%	6%	6%	3%	19%
Political parties were involved	1%	1%	2%	1%	5%
Women were not allowed to vote	1%	2%	2%	1%	7%
There was no control/monitoring	1%	3%	2%	1%	8%
Interference of ANA and ISAF	*	*	*	*	1%
President is a puppet installed by foreign countries	*	*	*	1%	2%
Existence of Taliban	1%	1%	1%	1%	3%
Too many candidates	*	*	1%	*	2%
Delay in declaration of election results	1%	1%	1%	1%	4%
Weak government	1%	1%	1%	1%	4%
Finger ink was removable	*	*	*	*	1%
Use of fake cards	*	1%	1%	*	2%
Taliban were not elected	1%	*	*	*	2%
Local militia interference	*	*	*	*	*
Lack of voting stations	*	*	*	*	1%
Under aged people were voting	*	*	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*	*	*
Don't know	2%	8%	31%	67%	67%

Q-56. (ASK ALL) Please tell me which statement you agree with more (Interviewer: Read each statement).

Base: All Respondents	9260
Statement A	81%
Statement B	19%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	*

Q-57. From the following four sources – mosque, community shuras, friends/family, and bazaars – which one do you use most often for obtaining information about elections and who to vote for? (Interviewer: Read out the options below; circle the ONE used most often)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Mosque	13%
Community shuras	18%
Friends and family	48%
Bazaars	5%
Other source (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	16%

Q-58. Does security, by this we mean participating and traveling to polling stations, play a part in deciding whether you will vote in an election?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	81%
No	17%
Refused	*
Don't know	2%

Q-59. In 2014, there is going to be an election for a new president in Afghanistan. Do you think the result of the presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have no impact on your life?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Better	56%
Worse	15%
No difference	24%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know	5%

Q-60. (“Reconciliation” is a process that takes place when opposing parties overcome a grievance and start to rebuild their relationships) Are you aware of any efforts being taken by the Afghan Government to reconcile with armed opposition groups?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	74%
No	25%
Refused	*
Don't know	1%

Q-61. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	63%
No	32%
Refused	*
Don't know	4%

Q-62. In your opinion, what is the reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (Interviewer: Open-ended; write down first answer)

Write First Mention: \_\_\_\_\_

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents	9260
Presence of foreign troops/international community	22%
To gain power	20%
They are supported by Pakistan	10%
Too much corruption in the government	5%
They are dissatisfied with the government	5%
To support Islam	4%
For money	3%
Unemployment/poverty	3%
They are against democracy	2%
To create insecurity	2%
To establish security	2%

Illiteracy	2%
Fighting is their way of life	1%
Lack of attention to their desires	1%
Injustice	1%
Ethnic problems	1%
To defend the country	1%
To destroy our country	1%
Creating fear/terror	1%
They implement law	1%
They are brutal/cruel	1%
They are supported/motivated by foreign countries	1%
They are against police forces	*
There is not reason	*
To support drug trafficking	*
Robbery	*
Moral corruption	*
Violence against women	*
Killing innocent people	*
Freedom	*
They are not Afghan	*
Destroying schools	*
Availability of weapons	*
They are corrupt	*
They are Afghans	*
Suffering losses by international forces	*
They are against Islam	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	7%

Q-63. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might support the goals of armed opposition groups?

Write Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

Base: All Respondents	9260
Nationalism	6%
Corruption	9%
AOGs work for Pakistan	4%
Their supporters are against peace	3%
Their supporters have been deceived	3%
There is no reason	3%
Lack of jobs	7%
For better security	6%
Their supporters are backed by foreign countries	3%
For their own profit	7%
They are against the USA	3%
AOGs are Muslims	8%
AOGs solve problems faster	1%
They are illiterate	2%
AOGs are Afghan	4%
AOGs are performing Jihad	6%
AOGs serve the people	1%
They are afraid of AOGs	6%
Injustice in Afghanistan	4%
AOGs prevent civilian casualties	*
Their supporters are against development	*
Their supporters hate democracy	*
Weak government	1%
Take revenge on the government	*
Lack of shelter	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	13%

Q-64. What is one reason that an Afghan citizen might disagree with the goals of armed opposition groups?

Write Reason: \_\_\_\_\_

Base: All Respondents	9260
To finish the war	14%
AOGs are not trustworthy	4%
AOGs have bad intentions	4%
They kill innocent people	24%
They love their country	3%
AOGs are non-Muslims	1%
They work for Pakistan/foreigners	8%
AOGs are corrupt	2%
AOGs are nationalist	1%
They harass people and take bribes	2%
AOGs are not Afghans	1%
They perform suicide bombings	8%
They are fighting against the government	2%
They are against women's rights	2%
People hate them	2%
AOGs are drug addicts	*
AOGs are illiterate	1%
To support the Afghan government	1%
Planting bombs along the roads	1%
They are against development	2%
They are against education	1%
AOGs are kidnapers	*
They don't maintain justice	*
People who hate them support Islam	1%
AOGs are against freedom and peace	3%
They don't want AOGs to gain power	*
Refused (vol.)	1%
Don't know (vol.)	11%

**Q-65.** Thinking about the reasons you have given for why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy or no sympathy at all for these groups?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
A lot of sympathy	9%
A little sympathy	26%
No sympathy at all	63%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%

**Q-66.** I'm going to read some statements. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement. (Read out statement, wait for response and then ask):

	<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree somewhat</b>	<b>Disagree somewhat</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Refused (vol.)</b>	<b>Don't know (vol.)</b>
a) Everyone should have equal rights under the law, regardless of their gender	9260	59%	31%	7%	3%	*	*
b) Everybody should have equal rights under the law regardless of their ethnicity	9260	56%	31%	10%	2%	*	*
c) Everybody should have equal rights under the law regardless of their religion	9260	54%	32%	10%	3%	*	1%

Q-67. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

	Base: All Respondents	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
a) If I had a dispute, I am familiar with how to bring the case to the formal justice system (Huquq Department at district/provincial level)	9260	32%	45%	16%	6%	*	1%
b) If I had a dispute, I am familiar with how to bring the case to the local jirgas, shuras	9260	34%	42%	17%	5%	*	1%

Q-68. In the past two years have you had a dispute or a formal case that you couldn't settle with the other party and had to go to the Huquq Department or village/neighborhood based shura/jirga to resolve it, or not?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	19%
No	80%
Refused	*
Don't know	*

Q-69. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-68) What kind of a case or dispute was it? (Single Response. If more than one case or dispute, ask for the most recent one) (please note that in the text this question had undergone regression analysis for correlations purpose. As a result the percentages in the text do not match the respondents' answers percentages)

Base: Contacted Huquq Department or shura/jirga	1771
Dispute over land	41%
Other property dispute, not land	12%
Commercial dispute	12%
Divorce	5%
Family problems	18%
Traffic accident	9%
Drug smuggling	*
Robbery	*
Dispute over inheritance	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%



Q-70. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-68) Were you satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings, or not?

Base: Contacted Huquq Department or shura/jirga	1771
Fully	24%
Somewhat	47%
No/Dissatisfied	21%
Not finished yet/still in proceedings (vol.)	7%
Don't know (vol.)	2%

Q-71. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-68) Where have you taken this case or dispute?

Base: Contacted Huquq Department or shura/jirga	1771
Huquq Department/State court	36%
Village, neighborhood-based shura/jirga	36%
Both (vol.)	25%
Other (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	3%

Q-72. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 ‘Huquq Department/State court’ or code 3 ‘Both’ in Q-71) When taking a case to the Huquq Department/State Court or being a party in settling a case in a state court, have you used any professional legal services (from a lawyer), or have you pleaded your case alone/with help by friends/relatives?

Base: Huquq Department/State court or both	1073
Professional legal services	25%
Alone/helped by friends, relatives	49%
Both (vol.)	25%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-73. (ASK ALL) And now let's turn to the local Huquq Department. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the Huquq Department

	Base: All Respondents	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
a) Local Huquq are fair and trusted	9260	21%	49%	20%	8%	*	2%
b) Local Huquq follow the local norms and values of our people	9260	17%	41%	29%	10%	*	2%
c) Local Huquq are effective at delivering justice	9260	19%	40%	27%	11%	*	2%
d) Local Huquq resolve cases quickly and efficiently	9260	15%	38%	30%	14%	*	3%
e) Local Huquq effectively sent my case to the courts	9260	15%	37%	30%	14%	1%	3%
f) Local Huquq effectively sent my case to the local jirgas or shuras	9260	13%	39%	30%	14%	1%	4%

Q-74. Tell me, do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about state courts?

	Base: All Respondents	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
a) State courts are fair and trusted	9260	21%	41%	25%	13%	*	1%
b) State courts follow the local norms and values of our people	9260	14%	37%	32%	16%	*	1%
c) State courts are effective at delivering justice	9260	18%	36%	30%	16%	*	1%
d) State courts resolve cases timely and promptly	9260	13%	33%	33%	20%	*	1%
e) State courts treat men and women equally	9260	16%	38%	28%	16%	*	2%

Q-75. And now let's turn to village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements about the village/neighborhood-based jirgas/shuras?

	Base: All Respondents	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
a) Local jirgas, shuras are fair and trusted	9260	34%	47%	14%	4%	*	2%
b) Local jirgas, shuras follow the local norms and values of our people	9260	27%	43%	21%	7%	*	2%
c) Local jirgas, shuras are effective at delivering justice	9260	27%	43%	21%	7%	*	2%

d) Local jirgas, shuras resolve cases timely and promptly	9260	24%	43%	23%	7%	*	1%
e) There should be local women's jirgas and shuras	9260	26%	42%	21%	9%	*	2%

Q-76. And now let's turn to informal justice. Tell me do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

	Base: All Respondents	Strongly agree	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Strongly disagree	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
a) The practices of baad and badal in Afghanistan	9260	13%	24%	24%	38%	*	1%
b) The guardian of a female should wait until she is of adult age and should always consult her first before arranging her marriage	9260	37%	37%	16%	8%	*	1%
c) If a husband dies without children, his wife is entitled to part of mahr	9260	36%	35%	17%	9%	*	3%

Q-77. How satisfied are you with the available dispute resolution mechanisms/services in your area? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied?

*"Please note the text in chapter 6 indicates 71% are very or somewhat satisfied". This is because the 3% Don't know responses have been excluded"*

Base: All Respondents	9260
Very satisfied	17%
Somewhat satisfied	54%
Some what dissatisfied	21%
Very dissatisfied	6%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	2%

Q-78. Now let's talk specifically about women's issues. What are the biggest problems facing women in this area today? [Interviewer: Write down top two answers]

Q-78a. First mention: \_\_\_\_\_

Q-78b. Second mention: \_\_\_\_\_

	Q78a	Q78b	Q78a+b
Column percents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents	Base: All Respondents
Base: All Respondents	9260	9260	9260
Education/illiteracy	27%	17%	44%
Lack of job opportunities for women	12%	13%	25%
Lack of rights/women's rights	10%	8%	19%
Forced marriages/dowry	9%	7%	16%
Domestic violence	8%	7%	16%
Poverty	3%	4%	7%
General healthcare	4%	2%	6%
Nothing	6%	6%	6%
Pregnancy-related healthcare	3%	3%	5%
Lack of professional courses	3%	2%	5%
Under the control of men/men have power	2%	2%	4%
Security	2%	2%	4%
Can't leave homes	1%	1%	3%
Freedom and democracy	1%	1%	2%
Lack of electricity and water	*	*	1%
Murder of literate women	*	*	1%
Government not paying attention to women	1%	1%	1%
Rapes	*	*	1%
Representation in shura/jirga	*	*	*
Suicide	*	*	*
Transportation problems	*	*	*
Lack of bakeries for women	*	*	*
Lack of shelter	*	*	*
Drug addiction	*	*	*

Presence of Taliban	*	*	*
High prices	*	*	*
Cultural problems	*	*	*
Lack of public baths	*	*	*
Corruption	*	*	*
No availability to religious education	*	*	*
Lack of markets for crafts	*	*	*
Injustice	*	*	*
Ethnic problems	*	*	*
Lack of parks for women	*	*	*
Kidnaping of women	*	*	*
Bias	*	*	*
Lack of opportunities for women	*	*	*
Lack of courts for women	*	*	*
Divorcing women	*	*	*
Checkups	*	*	*
Lack of construction	*	*	*
Roadside bombs	*	*	*
Refused	*	*	*
Don't know	4%	20%	4%

Q-79. In your area is there an organization, institution, or authority, where women can go to have their problem(s) resolved?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Yes	18%
No	80%
Refused	*
Don't know	2%

Q-80. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-79) What organization, institution, or authority is that?

Write response: \_\_\_\_\_

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Has such organization, institution, or authority	1654
Directorate of Women’s Affairs	46%
Human Rights Council	13%
District office	9%
Police	4%
Women’s shura	4%
Human rights office	3%
Provincial office	2%
Qawm elders	2%
Local council	2%
Village shura/Elders shura	2%
The court	1%
National Solidarity Program	1%
Chief of police	1%
Local jirgas	1%
Safe house	1%
Neda-e-Zan organization	1%
Government organizations in general	*
Attorney general	*
Municipality	*
MRRD	*
Directorate of Social Works	*
WASA organization	*
Women capacity-building literacy organization	*
Agha Khan foundation	*
Red Crescent Society	*
Swedish organization	*
Relief International	*
Religious Ulema	*

Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	4%

Q-81. (ASK ALL) Some people say that women should have the same opportunities as men in education. Do you agree or disagree with this opinion? (Wait for response and then ask): Strongly or somewhat?

Base: All Respondents	9260
[1] Strongly agree	43%
[2] Agree somewhat	40%
[3] Disagree somewhat	12%
[4] Strongly disagree	4%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-82. Some people say that women should be allowed to work outside the home, while others say that women should not be allowed to work outside of the home. What is your opinion on this?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Women should be allowed to work outside the home	63%
Women should not be allowed to work outside the home	36%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-83. Do you think that elected government positions should be mostly for men, mostly for women, or do you think that both men and women should have equal representation in the political leadership?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Mostly for men	42%
Mostly for women	12%
Equal for both men and women	44%
Leadership should be given to them according to their capability	*
Women should do house work	*
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%



Q-84. If women vote, do you think that women should decide whom to vote for themselves or should men decide for women who they should vote for?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Women should decide for themselves	53%
Men should decide for women	25%
Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men (vol.)	21%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-85. Do you or other members of your household own any farm land, regardless of whether you personally work on or farm the land yourself or not?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	51%
No	49%
Don't know	*

Q-86. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-85) How many jeribs of land do you or other members of your household own?

\_\_\_\_\_ jeribs

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Base: Farm land owners	4743
2	17%
3	16%
1	10%
4	10%
5	9%
6	6%
10	6%
8	4%
7	3%
9	2%

12	2%
15	2%
20	2%
11	1%
13	1%
14	1%
16	1%
25	1%
30	1%
40	1%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	3%
Mean value	6.98

Q-87. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-85) How much of your land do you or other members of your household farm?

<b>Base: Farm land owners</b>	<b>4743</b>
Less than 1 Jerib	9%
1 - 2 Jerib	29%
2 - 3 Jerib	22%
More than 3 Jerib	38%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	1%

Q-88. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" in Q-85) Have you or other members of your household lost any land in the past year?

<b>Base: Farm land owners</b>	<b>4743</b>
Yes	14%
No	84%
Don't know	2%

**Q-89.** (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” in Q-88) What is the reason you or other members of your household lost land this past year?

Write reason for loss: \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Base: Lost any land</b>	<b>649</b>
Sale of land	27%
Land-grabbing	8%
Lack of anti-flood walls	20%
I lost it in a dispute	5%
Lost land because of debt	26%
Lost land due to a murder case	4%
Refused (vol.)	1%
Don't know (vol.)	10%

## DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

### D-1. Gender

Base: All Respondents	9260
Male	62%
Female	38%

### D-2. (ASK ALL) How old are you? (Record actual age; if respondent doesn't know or refuses, please estimate)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Years	Percentage of respondent
30	6%
40	6%
18	5%
20	5%
25	4%
28	4%
35	4%
19	3%
21	3%
22	3%
23	3%
32	3%
38	3%
45	3%
50	3%
24	2%
26	2%
27	2%
29	2%
31	2%
33	2%
36	2%
37	2%

41	2%
42	2%
60	2%
34	1%
39	1%
43	1%
44	1%
46	1%
47	1%
48	1%
49	1%
51	1%
52	1%
54	1%
55	1%
56	1%
65	1%
70	1%

D-3. Are you now working, a housewife (ask only women), retired, a student, or looking for work?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Working	51%
Retired	1%
Housewife	33%
Student	8%
Unemployed	7%
Refused	*
Don't know	*

- D-4. (Ask if codes 1 or 2, 'Working' or 'Retired' in D-3): What is your main occupation? (Write down and then code. If retired, ask for previous occupation and then code)

Occupation: \_\_\_\_\_

Base: Working or retired	4802
Farmer (own land/tenant farmer)	36%
Skilled worker/artisan	10%
Farm laborer (other's land)	9%
Informal sales/business	9%
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	8%
Self-employed professional	7%
Small business owner	6%
School teacher	5%
Government office - clerical worker	4%
Military/Police	3%
Private office - clerical worker	1%
Government office - executive/manager	1%
Private office - executive/manager	1%
University teacher	*

- D-5. (ASK ALL) What is the highest level (grade) of school you have completed? (Write down one code for just the highest level selected from the list below)

Education level: \_\_\_\_\_

Base: All Respondents	9260
Never went to a school	60%
Informal schooling at home or at a literacy class	2%
Islamic education at a Madrassa	3%
Primary School, incomplete (classes 1 to 5)	6%
Primary School, complete (finished class 6)	4%
Secondary education, incomplete (classes 7 to 8)	5%
Secondary education, complete (finished class 9)	3%
High School incomplete (classes 10-11)	5%

High School complete (finished class 12)	9%
14th grade incomplete (class 13)	2%
14th grade complete (finished class 14)	3%
University education incomplete (have no degree diploma)	1%
University education complete (have degree diploma)	1%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	*

D-6. Please tell me if you can:

	Base: All Respondents	Yes	No	Don't know (vol.)
a. Write a letter to someone without any assistance	9260	40%	60%	*
b. Read a letter from somebody without any assistance	9260	41%	59%	*

c. 'If a piece of nan cost 20 Afghani at a bakery, do you know how much change you will get if you want to buy 4 pieces and you have 100 Afghani in your pocket? (Do not read responses)'	Base: All Respondents	Yes, 20 Afs	Yes, other amount	No	Don't know (vol.)
	9260	79%	12%	8%	1%

D-7. Which languages do you speak? (Multiple Response)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Dari	79%
Pashto	51%
Uzbeki	9%
English	5%
Turkmeni	3%
Urdu	2%
Balochi	1%
Pashayee	1%
Nooristani	1%
Arabic	1%

## D-8. What languages can you read? (Multiple Response)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Dari	30%
Pashto	26%
English	6%
Arabic	2%
Uzbeki	1%
Urdu	1%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	61%

## D-9. What languages can you write? (Multiple Response)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Dari	28%
Pashto	23%
Uzbeki	1%
Arabic	2%
English	6%
Urdu	1%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	63%

## D-10. Are you married or single?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Single	19%
Married	79%
Widower/Widow	2%

## D-11. (Filtered. Ask if answered code 2 or 3 in D-10 [Men only]) How many times have you been married? (Record Number Below)

Total:	4497
1	91%
2	8%
3	1%



**D-11a.** (Filtered, Ask if answered code 2 or 3 in D-10 [Men only]) Of these, how many are still living?  
(Record Number Below)

Column percents	Base: All Respondents
Total:	4497
0	1%
1	96%
2	4%

**D-12.** (ASK ALL) How often do you eat meat in a typical week (excluding weddings or special events)?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Never	10%
Once	52%
More than once	34%
Every day	3%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know	*

**D-13.** How often do you eat vegetables in a typical week (excluding weddings or special events)?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Never	6%
Once	23%
More than once	44%
Every day	26%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know	*

**D-14.** Which ethnic group do you belong to? (SINGLE RESPONSE ONLY)

Base: All Respondents	9260
Pashtun	43%
Tajik	32%
Hazara	10%
Uzbek	7%
Turkmeni	2%
Arab	2%
Baloch	1%
Nooristani	1%
Aimak	1%
Sadat	1%

D-15. Which of the following three options do you identify with most at the moment – choose one?

	Base: All Respondents	Being a citizen of your country	Being a member of your ethnic group	Being a follower of your religion	Refused (vol.)	Don't know (vol.)
D15a First Mention	9260	66%	17%	17%	*	*
D15b Second Mention	9260	15%	30%	47%	*	8%
D15a,b,c, Mention	9260	81%	46%	64%	*	*

D-16. (Ask All) How many people live here in this household? (Record Number Below)

Base: All Respondents	9260
8	13%
7	12%
9	12%
10	11%
6	10%
5	7%
11	7%
12	7%
13	4%
4	3%
3	2%
14	2%
15	2%
16	2%
2	1%
17	1%
18	1%
19	1%
20	1%
Mean value	9.22

**D-18a.** For statistical purposes only, we need to know your average monthly household income. Will you please tell me which of the following categories best represents your average total family monthly income? [Interviewer: if the respondent can only tell you their annual family income, divide this by 12]

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Less than 2,000 Afs	6%
2,001 - 3,000 Afs	12%
3,001 - 5,000 Afs	24%
5,001 - 10,000 Afs	30%
10,001 - 15,000 Afs	15%
15,001 - 20,000 Afs	8%
20,001 - 25,000 Afs	3%
25,001 - 40,000 Afs	1%
More then 40,000 Afs	1%
Refused	*
Don't know	1%

**D-18b.** Do female members of the family contribute to this household income, or not?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Yes	17%
No	82%
Refused (vol.)	*
Don't know (vol.)	*

**D-18c.** (Filtered. Ask if answered code 1 "Yes" in D-18b) How much of your household's total income comes from female members of the household?

<b>Base: Female members of the family contribute to HHI</b>	<b>1614</b>
Less than 25%	64%
Between 26% and 50%	26%
Between 51% and 75%	7%
Between 76% and 100%	2%
Refused	*
Don't know	*

**D19a.** Please rate the living standard of your household. Does your household have enough money for food every day?

	Yes	No	Refused	Don't Know
a. Does your household have enough money for food every day?	85%	15%	*	*
b. Does your household always have enough money for fuel?	66%	44%	*	*
c. Does your household have enough money for your daily food, fuel and children's education?	53%	47%	*	*
d. Does your household have enough money for your daily food, fuel, children's education and to buy occasional luxury items?	26%	73%	*	*

**D-20.** Have you lived outside of Afghanistan in another country at any time in the past 20 years?

Base: All Respondents	9260
Yes	23%
No	77%
Refused (vol.)	*

**D-21a.** (Ask if code 1 "Yes" in D-20) In what country or countries have you lived?

Base: Lived outside Afghanistan	2116
Pakistan	67%
Iran	35%
India	1%
Saudi Arabia	1%
Dubai	1%
Russia	1%

**D-21b.** (Fill in for each country listed in D-21a) How long in years did you live in this country?

Base: Lived outside Afghanistan	1409
10	13%
2	9%
3	9%
8	8%
4	7%

5	7%
12	6%
15	6%
1	5%
6	4%
7	4%
9	3%
11	3%
13	3%
14	3%
20	2%
16	1%
17	1%
18	1%
25	1%
30	1%

RECORD THE TIME (USING 24-HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-16 AND M-17)

**Read closing statement to the respondent:**

“Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have. To help him do that, could I have your name and address?”

Respondent Information: Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewer Certification: “I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided me by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research.”

\_\_\_\_\_

Signed

\_\_\_\_\_

Date


To be completed by the supervisor:

D-25. Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Yes	44%
No	56%

D-26. Method of quality control/back-check

<b>Base: All Respondents</b>	<b>9260</b>
Direct supervision during interview	2%
Back-check in person by supervisor	27%
Back-check from the central office	7%
Not applicable	56%
Back-checked by Sayara personnel	8%



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