{"id":10012,"date":"2018-10-23T14:43:35","date_gmt":"2018-10-23T12:43:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/?p=10012"},"modified":"2018-10-23T17:13:52","modified_gmt":"2018-10-23T15:13:52","slug":"civil-society-in-iran-and-its-future-prospects-a-case-study","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/2018\/10\/civil-society-in-iran-and-its-future-prospects-a-case-study\/","title":{"rendered":"CIVIL SOCIETY IN IRAN AND ITS FUTURE PROSPECTS; A CASE STUDY"},"content":{"rendered":"

Volunteer Activists Institute<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"
\nExecutive Summary<\/span><\/h3>\n

The following report is the result of a research project by the Volunteer Activists Institute about the situation of civil society
\nin Iran and its prospects. The research phase of the project was conducted between September 2017 and May 2018
\nand covers a variety of Iranian civil society organizations (CSOs) such as women\u2019s NGOs, environmental NGOs,
\nyouth NGOs, social pathology NGOs, charities, workers unions, and journalists\u2019 associations. The main purpose of
\nthis research was to explain the current situation of Iranian CSOs, the challenges and restrictions they face, as well as
\nhighlight the position of CSOs in Iranian society (opportunities and threats), understand dominant trends in Iranian civil
\nsociety, and outline its future prospects.<\/p>\n

This research paper is made up of 11 chapters on the following topics:<\/h4>\n

\u2192 Methodology and Research Procedure
\n\u2192 Historical Analysis of Iranian Civil Society in the Last Four Decades
\n\u2192 Situation Analysis of Civil Society in Iran
\n\u2192 Mapping of Civil Society
\n\u2192 Restrictions of Civil Society in Iran: Freedom and Autonomy of CSOs
\n\u2192 Civil Society Main Actors and Builders
\n\u2192 Driving and Restraining Forces of Civil Society in Iran
\n\u2192 Influential Trends Within and Around Civil Society
\n\u2192 Strategic Concerns of Civil Society Leaders and Activists
\n\u2192 Future Scenarios for Civil Society in Iran<\/p>\n

Main Findings of the Research Project<\/span><\/h3>\n

The main findings of this research can be listed as followed:
\n\u2192 Civil society in Iran has various facets and faces, and it is not coherent and homogeneous. One of its facets
\nis its instrumentalization, which is very effectively at work in rescue work and services. One can find both traditionally
\nstructured as well as modern associations here, including charities and health- and hygiene-related CSOs. This branch
\nof civil society has a long history and enjoys an extensive social base. They are politically apathetic and usually adapt
\nto government policies and programs. The government also favors this branch and encourages its expansion and
\ndevelopment. Another aspect of civil society is its use as a domination tool. Iranian government uses civil society as yet
\nanother domination tool along with other suppressive measures and its ideological apparatus in order to legitimize its
\npolicies and plans. The most important feature of this aspect is to marginalize independent civil society, occupy civil
\nspheres, and advance government policies. Presently, this version of civil society controls vast public spheres in Iranian
\nsociety. The third facet of civil society is its acting as a force of emancipation and equality in society. This aspect of
\ncivil society is based on the premise that civil society is a social force for change based on principles of justice, nondiscrimination,
\nand non-violence. This is the face of a civil society that is aware of its socio-political responsibility and
\nstrives for a shift from civil society in itself to civil society for itself. The dominant discourse of this facet of civil society is
\ndemocracy, human rights, and peacebuilding, and its main mission is to protect citizen and union rights and advance
\nassociational life in society.
\n\u2192 Under Rouhani\u2019s government, civil society evolves in a top-down, greenhouse style and is being harnessed as
\na technical toolkit for domination and advancement of government policies. As a result, we have seen a growth in the
\nnumber of such instrumentalized CSOs in fields like women, youth, and the environment, whereas the formation and
\nestablishment of associations and trade unions or independent social movements for women, students, or workers is
\nprohibited. In other words, civil society as a social force that drives change and transformation is not accepted, and
\nlike the governments before him, Rouhani\u2019s government follows two main strategies against independent civil society;
\nsuppression and marginalization as well as replacement of independent CSOs and associations with quasi-governmental
\nones.
\n\u2192 The biggest challenge to this aspect is the lack of autonomy and freedom to establish and operate associations
\nand civil society organizations in Iran as well as government interference with their every procedure, thus stalling the
\nformation of associational life. Using legal as well as illegal mechanisms, the government blocks their activities, their
\naccess to free exchange of information, and freedom of speech, and outlaws citizens\u2019 and associations\u2019 rights to public
\ngatherings and demonstrations.
\n\u2192 The legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a preventive system requiring permission before action. In other
\nwords, citizens must observe certain rules before they can enjoy their rights and liberty. With regard to CSOs, this system
\nentails that in order for CSOs to acquire the status of a legal entity, citizens need to fulfill two prerequisites: 1. obtain an
\noperating license from relevant authorities, and 2. register the CSO in the National Registry Bureau of Companies and
\nNon-Commercial Organizations. The first step is a prerequisite for the second one, which opens a window of opportunity
\nfor government institutions to manipulate and interfere with the establishment and operation of CSOs.
\n\u2192 A significant development of Iranian civil society in recent years has been the emergence of a new generation
\nof civil activists in fields such as women\u2019s rights and youth. Although the numbers are not large, the new generation has
\ntaken upon itself to expand civil society and challenge government policies on matters such as social pathology and
\nwomen\u2019s rights. They have launched a number of creative civic initiatives, both online and offline, such as I am Urmia
\nLake 2, which mobilized huge efforts to prevent the Urmia Lake from completely drying out, Wall of Kindness 3, which
\ncreated spaces (walls) across neighborhoods where citizens would hang unneeded clothes for those in need to take,
\nChanging the Masculine Face of the Parliament 4, a campaign to shine light on the scarcity of women MPs and to get
\nmore women elected to parliament, Girls of Enqelab Street 5, a spontaneous and unorganized women\u2019s protest against
\ncompulsory hijab, etc. These movements pursue a bottom-up model of civil society. A significant characteristic of this new
\ngeneration of activists is their civic courage and audacity, which has successfully torn into the power myths of the past.
\n\u2192 Online and virtual social networks are an important asset for Iranian civil society. Despite the enormous
\ncensorship apparatus of the Islamic Republic, Iranian citizens have been increasingly attracted to social networks and
\nhave been using them to exchange news and information, initiate civic actions, and communicate. Expansion of virtual
\nsocial networks in Iran has given civil activists a unique opportunity to pursue their rightful civic actions. Instagram and
\nTelegram are the two applications and platforms most used by Iranians in general and activists, in particular. Telegram has
\na double significance for activists as it not only serves as the most prominent media channel of blocked or marginalized
\ngroups in society, thus breaking the news monopoly of the regime, but it also connects members of various circles and
\nsocial groups regardless of time and geography. These types of connectivity reinforce civil society and strengthen the
\nfoundation of democracy.<\/p>\n

\u2192 This cumulative growth of social protests such as labor and syndicate protests in Iran in recent years, which has
\nbeen increasing since Rouhani\u2019s inauguration in 2013, is now an undeniable trend in Iranian society. Although many of
\nsuch protests lack organization and proper execution, they indicate a general discontent with authorities as well as the
\ngovernment\u2019s inability to meet its citizens\u2019 social demands. A growing number of sit-ins and gatherings against poverty,
\ndiscrimination, unemployment, and extensive embezzlement and corruption of authorities indicate a general discontent
\nin society, stemming from various groups and different directions.
\n\u2192 Iranian civil society is made up of various actors and players. The intellectual middle class, religious and secular
\nintellectuals, and reformist groups encourage and advocate an expansion of civil society towards a dynamic, democratic,
\nand development-oriented society. On the other hand, restraining forces such as the clergy, anti-modernity intellectuals,
\nleftist and orthodox Marxist-Leninist intellectuals, some of whom have a powerful social base, work hard to undermine
\ncivil society and stir a phobia of civil society.
\n\u2192 Considering the future prospects of civil society and the range of capabilities of Iranian CSOs, their current
\nsituation in Iran, the driving and restricting forces, as well as main trends in civil society, we can predict five possible
\ndifferent scenarios for Iranian civil society by 2020:
\n1. The collapse and dissolution of Iran
\n2. A military takeover of power centers and the formation of a security state
\n3. A continuation of the current situation
\n4. A socio-political and economic reformation
\n5. The collapse of the Islamic regime and transition to a democratic system
\nAccording to activists and thinkers interviewed for this study and opinions collected in two different strategic meetings
\nVolunteer Activists held with activists from Iran in the last two years, scenarios 2, 3 and 4 are more probable than 1
\nand 5.<\/p>\n

Preface<\/span><\/h3>\n

It has now been four decades since civil society organizations entered the socio-political life of Iranian society after the
\n1979 Revolution. Throughout these years, and under the influence of the dominant discourse of each period as well
\nas general conditions of the country, Iranian civil society has seen ebbs and flows. The 2013 Presidential election and
\ninauguration of a new President opened a new window of opportunity for civil society after eight years of suppression
\nand destruction. Social hope is returning to society, and socio-political forces are returning to the social arena. Civil
\nactivists are seeking to resuscitate demolished social networks and reconstruct Iranian civil society. The present study is
\na research project by Volunteer Activists Institute with the aim of recognizing and understanding Iranian civil society in
\nrecent years, its position in Iranian society, its restrictions and challenges, as well as its prospects.
\nVolunteer Activists1 is an independent non-profit, non-governmental, and non-political institute seeking to build capacity
\namong activists and organizations of civil society, facilitating free exchange of knowledge among activists, and advocating
\ndemocracy, human rights, and peace building within Iranian society and communities in the MENA region. This research
\nproject follows the mission statement of the Volunteer Activists Institute, and the findings and recommendations presented
\nhere serve to support the freedom to establish and operate such associations, form international networks for exchange
\nof knowledge and experience, as well as design capacity building programs for Iranian civil society organizations
\n(CSOs). We hope that with the support of global civil society networks as well as Iranian socio-political forces, Iranian
\ncivil activists and CSOs can secure autonomy and the freedom to respond to their stakeholders. We hope that our work
\nhere is helpful for democratization processes in Iranian society.
\n1 www.volunteeractivists.nl\/en<\/p>\n

Table of Contents<\/span><\/h3>\n

Preface
\nExecutive Summary
\nMain Findings of the Research Project
\n1. Methodology and Research Procedure
\nMethodology and Data Collection
\nLimitation of Representation in this Analysis
\nDefining Civil Society<\/p>\n

2. Historical Analysis<\/p>\n

3. Civil Society Main Actors and Builders
\nGovernment
\nCivil Activists and Social Forces
\nPolitical Parties and Groups
\nPrivate Sector
\nUnited Nations\u2019 Agencies in Iran
\nInternational Organizations and Overseas Iranian CSOs<\/p>\n

4. Mapping of Civil Society in Iran
\nTopical Map of CSOs in Iran
\nGeographical diversity map of CSOs
\nSensitiity and risk factor of CSOs in various fields<\/p>\n

5. Situation Analysis of Civil Society in Iran
\nPolitical Environment
\nSocial Environment
\nCultural Environment
\nEconomic Environment
\nInternational Environment<\/p>\n

6. Restrictions of Civil Society in Iran: Freedom and Autonomy of CSOs
\nAutonomy of Civil Society Organizations
\nLegal Criteria
\nFinancial Criteria
\nFreedom to Establish and Operate a Civil Society Organizations
\nField Examples from Restrictions on Establishing and Operation of CSOs
\nLabor Unions and Worker Associations
\nJournalists\u2019 Association
\nTeachers\u2019 Association
\nStudent Associations
\nEnvironmental NGOs
\nWomen NGOs<\/p>\n

7. Driving Forces and Restraining Forces Reshaping Civil Society
\nDriving Forces behind Iranian Civil Society
\nCultural Middle Class
\nJournalists, Bloggers and Social Network Activists
\nCivil Activists and Social Movements
\nReformist Groups and Religious Intellectuals
\nSecular and Democratic Intellectuals and Groups
\nThe Private Sector
\nOverseas Iranian Civil Activists
\nInternational Organizations
\nRestraining Forces Opposing Civil Society In Iran
\nCivil Society Organizations dependent on the Government
\nBureaucracy
\nTraditional Conservative Groups
\nTraditional Conservative Groups
\nIslamic Seminaries and Disciples of Mesbah Yazdi
\nClergy and Friday Prayer Imams
\nAnti-Western Intellectuals and Fardid Circle of Intellectuals
\nOrthodox Leftist Groups
\nTraditional Bazar
\nBasidj Militia
\nSupreme Leader and Dependent Institutions<\/p>\n

8. Influential Trends within and around Civil Society
\nEmergence of a New Generation of Civil Society Activists
\nReification of Social Relations
\nGrowth of Social, Labor and Union Protests
\nExpansion of Civil Society as a Technical Instrumental instead of Civil Society as a Social Force
\nConstant Violation of Freedom of Associations
\nContinuous Citation, Arrest and Imprisonment of Civil Society Activists and \u201cStarred\u201d Students<\/p>\n

9. Strategic Concerns of Civil Society Leaders and Activists
\nTransitioning from a Weakened and Disjointed Civil Society to a Strong and Coherent One
\nCounteracting Government Policy of Building a Quasi-Governmental Civil Society
\nCreating an Appropriate Legal Foundation for Civil Activism and Associational Life
\nEncouraging Peace-Building and Democratization
\nRepresenting Stakeholder Groups and Holding the Government Accountable
\nPromoting Associational Life, Coalition and Online\/Offline Social Networks
\nFostering an Efficient Capacity Building Strategy for Activists and NGOs<\/p>\n

10. Future Scenarios for Civil Society in Iran<\/p>\n

11. Recommendations<\/p>\n

References<\/p>\n

Civil Society in Iran and its Future Prospects<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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