Source: APPRO<\/p>\n
BACKGROUND<\/strong><\/p>\n In June 2005 President Karzai signed the new Law on Non-Governmental Organizations\u00a0(NGOs) to replace the Taliban-era regulation on NGOs. Under the Taliban-era law the many\u00a0private sector contractors delivering services and humanitarian aid were listed as among some\u00a02,400 NGOs. The new law, still pending approval from the Afghan National Assembly but\u00a0remaining in full force and effect, redefines NGOs as non-profit \/ non-commercial entities.<\/p>\n All I\/NGOs had to first qualify and then re-register with the Ministry of Economy from 2005\u00a0onward.\u00a0A wide range of programmes and services are provided by Afghanistan\u2019s estimated 1,500 \u2013\u00a02,000 NGOs. Among these there is a small number of faith-based NGOs. The majority of the\u00a0NGOs are national while the large development and humanitarian programs are implemented\u00a0by long-established international relief and development NGOs, sometimes working with\u00a0smaller Afghan national NGOs. The main services provided by NGOs are in the health,\u00a0education, agriculture, community development, and humanitarian sectors while a very small\u00a0number conduct research and advocacy.\u00a0Progressively, since around 2006, Afghanistan has become more and more dangerous for\u00a0NGOs to operate with an increasing number of casualties from NGO workers, either targeted\u00a0or as collateral victims. The response to these developments by many of the NGOs delivering\u00a0humanitarian aid has been to work more closely with local elders and even negotiating and NGOs have a mixed reputation in Afghanistan. While some are poorly regarded and viewed\u00a0only as fronts to tap into donor aid funding, others are highly valued and offer humanitarian\u00a0and development programmes with a variety of other much-needed services. INGOs\u2019 work in\u00a0Afghanistan since around 2005 has also been associated with the presence of the international\u00a0military forces, resulting in a lack of recognition of their contributions to reconstruction\u00a0since before 2001 and doubts over their future role in the post-2014 period. In Afghanistan\u00a0the general view of I\/NGOs is often so negative that of late a distinction has had to be made\u00a0between I\/NGOs and CSOs to separate for-profit commercial entities from I\/NGOs and CSOs.<\/p>\n The phrase NGO has been used interchangeably by some to describe organizations including\u00a0the UN, private sector companies as well as traditional non-profit aid agencies. This confusion\u00a0has meant that \u201cNGO\u201d is frequently used, erroneously, to describe for-profit commercial\u00a0entities that receive donor funds to implement services, particularly in health and education\u00a0but also in other areas including infrastructure development. CSOs, some of which are also\u00a0registered as NGOs, can be more organic and made up of a wide range of individuals from\u00a0citizenry, operating as non-profit entities. The CSO category includes organizations that provide\u00a0commentary and insight on the development process, conduct research, and undertake\u00a0advocacy aimed at the Government of Afghanistan and the international donor community.
\ngaining permission from Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in the more remote areas. International NGOs with a long presence in Afghanistan are no longer able to reach some of\u00a0the areas where they have been active since the early 1990s. These developments have forcedmany NGOs to stop operations in the most dangerous areas altogether and reduce operations\u00a0in riskier areas, the net result of which has been the deprivation of many communities of\u00a0essential services such as basic health. As early as 2005, a survey of NGOs active in Afghanistan\u00a0reported that 30% of the NGOs had experienced attacks on their staff members. There is strong sentiment among NGOs and observers that a major contributing factor to the\u00a0currently high level of threat toward NGOs is the militarization of aid in Afghanistan. The initial\u00a0ideas and plans to include in military campaigns such approaches as \u201cclear, hold, and stabilize\u201d\u00a0or \u201cwinning hearts and minds\u201d and reliance on the heavily militarized Provincial Reconstruction\u00a0Teams (PRTs) have led to many NGOs being closely associated with the military. Some NGOs,\u00a0due to the need for funds but also because of initial na\u00efvet\u00e9 took funds from and interacted\u00a0with military and other staff in PRTs. With the military coming increasingly under attack by AOGs\u00a0and disliked by vast swathes of the population, it is inevitable that NGOs \u2013 and Afghans working\u00a0for them \u2013 are increasingly looked upon unfavorably if they are perceived to have had a close\u00a0association with the military.<\/p>\n
\nThe concern about the perceived loss of independence in activities and approach of NGOs\u00a0has been a topic of debate between civil society and humanitarian aid organizations on the\u00a0one hand and the NATO mission in Afghanistan on the other. A statement by Anders Fogh\u00a0Rasmussen, the NATO Secretary General in 2010, on NGOs being the \u201csoft power\u201d side\u00a0of foreign intervention in Afghanistan led to a fierce rebuttal by over one hundred largely\u00a0international NGOs who wished to disclaim the suggested linkages by Rasmussen between\u00a0the military and NGOs. The ground for concern by the NGOs was that such statements by\u00a0NATO and other military entities would only contribute to the already existing confusion\u00a0about the role of NGOs and \u201cputs at risk\u00a0the lives of civilians affected by conflict and\u00a0those delivering assistance to the people\u00a0of Afghanistan.\u201d<\/p>\n