{"id":956,"date":"2013-08-16T08:13:08","date_gmt":"2013-08-16T08:13:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/?p=956"},"modified":"2013-08-17T08:26:58","modified_gmt":"2013-08-17T08:26:58","slug":"afghanistans-parties-in-transition","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/2013\/08\/afghanistans-parties-in-transition\/","title":{"rendered":"Afghanistan\u2019s Parties in Transition"},"content":{"rendered":"

International Crisis Group Asia Briefing N\u00b0141, Kabul\/Brussels, 26 June 2013<\/strong><\/p>\n

Afghanistan\u2019s political parties must exercise restraint as they jostle for power in the final months of President Karzai\u2019s mandate. For its part, the outgoing administration should also resist calls to excessively regulate the parties. A commitment to pluralism, by all players, is key to the legitimacy of Kabul politics \u2013 and an important advantage against armed insurgents.<\/p>\n

OVERWIEW<\/strong><\/p>\n

Political parties are developing slowly in Afghanistan, discouraged by electoral laws
\nand fragmented ethnic politics, but starting to shed their legacy as armed groups.
\nTheir newfound legitimacy will face its most serious challenge during the 2014 presidential
\nelection and 2015 parliamentary polls, as parties scramble to ensure their place
\nin the new order that will follow the end of President Hamid Karzai\u2019s constitutional
\nmandate. Many obstacles remain, as the outgoing government threatens to revoke the
\nlicences of many, if not all, political parties, and introduce tough regulations on political
\nparty activity. The jostling for power could inflict lasting damage on the political
\nsystem, because the government\u2019s effort to curtail the number of parties, while a popular
\nmeasure among many Afghans, could shut out moderate political movements and
\nemerging youth organisations, leaving voters with limited choices among only the
\nbiggest of the tanzims, or former mujahidin parties. For its part, the international
\ncommunity should condition financial assistance on further government efforts to
\npromote multiparty politics.
\nSome parties with roots as northern militias are preparing to rally their supporters
\nfor street demonstrations that could turn violent. This comes as all the major political
\nplayers are leveraging pre-election displays of strength in negotiations over slates of
\npresidential and vice presidential candidates. Major opposition players, including traditional
\nrivals such as Junbish-i-Meli-Islami, Hizb-e Islami and the Jamiat-i Islami factions
\n\u2013 leading representatives of the Uzbek, Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups, respectively
\n\u2013 are showing unprecedented unity in their calls for electoral reform. However,
\ntheir activism, albeit for commendable goals, could lead to further destabilisation in
\nthe transition period.
\nIndeed, any profound disruption in Kabul politics would leave an opening for the
\narmed insurgency. Failure to see an understanding emerge between the Palace, parliament,
\npolitical parties and civil society on remaining electoral reform issues or
\nanother veto of the reform law approved by parliament would undermine hopes for a
\nstable transition and play even more directly into the hands of the insurgency. Irrespective
\nof political parties\u2019 technical progress, if there is again manipulation in the
\nmanner of the 2009 and 2010 elections, the 2014 winner may lack the credibility
\nand legitimacy the new era will require.
\nFor their part, the Taliban do not seem prepared to launch a political party. Despite
\nrecent announcements to the contrary from ex-Taliban figures and the successful
\nentry of another armed opposition group, Hizb-e Islami, into mainstream politics,
\nthe insurgents\u2019 primary mode of political expression in the near future will remain
\nfighting, not party politics. Nor does the opening of a political office in Doha offer
\nany likelihood of a change in Taliban strategy in relation to entering politics. The
\noverall implications for the coming elections \u2013 good or bad \u2013 remain unclear.
\nThis briefing builds on earlier Crisis Group reporting on Afghanistan\u2019s political
\nparties to provide an overview of their current position and analyse their ability and
\nwillingness to shape the transition to the post-Karzai era, after a decade of government
\nefforts to restrict political party functioning. It is based on interviews with political
\nparty and other stakeholders in Kabul and four regional centres of Mazar-i-Sharif,
\nHerat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Without undertaking a detailed assessment of the
\ninsurgency, the briefing also includes interviews with insurgents to assess Taliban
\nattitudes toward the party system. Its findings include the need for:
\n\uf071 Greater transparency in the implementation of laws and regulations on political
\nparties to improve perceptions of impartiality.
\n\uf071 Greater independence of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral
\nComplaints Commission (ECC), and consultation with parties to achieve an
\naccord on electoral laws and a more transparent electoral process.
\n\uf071 Kabul\u2019s support for pluralistic political development by providing funds for basic
\nfunctions of parties that meet a threshold of popular support in elections.
\n\uf071 Deferring implementation of the requirement, in the 2012 political party regulations,
\nthat parties maintain offices in at least twenty provinces. Additional time
\nmay be required for parties to establish themselves, and for security conditions to
\nallow party offices in remote provinces. The deferral period should at minimum
\nextend beyond the 2014 presidential and 2015 parliamentary elections. If the requirement
\nis not deferred, Afghan security forces should offer physical security
\nfor party facilities where requested by party leaders.
\n\uf071 Support by donor countries and the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for these
\nreforms, including conditioning continued economic and military assistance in
\nthe coming years on credible electoral reforms that allow for political pluralism.<\/p>\n

READ FULL REPORT HERE<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

International Crisis Group Asia Briefing N\u00b0141, Kabul\/Brussels, 26 June 2013 Afghanistan\u2019s political parties must exercise restraint as they jostle for power in the final months of President Karzai\u2019s mandate. For its part, the outgoing administration […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,19,90,43,50,122,48],"tags":[144],"class_list":["post-956","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-afghanistan","category-citizens-and-civil-society","category-editor-selection","category-human-rights-online-library","category-political-civil-economic-social-and-cultural-rights","category-politics","category-war-and-peace","tag-election","country-afghanistan","Documents-statements-multimedia"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/956","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=956"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/956\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":960,"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/956\/revisions\/960"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=956"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=956"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/openasia.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=956"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}