International Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°141, Kabul/Brussels, 26 June 2013
Afghanistan’s political parties must exercise restraint as they jostle for power in the final months of President Karzai’s mandate. For its part, the outgoing administration should also resist calls to excessively regulate the parties. A commitment to pluralism, by all players, is key to the legitimacy of Kabul politics – and an important advantage against armed insurgents.
OVERWIEW
Political parties are developing slowly in Afghanistan, discouraged by electoral laws
and fragmented ethnic politics, but starting to shed their legacy as armed groups.
Their newfound legitimacy will face its most serious challenge during the 2014 presidential
election and 2015 parliamentary polls, as parties scramble to ensure their place
in the new order that will follow the end of President Hamid Karzai’s constitutional
mandate. Many obstacles remain, as the outgoing government threatens to revoke the
licences of many, if not all, political parties, and introduce tough regulations on political
party activity. The jostling for power could inflict lasting damage on the political
system, because the government’s effort to curtail the number of parties, while a popular
measure among many Afghans, could shut out moderate political movements and
emerging youth organisations, leaving voters with limited choices among only the
biggest of the tanzims, or former mujahidin parties. For its part, the international
community should condition financial assistance on further government efforts to
promote multiparty politics.
Some parties with roots as northern militias are preparing to rally their supporters
for street demonstrations that could turn violent. This comes as all the major political
players are leveraging pre-election displays of strength in negotiations over slates of
presidential and vice presidential candidates. Major opposition players, including traditional
rivals such as Junbish-i-Meli-Islami, Hizb-e Islami and the Jamiat-i Islami factions
– leading representatives of the Uzbek, Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups, respectively
– are showing unprecedented unity in their calls for electoral reform. However,
their activism, albeit for commendable goals, could lead to further destabilisation in
the transition period.
Indeed, any profound disruption in Kabul politics would leave an opening for the
armed insurgency. Failure to see an understanding emerge between the Palace, parliament,
political parties and civil society on remaining electoral reform issues or
another veto of the reform law approved by parliament would undermine hopes for a
stable transition and play even more directly into the hands of the insurgency. Irrespective
of political parties’ technical progress, if there is again manipulation in the
manner of the 2009 and 2010 elections, the 2014 winner may lack the credibility
and legitimacy the new era will require.
For their part, the Taliban do not seem prepared to launch a political party. Despite
recent announcements to the contrary from ex-Taliban figures and the successful
entry of another armed opposition group, Hizb-e Islami, into mainstream politics,
the insurgents’ primary mode of political expression in the near future will remain
fighting, not party politics. Nor does the opening of a political office in Doha offer
any likelihood of a change in Taliban strategy in relation to entering politics. The
overall implications for the coming elections – good or bad – remain unclear.
This briefing builds on earlier Crisis Group reporting on Afghanistan’s political
parties to provide an overview of their current position and analyse their ability and
willingness to shape the transition to the post-Karzai era, after a decade of government
efforts to restrict political party functioning. It is based on interviews with political
party and other stakeholders in Kabul and four regional centres of Mazar-i-Sharif,
Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Without undertaking a detailed assessment of the
insurgency, the briefing also includes interviews with insurgents to assess Taliban
attitudes toward the party system. Its findings include the need for:
Greater transparency in the implementation of laws and regulations on political
parties to improve perceptions of impartiality.
Greater independence of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC), and consultation with parties to achieve an
accord on electoral laws and a more transparent electoral process.
Kabul’s support for pluralistic political development by providing funds for basic
functions of parties that meet a threshold of popular support in elections.
Deferring implementation of the requirement, in the 2012 political party regulations,
that parties maintain offices in at least twenty provinces. Additional time
may be required for parties to establish themselves, and for security conditions to
allow party offices in remote provinces. The deferral period should at minimum
extend beyond the 2014 presidential and 2015 parliamentary elections. If the requirement
is not deferred, Afghan security forces should offer physical security
for party facilities where requested by party leaders.
Support by donor countries and the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for these
reforms, including conditioning continued economic and military assistance in
the coming years on credible electoral reforms that allow for political pluralism.
